Wulf Gaertner – författare

Wulf Gaertner provides a comprehensive account of an important and complex issue within social choice theory: how to establish a social welfare function while restricting the spectrum of individual preferences in a sensible way. Gaertner's starting point is K. J. Arrow's famous 'Impossibility Theorem', which showed that no welfare function could exist if an unrestricted domain of preferences is to be satisfied together with some other appealing conditions. A number of leading economists have tried to provide avenues out of this 'impossibility' by restricting the variety of preferences: here, Gaertner provides a clear and detailed account, using standardized mathematical notation, of well over forty theorems associated with domain conditions. Domain Conditions in Social Choice Theory will be an essential addition to the library of social choice theory for scholars and their advanced graduate students.

Wulf Gaertner provides a comprehensive account of an important and complex issue within social choice theory: how to establish a social welfare function while restricting the spectrum of individual preferences in a sensible way. Gaertner's starting point is K. J. Arrow's famous 'Impossibility Theorem', which showed that no welfare function could exist if an unrestricted domain of preferences is to be satisfied together with some other appealing conditions. A number of leading economists have tried to provide avenues out of this 'impossibility' by restricting the variety of preferences: here, Gaertner provides a clear and detailed account, using standardized mathematical notation, of well over forty theorems associated with domain conditions. Domain Conditions in Social Choice Theory will be an essential addition to the library of social choice theory for scholars and their advanced graduate students.

Since Aristotle, many different theories of distributive justice have been proposed, by philosophers as well as social scientists. The typical approach within social choice theory is to assess these theories in an axiomatic way - most of the time the reader is confronted with abstract reasoning and logical deductions. This book shows that empirical insights are necessary if one wants to apply any theory of justice in the real world. It does so by confronting the main theories of distributive justice with data from (mostly) questionnaire experiments. The book starts with an extensive discussion on why empirical social choice makes sense and how it should be done. It then presents various experimental results relating to theories of distributive justice, including the Rawlsian equity axiom, Harsanyi's version of utilitarianism, utilitarianism with a floor, responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism, the claims problem and fairness in health.

It is probably fair to say that there does not exist a unique and generally accepted not ion of justice. Even if one confines oneself to economic justice one can still get many answers to the question of how justice - henceforth we shall use the term "distributive justice" ­ should be defined and characterized. This may be disappointing for the outside observer but one can also view this as achallenge, at least as long as one thinks that distributive justice is an issue economics should be concerned with. Many problems of distributive justice can be described as follows: There is a fixed collection of well-defined objects (usually commodi­ ties) which are quantitatively measurable and perfectly divisible. This collection is to be divided up among a certain number of individuals, the members of society, let 's say. According to which principles or rules should this distribution be carried out? Should people be rewarded according to their ability or according to their needs? Should the distribution be such that nobody envies the bundle of any other member of society? Should the collection of entities be distributed in a way that yields the greatest benefi.

From May 20 to May 24, 1986 a conference on distributive justice and in­ equality was held at the Institute for Advanced Study Berlin (Wis­ senschaftskolleg zu Berlin). More than thirty scholars participated in this conference. The topics of the presentations ranged from ethics, welfare economics and social choice theory to characterizations of inequality meas­ ures and redistributive taxation schemes. This book contains a selection of the papers given at the conference. This collection of articles also appeared as issues 2 and 3 of volume 5 of Social Choice and Welfare. In the first paper P. Suppes argues for a pluralistic concept of equity. For too long the emphasis has been on income distribution but there are other characteristics which are important when one talks about equity. Suppes suggests that it would be desirable to have Lorenz curves for a variety of fea­ tures of societies, such as education, health and housing. P. Dasgupta studies the quality of lives in terms of an index of living stand­ ards. One has to distinguish between "same number choices" (the number of lives is given) and "different numbers choices" (problem of optimum popUlation). The author argues that in the latter case the anonymity (or sym­ metry) axiom cannot be readily defended. Once it is dropped, however, an incoherence in the moral ordering of possible worlds arises. The moral basis for different numbers choices becomes generation-dependent, an overall moral ordering of possible worlds no longer exists.

From May 20 to May 24, 1986 a conference on distributive justice and in­ equality was held at the Institute for Advanced Study Berlin (Wis­ senschaftskolleg zu Berlin). More than thirty scholars participated in this conference. The topics of the presentations ranged from ethics, welfare economics and social choice theory to characterizations of inequality meas­ ures and redistributive taxation schemes. This book contains a selection of the papers given at the conference. This collection of articles also appeared as issues 2 and 3 of volume 5 of Social Choice and Welfare. In the first paper P. Suppes argues for a pluralistic concept of equity. For too long the emphasis has been on income distribution but there are other characteristics which are important when one talks about equity. Suppes suggests that it would be desirable to have Lorenz curves for a variety of fea­ tures of societies, such as education, health and housing. P. Dasgupta studies the quality of lives in terms of an index of living stand­ ards. One has to distinguish between "same number choices" (the number of lives is given) and "different numbers choices" (problem of optimum popUlation). The author argues that in the latter case the anonymity (or sym­ metry) axiom cannot be readily defended. Once it is dropped, however, an incoherence in the moral ordering of possible worlds arises. The moral basis for different numbers choices becomes generation-dependent, an overall moral ordering of possible worlds no longer exists.