Elements in Comparative Political Theory – serie

The purpose of this Element is to analyse the assiduous attempts of two Islamic political thinkers-the 12th century Andalusian philosopher Ibn Rushd and the contemporary Sudanese reformist Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im-to theorise Islamic politics through an approach the author refers to as 'pluralistic frameworks'. A pluralistic framework, is a systematic mediation of Islamic ethics and politics that incorporates extra-Islamic traditions of thought from diverse sources. Pluralistic frameworks selectively and self-consciously enable dialogue, synthesis, and hybridity and seek to maintain a distinct conception of Islamic ethics that concords with a preferred set of political arguments. They enable reflexivity within the ethical purview of Islam and with an awareness of the normativity of sharī'a.Both Ibn Rushd and An-Na'im reconcile sharī'a in two very different ways, but to a common end; Ibn Rushd lays out a method of harmonisation with Greek thought, while An-Na'im resorts to the radical subversion of sharia under liberal thought.

Theocratic movements are on the rise. But what does it actually mean for God to rule? This Element offers one answer by recovering the theocratic project of medieval Judaism's most important thinker, Moses Maimonides. Theocracy is often thought to quash human agency, evoking an overpowering deity and clerical domination. Yet by reconsidering Maimonides' debt to the Islamic philosopher al-Fārābī, and challenging Leo Strauss' influential reading, the author argues that among Maimonides' aims was to elevate humanity's role in divine rule. In its highest form reason is identical with revelation, action with providence. God's governance is delegated: theocracy requires human agency-the imitation of God. Maimonides focuses on philosophical-religious leaders. But he also broadens imitatio dei to anyone whose knowledge of God inspires love of God: by emulating God's goodness, we can become agents of divine rule. In this way, Maimonides' ideas suggest ways by which theocracy and democracy might, counter-intuitively, be reconciled. This title is also available as open access on Cambridge Core.

Radical democracy informs contemporary social movements both as critique of existing liberal democratic social orders and as inspiration for collective action to challenge power structures. However, existing approaches on the relationship between radical democracy and social movements often truncate complex socio-political issues, constraining political imagination and stifling 'truly radical' alternatives. This Element offers an analysis of contemporary social movements in Colombia and Turkey to show the limits and potential of radical democracy to reimagine new expressions of citizenship and non-capitalist alternatives. It argues that there is a mismatch between the radical democratic paradigm as it is formulated within Eurocentric purview, and the ways it has been articulated and practised by anti-austerity and pro-democracy movements of the twenty-first century. We propose that radical democracy should be rethought in light of novel forms of political activism and visions emerging from these social movements as a response to the failures of liberal democracy.

Radical democracy informs contemporary social movements both as critique of existing liberal democratic social orders and as inspiration for collective action to challenge power structures. However, existing approaches on the relationship between radical democracy and social movements often truncate complex socio-political issues, constraining political imagination and stifling 'truly radical' alternatives. This Element offers an analysis of contemporary social movements in Colombia and Turkey to show the limits and potential of radical democracy to reimagine new expressions of citizenship and non-capitalist alternatives. It argues that there is a mismatch between the radical democratic paradigm as it is formulated within Eurocentric purview, and the ways it has been articulated and practised by anti-austerity and pro-democracy movements of the twenty-first century. We propose that radical democracy should be rethought in light of novel forms of political activism and visions emerging from these social movements as a response to the failures of liberal democracy.

This Element revisits the conceptual history of freedom and democracy in Cold War South Korea. Cold War liberalism is usually told as a North Atlantic story of defensive anti-communism, the 'liberalism of fear', and pluralist scepticism towards mass politics. Yet behind that veneer lay another face - the technocratic administrative state - that became dominant once Cold War liberalism reached the decolonising periphery under the rubric of 'modernisation'. Through a conceptual historical analysis, this Element traces how freedom and democracy were continually recombined with nationalism, developmentalism and diverse moral-economic registers, generating conceptual problematics the metropolitan tradition had rarely been compelled to confront. From the Founding Constitution through 'Korean-style democracy' to the minjung turn and democratic transition, Cold War Korea emerges not as belated reception but as a vantage from which liberalism's constitutive tensions become visible.

This Element revisits the conceptual history of freedom and democracy in Cold War South Korea. Cold War liberalism is usually told as a North Atlantic story of defensive anti-communism, the 'liberalism of fear', and pluralist scepticism towards mass politics. Yet behind that veneer lay another face - the technocratic administrative state - that became dominant once Cold War liberalism reached the decolonising periphery under the rubric of 'modernisation'. Through a conceptual historical analysis, this Element traces how freedom and democracy were continually recombined with nationalism, developmentalism and diverse moral-economic registers, generating conceptual problematics the metropolitan tradition had rarely been compelled to confront. From the Founding Constitution through 'Korean-style democracy' to the minjung turn and democratic transition, Cold War Korea emerges not as belated reception but as a vantage from which liberalism's constitutive tensions become visible.

The purpose of this Element is to analyse the assiduous attempts of two Islamic political thinkers-the 12th century Andalusian philosopher Ibn Rushd and the contemporary Sudanese reformist Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im-to theorise Islamic politics through an approach the author refers to as 'pluralistic frameworks'. A pluralistic framework, is a systematic mediation of Islamic ethics and politics that incorporates extra-Islamic traditions of thought from diverse sources. Pluralistic frameworks selectively and self-consciously enable dialogue, synthesis, and hybridity and seek to maintain a distinct conception of Islamic ethics that concords with a preferred set of political arguments. They enable reflexivity within the ethical purview of Islam and with an awareness of the normativity of sharī'a.Both Ibn Rushd and An-Na'im reconcile sharī'a in two very different ways, but to a common end; Ibn Rushd lays out a method of harmonisation with Greek thought, while An-Na'im resorts to the radical subversion of sharia under liberal thought.

The twentieth-century consolidation of the nation-state as the dominant political institution has meant that political theorists have conceptualised justice primarily through the provision of statist rights. The author shows that the concept of haqq allows us to recognise and move past some limitations of justice as statist rights. Focussing on critical theory, given its sympathetic substantive focus on oppression and liberatory struggles, and methodological emphasis on combining empirical detail with theoretical insight, she argues that dominant strands are locked in a circular debate due to their investment in statist visions of justice. This renders their theorising irrelevant to the concerns of many especially in the Global South, and importantly, truncates imagination of alternatives. Building upon oral histories of refugees from the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and their articulation of haqq, the author argues for approaching haqq as enabling actually existing non-statist justice that foregrounds the agency of the oppressed.

The aim of this Element is to foreground Native American conceptions of sovereignty and power in order to refine the place of settler colonialism in American colonial and early republican history. It argues that Indigenous concepts of sovereignty were rooted in complex metaphorical language, in historical understandings of alliance, and in mobility in a landscape of layered interconnections of power. Where some versions of the interpretive paradigm of settler colonialism emphasise the violent 'elimination of the native', this work reveals that diplomatic transactions between the Iroquois Confederacy and British colonial and imperial agents reveal a hybrid language of alliance, sovereignty and territory. These languages and concepts of inter-cultural diplomacy provide contexts that suggest a more nuanced and dynamic relationship between colonialism and Indigenous power.

This Element explores a range of conceptions of politically relevant merit found in the philosophical texts of pre-Qin China (before 221BCE). It demonstrates both that the role accorded to political merit was substantial and that the ideas of what constituted politically relevant merit were heavily contested. Through a focus on four texts, the Xunzi, the Mozi, the Laozi, and the Han Feizi, it sketches out a long-standing debate over questions including the appropriate source of merit, the relationship between political merit and moral merit, and how merit should be nurtured and directed in the political arena. In doing so, it hopes to show why contemporary discussions of Asian-inspired political meritocracy, its promise, and its perils, are impoverished if they limit themselves to 'Confucian' notions of meritocracy rather than exploring more fully the wider variety on offer.

Theocratic movements are on the rise. But what does it actually mean for God to rule? This Element offers one answer by recovering the theocratic project of medieval Judaism's most important thinker, Moses Maimonides. Theocracy is often thought to quash human agency, evoking an overpowering deity and clerical domination. Yet by reconsidering Maimonides' debt to the Islamic philosopher al-Fārābī, and challenging Leo Strauss' influential reading, the author argues that among Maimonides' aims was to elevate humanity's role in divine rule. In its highest form reason is identical with revelation, action with providence. God's governance is delegated: theocracy requires human agency-the imitation of God. Maimonides focuses on philosophical-religious leaders. But he also broadens imitatio dei to anyone whose knowledge of God inspires love of God: by emulating God's goodness, we can become agents of divine rule. In this way, Maimonides' ideas suggest ways by which theocracy and democracy might, counter-intuitively, be reconciled. This title is also available as open access on Cambridge Core.