Rach Cosker-Rowland – författare

Fittingness explores the nature, roles, and applications of the notion of fittingness in contemporary normative and metanormative philosophy. The fittingness relation is the relation in which a response stands to a feature of the world when that feature merits, or is worthy of, that response. In the late nineteenth to mid-twentieth century, this notion of fittingness played a prominent role in the theories of the period's most influential ethical theorists, and in recent years it has regained prominence, promising to enrich the theoretical resources of contemporary theorists working in the philosophy of normativity.This volume is the first central discussion of the notion of fit to date. It is composed of seventeen new essays covering a range of topics including the nature and epistemology of fittingness, the relation between fittingness and reasons, the normativity of fittingness, fittingness and value theory, and the role of fittingness in theorizing about responsibility. In addition to making important contributions to the debates in the philosophy of normativity with which they're concerned, the essays in the volume support the hypothesis that the notion of fittingness has great theoretical utility in investigating a range of normative matters, across a variety of domains.

Many have been attracted to the idea that for something to be good there just have to be reasons to favour it. This view has come to be known as the buck-passing account of value. According to this account, for pleasure to be good there need to be reasons for us to desire and pursue it. Likewise for liberty and equality to be values there have to be reasons for us to promote and preserve them. Extensive discussion has focussed on some of the problems that the buck-passing account faces, such as the 'wrong kind of reason' problem. Less attention, however, has been paid as to why we should accept the buck-passing account or what the theoretical pay-offs and other implications of accepting it are. The Normative and the Evaluative provides the first comprehensive motivation and defence of the buck-passing account of value. Rach Cosker-Rowland argues that the buck-passing account explains several important features of the relationship between reasons and value, as well as the relationship between the different varieties of value, in a way that its competitors do not. She shows that alternatives to the buck-passing account are inconsistent with important views in normative ethics, uninformative, and at odds with the way in which we should see practical and epistemic normativity as related. In addition, she extends the buck-passing account to provide an account of moral properties as well as all other normative and deontic properties and concepts, such as fittingness and 'ought', in terms of reasons.

Gender Identity: What It Is and Why It Matters is the first book in philosophy to focus on gender identity and transgender rights. To be trans is to have a gender identity different from the gender you were assigned at birth. But what is it to have a gender identity? In the first part of the book, Rach Cosker-Rowland develops a new account of our gender identities as the genders that seem to best fit us. Supported by trans testimony, this subjective fit account explains why gender identities deserve respect, discusses how we can discover our gender identity, and argues for why this is practically important. It also provides an overview of cis and trans, and non-binary and binary, gender identities.In the second part of the book, a new view of trans rights to gender marker change, legal gender recognition, gender-affirming healthcare, and sporting participation and participation is developed. Cosker-Rowland presents an integrity-based account, showing how these trans rights arise from basic liberal rights to live with integrity, to live in line with your judgements of how you ought to live, and what a good or meaningful life for you involves. Rights to live with integrity ground basic liberal rights to freedom of religious belief and expression; this book argues that they also ground trans rights. Finally, Cosker-Rowland addresses a wide range of gender-critical feminist philosophers' views against trans rights and shows that these arguments fail.

Disagreement is one of the deepest and most pervasive topics in philosophy; arguably its very bedrock, and is an ever-increasing feature of politics, ethics, public policy, science and many other areas. Despite the omnipresence of disagreement, the topic itself has received relatively little sustained examination.This outstanding handbook examines the philosophy of disagreement and how it extends to debates in public policy and science. Comprising 41 chapters by an international team of highly distinguished contributors, the Handbook is divided into six clear parts:Philosophy of DisagreementEpistemology of DisagreementDisagreement in ScienceMoral DisagreementPolitical DisagreementDisagreement and Public PolicyWithin these sections key topics are examined, including skepticism, truth, pluralism, feminist philosophy, philosophy of religion, epistemology of peer disagreement, ethics, metaethics, political philosophy, rationality, intellectual virtues, relativism, realism, instrumentalism, and scientific method.Ideal for those studying and researching philosophy and especially epistemology, ethics and philosophy of science, The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Disagreement will also be of interest to those in related disciplines such as politics, social policy and law.

Comparisons between morality and other ‘companion’ disciplines – such as mathematics, religion, or aesthetics – are commonly used in philosophy, often in the context of arguing for the objectivity of morality. This is known as the ‘companions in guilt’ strategy. It has been the subject of much debate in contemporary ethics and metaethics.This volume, the first full length examination of companions in guilt arguments, comprises an introduction by the editors and a dozen new chapters by leading authors in the field. They examine the methodology of companions in guilt arguments and their use in responding to the moral error theory, as well as specific arguments that take mathematics, epistemic norms, or aesthetics as a ‘companion’, and the use of the companions in guilt strategy to vindicate claims to moral knowledge.Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics is essential reading for advanced students and researchers working in moral theory and metaethics, as well as those in epistemology and philosophy of mathematics concerned with the intersection of these subjects with ethics.

Comparisons between morality and other ‘companion’ disciplines – such as mathematics, religion, or aesthetics – are commonly used in philosophy, often in the context of arguing for the objectivity of morality. This is known as the ‘companions in guilt’ strategy. It has been the subject of much debate in contemporary ethics and metaethics.This volume, the first full length examination of companions in guilt arguments, comprises an introduction by the editors and a dozen new chapters by leading authors in the field. They examine the methodology of companions in guilt arguments and their use in responding to the moral error theory, as well as specific arguments that take mathematics, epistemic norms, or aesthetics as a ‘companion’, and the use of the companions in guilt strategy to vindicate claims to moral knowledge.Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics is essential reading for advanced students and researchers working in moral theory and metaethics, as well as those in epistemology and philosophy of mathematics concerned with the intersection of these subjects with ethics.

Widespread moral disagreement raises ethical, epistemological, political, and metaethical questions. Is the best explanation of our widespread moral disagreements that there are no objective moral facts and that moral relativism is correct? Or should we think that just as there is widespread disagreement about whether we have free will but there is still an objective fact about whether we have it, similarly, moral disagreement has no bearing on whether morality is objective? More practically, is it arrogant to stick to our guns in the face of moral disagreement? Must we suspend belief about the morality of controversial actions such as eating meat and having an abortion? And does moral disagreement affect the laws that we should have? For instance, does disagreement about the justice of heavily redistributive taxation affect whether such taxation is legitimate?In this thorough and clearly written introduction to moral disagreement and its philosophical and practical implications, Rach Cosker-Rowland examines and assesses the following topics and questions:How does moral disagreement affect what we should do and believe in our day-to-day lives?Epistemic peerhood and moral disagreements with our epistemic peersMetaethics and moral disagreementRelativism, moral objectivity, moral realism, and non-cognitivismMoral disagreement and normative ethicsLiberalism, democracy, and disagreementMoral compromiseMoral uncertainty.Combining clear philosophical analysis with summaries of the latest research and suggestions for further reading, Moral Disagreement is ideal for students of ethics, metaethics, political philosophy, and philosophical topics that are closely related such as relativism and scepticism. It will also be of interest to those in related disciplines such as ethics and public policy and philosophy of law.