Social Choice and Bargaining Perspectives on Distributive Justice

This book studies two distinct approaches to distributive justice. The first originates from axiomatic social choice theory and studies positionalist aggregation functions. Profiles of individual extended orderings over alternative social states are mapped into a social ordering of these states. The informational framework of this procedure is ordinal and requires interpersonal comparisons of utility levels. The aggregation mechanism which is proposed can be characterized as a generalized ranking rule with a nonlinear weighting scheme, allowing an equity axiom to be satisfied. The second approach is rooted in axiomatic bargaining theory and uses cardinal individual utilities which are not required to be interpersonally comparable. The second path leads to a new characterization of the Gauthier solution for n persons that can suitably be defined as a lexicographical maximin solution in relative utility gains. Again, an equity axiom proves to be useful. Both approaches are subjected to empirical investigations. In the first one, results from questionnaires are presented. In the second one, findings from laboratory experiments are discussed.