Common Pool Resources

Strategic Behavior, Inefficiencies, and Incomplete Information

AvAna Espinola-Arredondo,Felix Muñoz-Garcia

Inbunden, Engelska, 2021

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Beskrivning

Common Pool Resources include, for instance, fishing grounds, irrigation systems, forests and the atmosphere. Now more than ever, how we responsibly share and use those goods is a vital issue. This textbook introduces students of economics, business and policy studies to the key issues in the field. It uses a game-theory approach to help readers understand the mathematical representation of how to find equilibrium behavior in CPRs, how to identify the socially optimal appropriation, and how to measure the inefficiencies that arise. Algebra and calculus steps are clearly explained, so students can more easily reproduce the analysis and apply it in their own research. Finally, the book also summarizes experimental studies that tested theoretical results in controlled environments, introducing readers to a literature that has expanded over the last decades, and provides references for further reading.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:2021-10-21
Mått:158 x 235 x 18 mm
Vikt:480 g
Format:Inbunden
Språk:Engelska
Antal sidor:224
Förlag:Cambridge University Press
ISBN:9781108831031

Utforska kategorier

Upphandlingsrätt inom Juridik
Miljöekonomi inom Ekonomi och Ledarskap

Mer om författaren

Ana Espinola-Arredondo is a Professor in the School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University. Felix Muñoz-Garcia is a Professor in the School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University.

Recensioner i media

'If you are looking for a textbook on common-pool resource problems that is both rigorous and intuitive, then you can't go wrong with this book. In a clear and engaging writing style, it provides comprehensive coverage of the individual and combined roles of strategic interactions, information and dynamics on the outcomes for all the involved parties. Professors and students will appreciate the analysis and exercises.' George Zaccour, HEC Montreal, Canada

Innehållsförteckning

Preface; 1. Introduction; 2. Common pool resources in a static setting; 3. Common pool resources in a dynamic setting; 4. Entry deterrence in the commons; 5. Repeated interaction in the commons; 6. Commons under incomplete information; 7. Signaling in the commons; Appendix A: game theory tools; Appendix B: solutions of selected end-of-chapter exercises.