Constitutional Democracy

János Kis is professor of political science and of philosophy at the Central European University, and Senior Research Fellow at the CEU Democracy Institute.

"This book deserves a wide audience among political theorists and scholars of constitutional law. Highly recommended."

• Introduction Notes THE COMMON GOOD AND CIVIC VIRTUE 1. Liberalism and Republicanism 2. The Preference-aggregating Model 3. The Ethical Model: the Responsible Voter 4. The Ethical Model: the Relation between Private and Communal References 5. The Ethical Model: Public Debate and Voting 6. On the Relation of the Two Models 7. Liberalism and the Descriptive Claims of the Ethical Model 8. Virtue in Politics 9. The Politics of Virtue and Personal Autonomy 10. Concluding Remarks Notes LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AGAINST THE COMPROMISE THESIS 1. Introduction 2. The Conflict 3. Constitutional Constraints, Constitutional Review 4. Political Equality and Rule by the Majority 5. Equality of Votes and Equality of Voters 6. Contractarian Theory: the Selection of Voting Rules 7. A Weakness of Contractarian Theory 8. The Typology of Preferences 9. Filtering the Preferences of the Contracting Parties 10. Moral Discussion before the Contract 11. The Mandate of the Guardians of the Constitution 12. Summary and Restrictions Notes CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW 1. Introduction 1.1. Two Conceptions 1.2. Questions of Principle and Questions of Regulation 1.3. The Means of Judicial Interpretation of the Constitution 1.4. A Brief Overview of What Follows 2. Interpreting the Constitution 2.1 Popular Sovereignty 2.2 Only That Which is “in the Text” 2.3. Strict Reading 2.4. Historical Readings 2.5. Substantive Readings: Structural Interpretation 2.6. Substantive Interpretations: the Moral Reading 2.7. Special Objections: The Structural Reading 2.8. Special Objections: the Moral Reading 2.9. Substantive Readings: Critical Interpretations 2.10. General Objections against Substantial Reading 2.11. Constitution Making 3. Striking down Legislation 3.1. Once again on Popular Sovereignty 3.2. “The Tyranny of the Majority” 3.3.The Power of Self-binding: Analogies from Individual Action 3.4. Communal Agency 3.5. Constitutional Self-binding 3.6. Judicial Review, Substantive Reading 3.7. The Limits of Constitutional Review 3.8. Precautionary Guidelines 3.9. Summary Notes THE LEGACY OF THE FIRST HUNGARIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 1. The Interpretive Practice of the Constitutional Court 1.1. The Self-understanding of the Court: Substantive Reading 1.2. Critical Reading: the Abolition of Death Penalty 1.3. Strict Textualism. the Issue of the Legal Status of Fetuses 1.4. A Shift in Self-understanding: Transitional Justice 1.5. The Decline of Rights Adjudication 1.6. The Upsurge of Welfare Protection 1.7. The Paradoxes of Welfare Protection 2. Summary and Glance to Future 2.1. Theses 2.2. Measuring the First Constitutional Court by our Theses 2.3. From ‘Legal Revolution’ to the ‘Consolidation of the Rule of Law’ Notes Index