Matthias Klatt – författare

Constitutionalism Justified analyzes leading Frankfurt School theorist Rainer Forst's theory of a basic right to justification, unique in combining insights from philosophy, constitutionalism, and legal theory. Drawing upon Kant's critical philosophy and Habermas's discourse theory, he has developed fresh perspectives on core topics like the concept of justice, the relation between modernity and emancipation, and human rights. The contributors to this volume explore Forst's work from three different perspectives: philosophy, legal philosophy, and constitutional theory. The first part of this volume addresses the philosophical argument of the basic right to justification, including the influence of Kantian thought on this right, the deontological versus teleological fundamentals, the tension between moral pluralism and universalism, and the relation of the right to justification with social and distributive justice. The second part covers how the right to justification is embedded in constitutional and legal frameworks. It explores the implications that Forst's right to justification has for conceptualizing constitutional democracy and its foundations, and how the moral right to justification may translate into particular practices of justification that are constrained by a legal framework. This includes discussion of the value of constitutionalism in general, of the relation between the formal structure of democracy and substantive justice, of the inclusion of outsiders to the constitutional setting, and of proportionality analysis and judicial review as forms of justification. The book concludes with Rainer Forst's reply to his interlocutors, making the book a valuable source for future research.

This volume gathers leading figures from legal philosophy and constitutional theory to offer a critical examination of the work of Robert Alexy. The contributions explore the issues surrounding the complex relations between rights, law, and morality and reflect on Alexy's distinctive work on these issues.The focus across the contributions is on Alexy's main pre-occupations - his anti-positivist views on the nature of law, his approach to the nature of legal reasoning, and his understanding of constitutional rights as legal principles. In an extended response to the contributions in the volume, Alexy develops his views on these central issues.The volume's juxtaposition of Anglo-American and German perspectives brings into focus the differences as well as the prospect of cross-fertilization between Continental and Anglo-American work in jurisprudence.

As constitutional law globalizes, the quest for a common grammar or 'generic constitutional law' becomes more pressing. Proportionality is one of the most prominent and controversial components of the modern, global constitutional discourse. In view of the alarming tension between the triumphant success of proportionality and the severity of the criticism directed towards it, this book offers an in-depth analysis of the critics of proportionality and demonstrates that their objections against the proportionality test are not convincing. It clarifies and further develops the current theories of proportionality and balancing. Building upon on Robert Alexy's predominant principles theory, the book suggests several modifications to this theory. Drawing examples from the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, the European Court of Justice, and various national constitutional courts it illustrates the argument in favour of proportionality and demonstrates its relevance for deciding concrete cases.

This is the second part of a 2-volume set which presents an in-depth investigation into the canon of constitutionally conforming interpretation.This second volume builds upon the insights of the first volume, which includes national reports on the use of constitutional interpretation. In Volume 2, the analysis is extended beyond the national context, discussing its application in the supranational and international contexts, including in EU law and the domestic use of international law. It presents several critical perspectives, challenging the legitimacy of constitutionally conforming interpretation, and looks at the invisible constitution, constitutional amendments, and the impact of legalism. The volume is rounded off by three comparative analyses, which formulate universally applicable insights.Together with Volume 1, this book fills an important gap in legal scholarship and sets the stage for cross-national discourse on this critical legal method.

This is the first part of a 2-volume set that presents an in-depth investigation into the canon of constitutionally conforming interpretation. These volumes address the fundamental issues the canon raises in the national, supranational and international contexts. In volume 1, experts from 19 jurisdictions, including Brazil, Canada, India, the UK, and the USA, present reports which give concise overviews of the approaches and debates on constitutionally conforming interpretation. These reports cover the structural background, the conditions of application, as well as issues of competence. Further aspects discussed are its perceived normativity and popularity in everyday legal practice.Together with volume 2, which explores the canon’s use and theoretical impact beyond the national context in a comparative and critical manner, this book fills an important gap in legal scholarship and sets the stage for cross-national discourse.

This is the first part of a 2-volume set that presents an in-depth investigation into the canon of constitutionally conforming interpretation. These volumes address the fundamental issues the canon raises in the national, supranational and international contexts. In volume 1, experts from 19 jurisdictions, including Brazil, Canada, India, the UK, and the USA, present reports which give concise overviews of the approaches and debates on constitutionally conforming interpretation. These reports cover the structural background, the conditions of application, as well as issues of competence. Further aspects discussed are its perceived normativity and popularity in everyday legal practice.Together with volume 2, which explores the canon’s use and theoretical impact beyond the national context in a comparative and critical manner, this book fills an important gap in legal scholarship and sets the stage for cross-national discourse.

This collection of essays from Dieter Grimm, Germany’s most renowned constitutional scholar, shines a light on the jurisprudence of the German Constitutional Court and constitutional adjudication in general. Established in 1951, the court has become a blueprint for new courts ever since and its jurisprudence, particularly in the field of fundamental rights, has influenced the decisions of judges throughout the world. After the seismic constitutional changes of the years 1989–90 in Germany and beyond, many countries adopted new democratic constitutions and established constitutional courts in order to make their constitutions effective. Today, many of these courts are under attack both politically and intellectually. In this book, Grimm considers some of the fundamental questions under academic scrutiny today: are constitutional courts political or legal institutions? Is judicial review a political or a legal activity? Is it a threat to, or a condition, of democracy? Should these courts be abolished or strengthened? Is a rational interpretation of constitutional law possible? The essays provide answers to these questions and describe how constitutional courts work if they properly fulfill their function of enforcing the constitution. A special emphasis is put on the importance of constitutional interpretation: something, the author argues, that most critics of constitutional adjudication neglect.

This collection of essays from Dieter Grimm, Germany’s most renowned constitutional scholar, shines a light on the jurisprudence of the German Constitutional Court and constitutional adjudication in general. Established in 1951, the court has become a blueprint for new courts ever since and its jurisprudence, particularly in the field of fundamental rights, has influenced the decisions of judges throughout the world. After the seismic constitutional changes of the years 1989–90 in Germany and beyond, many countries adopted new democratic constitutions and established constitutional courts in order to make their constitutions effective. Today, many of these courts are under attack both politically and intellectually. In this book, Grimm considers some of the fundamental questions under academic scrutiny today: are constitutional courts political or legal institutions? Is judicial review a political or a legal activity? Is it a threat to, or a condition, of democracy? Should these courts be abolished or strengthened? Is a rational interpretation of constitutional law possible? The essays provide answers to these questions and describe how constitutional courts work if they properly fulfill their function of enforcing the constitution. A special emphasis is put on the importance of constitutional interpretation: something, the author argues, that most critics of constitutional adjudication neglect.

This book challenges the near-universal acceptance of a US-style, Western constitutional paradigm as the best basis for comparative constitutional studies.It does so on three main grounds: anachronism, ‘othering’ and cultural specificity. Main pillars of ‘convergent constitutional theory’ are rooted in the revolutionary, late-eighteenth century – a lost world; constitutional arrangements that deviate from the paradigm are often branded as ‘outliers’ or even as not constitutional at all; and the foundations of the paradigm in liberal democracy give no space for other forms of constitutionalism. Whatever the attractions of convergent theory as a normative ideal of good government, for the purposes of understanding, analysing and explaining constitutional systems it is far from ideal.This book discusses and questions: convergent theory’s weddedness to writing as the technology of constitution-making; its image of a constitution as fundamental law; its idea that a constitution expresses the ‘sovereignty of the people’; its use of tripartite separation of powers as the basic principle of institutional design; its relative neglect of administrative law; its association of ‘rights’ with judicially enforceable bills of rights; and its obsession with a vaguely specified concept of ‘democracy’.It makes suggestions for alternative, preferable methods of understanding, analysing and explaining constitutions, and governmental and constitutional systems.

Legal argumentation consists in the interpretation of texts. Therefore, it has a natural connection to the philosophy of language. Central issues of this connection, however, lack a clear answer. For instance, how much freedom do judges have in applying the law? How are the literal and the purposive approaches related to one another? How can we distinguish between applying the law and making the law? This book provides answers by means of a complex and detailed theory of literal meaning. A new legal method is introduced, namely the further development of the law. It is so far unknown in Anglo-American jurisprudence, but it is shown that this new method helps in solving some of the most crucial puzzles in jurisprudence. At its centre the book addresses legal indeterminism and refutes linguistic-philosophical reasons for indeterminacy. It spells out the normative character of interpretation as emphasized by Raz and, with the help of Robert Brandom's normative pragmatics, it is shown that the relativism of interpretation from a normative perspective does not at all justify scepticism.On the contrary, it supports the claim that legal argumentation can be objective, and maintains that statements on the meaning of a statute can be right or wrong, and take on inter-subjective validity accordingly. This book breaks new ground in transferring Brandom's philosophy to legal theoretical problems and presents an original and exciting analysis of the semantic argument in legal argumentation. It was the recipient of the European Award for Legal Theory in 2002. 'This book represents, on the one hand, a reception of Robert Brandom's important theory including applications of this theory in the field of legal philosophy and, on the other, an exploration of the limits of an appeal in legal interpretation to the text. The enquiry thereby impinges upon the central juridico-philosophical themes of meaning, objectivity, and normativity. The author's work counts as a significant contribution to analytical jurisprudence and is deserving of a wide readership.' Robert Alexy, Professor for Public Law and Legal Philosophy, Kiel. 'Klatt focuses on a very profound theory of concept formation and uses this theory in a creative way to solve classical problems of legal argumentation.'Aleksander Peczenik

Spielräume sind im Recht allgegenwärtig. Sie machen das Recht flexibel, schwächen aber auch seine Steuerungskraft. Im öffentlichen Recht spielt die Offenheit der Abwägung von Prinzipien eine herausgehobene Rolle. Die daraus resultierenden Spielräume liegen vielen grundrechtlichen Fragestellungen des Verfassungsrechts, über den Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit aber auch einer Vielzahl verwaltungsrechtlicher Probleme zugrunde. Matthias Klatt und Johannes Schmidt nehmen die Frage der Spielräume im Rahmen der Abwägung von Prinzipien auf. Die vorliegende Schrift steht in der Tradition der Prinzipientheorie Robert Alexys. Die Autoren entwickeln Alexys Spielraumdogmatik aber in wesentlichen Teilen weiter und übertragen sie auf neue Rechtsgebiete wie das Verwaltungsrecht und das Europarecht. Die epistemischen Spielräume, die durch Unsicherheit von Wissen entstehen, stehen dabei im Zentrum.

Sprache ist ein soziales Phänomen. Sie ist für Gesellschaft und Recht grundlegend. Sprache formt das Recht als Sollensordnung. Zugleich ist sie selbst normativ strukturiert. Auf diesem ambivalenten Verhältnis von Sprache und Recht gründen intersubjektive Verständigung und politische Ordnung. Der interdisziplinäre Band hat diese Relationen zum Gegenstand. Die Autoren untersuchen das komplexe Verhältnis von Sprache, Recht und Gesellschaft anhand von drei ausgewählten, aktuell besonders virulenten Themenstellungen. Diskutiert werden die Zusammenhänge der Hermeneutik von Recht als gesellschaftlicher Institution, Sprache und juristischer Argumentation und schließlich von Recht, Sprache und Kultur. Dabei liegen den Beiträgen jeweils gemeinsame Leitfragen zugrunde, die aus Sicht der jeweiligen Disziplin beantwortet werden. Der Band bezeugt damit auch ein besonders innovatives Format interdisziplinärer Zusammenarbeit.

Abwägungen sind eine zentrale Methode der Rechtsfindung. Sie prägen nahezu sämtliche Rechtsgebiete und den Arbeitsalltag vieler Juristen. Abwägungen werfen jedoch eine Fülle von methodischen sowie rechts- und verfassungstheoretischen Problemen auf. Die Beiträge des vorliegenden Bandes untersuchen unter anderem die Abwägung bei Prinzipienmehrheiten, die Abwägung zwischen Abwehrrechten und Schutzrechten, die Besonderheiten der Abwägung unter Unsicherheiten sowie das Problem der Abwägung inkommensurabler Rechtsgüter. Ein besonderer Fokus liegt auf der Funktion formeller Prinzipien. Die Beiträge stehen in der Tradition der von Robert Alexy begründeten Prinzipientheorie und repräsentieren zum Teil eine neue Generation von Forscherinnen und Forschern. Insgesamt stützen die Beiträge die These, dass Abwägungen rational strukturierte Vorgänge der juristischen Argumentation darstellen.