Rach Cosker-Rowland is Research Fellow in Moral Philosophy at the Australian Catholic University. She obtained their PhD from the University of Reading in 2014. Before coming to ACU in Melbourne, she held temporary positions at the University of Oxford and the University of Warwick, and a permanent position at La Trobe University. Rowlands has published articles on topics in ethics and metaethics including moral disagreement, the moral error theory, the relationship between practical and epistemic normativity, as well as the relationship between reasons and value in journals including Noûs, Ethics, Analysis, Philosophical Studies, and Philosophical Quarterly.

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• 1: Introduction 2: The Value-First Account and First-Order Neutrality 3: The Value-First Account and the Unity of the Normative 4: The Buck-Passing Account and The No-Priority View 5: Reasons as The Unity among the Varieties of Goodness 6: Too Much Value? 7: Too Little Value? 8: Not Sufficiently Neutral? 9: Other Evaluative Concepts and Properties 10: A Buck-Passing Account of Morality 11: Reasons First

Rach Cosker-Rowland is Research Fellow in Moral Philosophy at the Australian Catholic University. She obtained their PhD from the University of Reading in 2014. Before coming to ACU in Melbourne, she held temporary positions at the University of Oxford and the University of Warwick, and a permanent position at La Trobe University. Rowlands has published articles on topics in ethics and metaethics including moral disagreement, the moral error theory, the relationship between practical and epistemic normativity, as well as the relationship between reasons and value in journals including Noûs, Ethics, Analysis, Philosophical Studies, and Philosophical Quarterly.

Select Guide Rating

• 1: Introduction 2: The Value-First Account and First-Order Neutrality 3: The Value-First Account and the Unity of the Normative 4: The Buck-Passing Account and The No-Priority View 5: Reasons as The Unity among the Varieties of Goodness 6: Too Much Value? 7: Too Little Value? 8: Not Sufficiently Neutral? 9: Other Evaluative Concepts and Properties 10: A Buck-Passing Account of Morality 11: Reasons First

Rach Cosker-Rowland is Research Fellow in Moral Philosophy at the Australian Catholic University. She obtained their PhD from the University of Reading in 2014. Before coming to ACU in Melbourne, she held temporary positions at the University of Oxford and the University of Warwick, and a permanent position at La Trobe University. Rowlands has published articles on topics in ethics and metaethics including moral disagreement, the moral error theory, the relationship between practical and epistemic normativity, as well as the relationship between reasons and value in journals including Noûs, Ethics, Analysis, Philosophical Studies, and Philosophical Quarterly.

Select Guide Rating

• 1: Introduction 2: The Value-First Account and First-Order Neutrality 3: The Value-First Account and the Unity of the Normative 4: The Buck-Passing Account and The No-Priority View 5: Reasons as The Unity among the Varieties of Goodness 6: Too Much Value? 7: Too Little Value? 8: Not Sufficiently Neutral? 9: Other Evaluative Concepts and Properties 10: A Buck-Passing Account of Morality 11: Reasons First