Deryck Beyleveld – författare

The concept of human dignity is increasingly invoked in bioethical debate and, indeed, in international instruments concerned with biotechnology and biomedicine. While some commentators consider appeals to human dignity to be little more than rhetoric and not worthy of serious consideration, the authors of this groundbreaking new study give such appeals distinct and defensible meaning through an application of the moral theory of Alan Gewirth.In Part One, the book seeks to bring human dignity more clearly into focus. It sketches two opposed conceptions, 'human dignity as empowerment', which treats human rights as based on the intrinsic dignity of humans, identified with individual autonomy, and 'human dignity as constraint', which acts as an umbrella for a number of duty-driven approaches. While viewing human dignity primarily as empowerment, the authors argue that it is not autonomy as such, but vulnerable agency around which dignity as the basis of human rights is to be analyzed. Alongside this, they develop the idea of dignity as a virtue, specifically as a practical attitude to be cultivated in the face of human finitude and vulnerability. At its sharpest, dignity as a virtue indicates the aspirational path of responsible and rational agency in the context of the existential anxiety that is part and parcel of the human condition. During this analysis they pay particular attention to the similarities and differences between Kantian and Gewirthian theory.In Part Two, the authors apply their analysis of dignity as generating rights and responsibilities to a range of activities (such as pre-natal selection, commodification of the human body, cloning, and euthanasia) running from birth with dignity through to death with dignity, and subject the use of 'human dignity' in existing regulatory frameworks to critical scrutiny.

Alan Gewirth's Reason and Morality, in which he set forth the Principle of Generic Consistency, is a major work of modern ethical theory that, though much debated and highly respected, has yet to gain full acceptance. Deryck Beyleveld contends that this resistance stems from misunderstanding of the method and logical operations of Gewirth's central argument. In this book Beyleveld seeks to remedy this deficiency. His rigorous reconstruction of Gewirth's argument gives its various parts their most compelling formulation and clarifies its essential logical structure. Beyleveld then classifies all the criticisms that Gewirth's argument has received and measures them against his reconstruction of the argument. The overall result is an immensely rich picture of the argument, in which all of its complex issues and key moves are clearly displayed and its validity can finally be discerned. The comprehensiveness of Beyleveld's treatment provides ready access to the entire debate surrounding the foundational argument of Reason and Morality. It will be required reading for all who are interested in Gewirth's theory and deontological ethics and will be of central importance to moral and legal theorists.

Alan Gewirth's Reason and Morality, in which he set forth the Principle of Generic Consistency, is a major work of modern ethical theory that, though much debated and highly respected, has yet to gain full acceptance. Deryck Beyleveld contends that this resistance stems from misunderstanding of the method and logical operations of Gewirth's central argument. In this book Beyleveld seeks to remedy this deficiency. His rigorous reconstruction of Gewirth's argument gives its various parts their most compelling formulation and clarifies its essential logical structure. Beyleveld then classifies all the criticisms that Gewirth's argument has received and measures them against his reconstruction of the argument. The overall result is an immensely rich picture of the argument, in which all of its complex issues and key moves are clearly displayed and its validity can finally be discerned. The comprehensiveness of Beyleveld's treatment provides ready access to the entire debate surrounding the foundational argument of Reason and Morality. It will be required reading for all who are interested in Gewirth's theory and deontological ethics and will be of central importance to moral and legal theorists.

This title was first published in 2000: This third volume of proceedings of the European Network for Biomedical Ethics focuses on the ethical issues surrounding the debates on reproductive medicine and genetics in human procreation. Central issues include procreation and parenthood, moral protection of the human embryo and foetus, autonomy and recognition, social implications, moral reasoning in applied ethics, legal regulations of assisted procreation, genetic diagnosis and gene therapy. The legal regulation paper evaluates the central laws and guidelines of European countries.

This title was first published in 2000: This third volume of proceedings of the European Network for Biomedical Ethics focuses on the ethical issues surrounding the debates on reproductive medicine and genetics in human procreation. Central issues include procreation and parenthood, moral protection of the human embryo and foetus, autonomy and recognition, social implications, moral reasoning in applied ethics, legal regulations of assisted procreation, genetic diagnosis and gene therapy. The legal regulation paper evaluates the central laws and guidelines of European countries.

This timely Research Handbook examines the key challenges for the governance of biomedicine and the life sciences. It explores the impact of significant political, technological and ecological developments on international governance and considers ethics in times of global crisis.Leading experts discuss the ways in which digitalization and AI have disrupted communication and knowledge infrastructure, while highlighting the threats posed by climate change and biodiversity loss to ecological stability. They investigate how the system of governance by law has been challenged by the erosion of public spaces and democratic political systems, while regulatory tools such as ethics committees, participatory structures and self-regulation are unprepared for emerging issues. The Research Handbook demonstrates the importance of developing novel methodological tools to interpret these problems within the field of bioethics. It further proposes a roadmap for future research and practice, outlining how the life sciences can provide new possibilities for human health and well-being.Scholars and students of law and society, legal philosophy and legal theory will greatly benefit from this illuminating Research Handbook. It is also a useful resource for those studying bioethics, moral philosophy and the social sciences.

This book is the result of a long-term comparative research project on intellectual property, with topics ranging from patents to copyright, examined across 16 jurisdictions. It does not aim at commenting on current policy issues. The country reports unearth the culturally, morally and historically imprinted thought patterns across Europe which underpin current discussions on the appropriation of information, and which do not change quickly. The research results question the common narratives of the distinctiveness of private and public law, of contracts and property, and of morality and the law.The point of departure is the public good character of information, with the focus being on public interests pursued when assigning information as property. The 14 selected cases, based on recent, and in some cases futuristic when the project began in 2001, scenarios, aim to identify how boundaries to information property emerge, the areas of law that are applied and the principles that are followed in order to balance the conflicting interests at stake. The issues discussed revolve around well-known interfaces such as IP and competition law, monetary interests versus personal interests in human genome data, individual freedoms-to-operate versus collective action models as found in basic research or ‘creative commons’. The book shows how some national discussions appear similar on the surface, in terms of resorting to parallel principles, but subsequent domestic policy answers vary greatly. Even legislation which aims at harmonisation may result into more diversity. Inversely, we found legal institutions applied which install contrasting legal rules which however aim at exactly the same behavioural change.The national reports in Part III are complemented by comparative analyses by the editors, whilst the chapters in Part II are dedicated to an analysis of the submissions from a theoretical point of view, departing from the editors’ own research interests. The chapter in Part I describes the overall ‘Common Core’ research method, which splits the national reports into operative, descriptive and metalegal formants.Boundaries of Information Property is aimed at researchers in IP and practitioners interested in the foundational theory of their subject. It is an inspiring read for those interested in the deeper structures of regulating information.With a foreword by Sjef van Erp (em. University of Maastricht) and contributions by Christine Godt (Carl von Ossietzky University of Oldenburg), Geertrui Van Overwalle (University of Leuven), Lucie Guibault (Dalhousie University), Deryck Beyleveld (University of Durham), Mike Adcock (University of Durham), Ramūnas Birštonas (Vilnius University), Maja Bogataj Jančič (Intellectual Property Institute, Ljubljana), Konstantinos Christodoulou (University of Athens), Teresa Franquet Sugrañes (University Rovira i Virgili), Pablo Garrido Pérez (University of Barcelona), Christophe Geiger (Luiss Guido Carli University), Silvia Gómez Trinidad (University of Barcelona), Mariona Gual Dalmau (University of Barcelona), Aleksei Kelli (University of Tartu), Tomaž Keresteš (University of Maribor), Maja Lubarda (Lawyer, Ljubljana), Thomas Margoni (University of Leuven), Jan Mates (Attorney-at-Law, Prague), Maureen O’Sullivan (NUI Galway), Andrea Pradi (University of Trento), Martina Repas (University of Maribor), Giorgio Resta (University of Rome 3), Ole-Andreas Rognstad (University of Oslo), Cristina Roy Pérez (University of Barcelona), Jens Schovsbo (University of Copenhagen), Agnes Schreiner (University of Amsterdam), Simone Schroff (Plymouth University), Tobias Schulte in den Bäumen (Hapag-Llyod, Hamburg), Simona Štrancar (University of Maribor), Tomasz Targosz (Jagiellonian University), Elżbieta Traple (Jagiellonian University), and Gabriele Venskaityte (European Commission, Brussels).

In a community that takes rights seriously, consent features pervasively in both moral and legal discourse as a justifying reason: stated simply, where there is consent, there can be no complaint. However, without a clear appreciation of the nature of a consent-based justification, its integrity, both in principle and in practice, is liable to be compromised. This book examines the role of consent as a procedural justification, discussing the prerequisites for an adequate consent -- in particular, that an agent with the relevant capacity has made an unforced and informed choice, that the consent has been clearly signalled, and that the scope of the authorisation covers the act in question. It goes on to highlight both the Fallacy of Necessity (where there is no consent, there must be a wrong) and the Fallacy of Sufficiency (where there is consent, there cannot be a wrong). Finally, the extent to which the authority of law itself rests on consent is considered.If the familiarity of consent-based justification engenders confusion and contempt, the analysis in this book acts as a corrective, identifying a range of abusive or misguided practices that variously under-value or over-value consent, that fictionalise it or that are fixated by it, and that treat it too casually or too cautiously. In short, the analysis in Consent in the Law points the way towards recognising an important procedural justification for precisely what it is as well as giving it a more coherent application.

This volume collects six original essays by internationally respected researchers who have devoted themselves to the study of legal obligation. It brings together works that innovatively address key dimensions of the current debates concerning legal obligation from different and, in some cases, even opposing theoretical perspectives. As a result, the collection offers a comprehensive discussion of legal obligation that promises to significantly advance our understanding of the obligatory dimension of law. What specifically connects the contributions gathered here is one common thread: coming to terms with a notion – legal obligation – that is of both practical and theoretical importance. On the one hand, it is widely regarded as a fundamental legal concept by legal practitioners and laypeople alike, as not only judges, prosecutors, lawyers, and juries but also ordinary citizens make extensive use of obligation-related terms and discourses. On the other hand, the notion of legal obligation is of paramount significance for the theory of law. Indeed, even legal theorists who, quite understandably, refuse to reduce the law to a mere obligation-imposing device and opt instead for a view in which the normative dimension of the law also encompasses powers, rights, permissions, privileges and immunities, duly acknowledge the centrality of legal obligation for the understanding and conceptualisation of law. Hence the importance of the treatments presented in this volume.

This volume collects six original essays by internationally respected researchers who have devoted themselves to the study of legal obligation. It brings together works that innovatively address key dimensions of the current debates concerning legal obligation from different and, in some cases, even opposing theoretical perspectives. As a result, the collection offers a comprehensive discussion of legal obligation that promises to significantly advance our understanding of the obligatory dimension of law. What specifically connects the contributions gathered here is one common thread: coming to terms with a notion – legal obligation – that is of both practical and theoretical importance. On the one hand, it is widely regarded as a fundamental legal concept by legal practitioners and laypeople alike, as not only judges, prosecutors, lawyers, and juries but also ordinary citizens make extensive use of obligation-related terms and discourses. On the other hand, the notion of legal obligation is of paramount significance for the theory of law. Indeed, even legal theorists who, quite understandably, refuse to reduce the law to a mere obligation-imposing device and opt instead for a view in which the normative dimension of the law also encompasses powers, rights, permissions, privileges and immunities, duly acknowledge the centrality of legal obligation for the understanding and conceptualisation of law. Hence the importance of the treatments presented in this volume.

This book presents a comprehensive analysis of Kant’s justification of the categorical imperative. The book contests the standard interpretation of Kant’s views by arguing that he never abandoned his view about this as expressed in his Groundwork. It is distinctive in the way in which it places Kant’s argument in the context of his transcendental philosophy as a whole, which is essential to understand it as an argument from within human agential self-understanding. The book reviews that existing literature, then presents a logical construction of Kant’s argument, which it defends by examining what Kant has to say about synthetic a priori practical propositions in the context of his transcendental philosophy as a whole, and by a detailed examination of how he presents his argument in the Second Critique and the Groundwork. Particular attention is given to the views of two scholars who share many of the views expressed in this book: Klaus Steigleder and Michael Wolff. Special attention is also given to the views of Owen Ware, who, while sharing many of our arguments has a very different overall view. The concluding chapter provides a statement about the validity of Kant’s argument.