Domain Conditions in Social Choice Theory

AvWulf Gaertner

Häftad, Engelska, 2006

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Beskrivning

Wulf Gaertner provides a comprehensive account of an important and complex issue within social choice theory: how to establish a social welfare function while restricting the spectrum of individual preferences in a sensible way. Gaertner's starting point is K. J. Arrow's famous 'Impossibility Theorem', which showed that no welfare function could exist if an unrestricted domain of preferences is to be satisfied together with some other appealing conditions. A number of leading economists have tried to provide avenues out of this 'impossibility' by restricting the variety of preferences: here, Gaertner provides a clear and detailed account, using standardized mathematical notation, of well over forty theorems associated with domain conditions. Domain Conditions in Social Choice Theory will be an essential addition to the library of social choice theory for scholars and their advanced graduate students.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:2006-11-02
Mått:152 x 228 x 10 mm
Vikt:229 g
Format:Häftad
Språk:Engelska
Antal sidor:168
Förlag:Cambridge University Press
ISBN:9780521028745

Utforska kategorier

Nationalekonomi inom Ekonomi och Ledarskap

Mer om författaren

WULF GAERTNER is Professor of Economics at the University of Osnabrück. He has been a Visiting Scholar at Harvard University and at the London School of Economics and Political Science and has published extensively on social choice theory in leading journals. He is one of the managing editors of the journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Recensioner i media

'The domain conditions in social choice theory have a history of about half a century, going back to the classic paper of Duncan Black published in 1948. Over this period, a large number of writers have explored various aspects of the subject. Gaertner's survey provides an exceptionally lucid and comprehensive account of this diverse literature. Gaertner's exposition brings out the major intuitive themes in a very clear fashion, while paying meticulous attention to the technical details of individual results. Readers in search of an introduction to the literature, as well as researchers looking for an authoritative book of reference on the subject, should find the book very helpful.' Prasanta K. Pattanaik, University of California, Riverside

Innehållsförteckning

Preface and acknowledgements; 1. Introduction; 2. Notation, definitions and two fundamental theorems; 3. The existence of collective choice rules under exclusion conditions for finite sets of discrete alternatives; 4. Arrovian social welfare functions, nonmanipulable voting procedures and stable group decision functions; 5. Restrictions on the distribution of individuals' preferences; 6. The existence of social choice rules in n-dimensional continuous space; 7. Concluding remarks; 8. References; Indexes.