Nicholas F. Stang – författare

What is possible and why? What is the difference between the merely possible and the actual? In Kants Modal Metaphysics Nicholas Stang examines Kants lifelong engagement with these questions and their role in his philosophical development. This is the first book to trace Kants theory of possibility all theway from the so-called pre-Critical writings of the 1750s and 1760s to the Critical system of philosophy inaugurated by the Critique of Pure Reason in 1781. Stang argues that the key to understanding both the change and the continuity between Kants pre-Critical and Critical theory of possibility is his transformation of the ontological question about possibility-what is it for a being to be possible?-into a question in transcendental philosophy-what is it to represent an object as possible? The first half of Kants Modal Metaphysics explores Kants pre-Critical theory of possibility, including his answer to the ontological question about the nature of possibility, his rejection of the traditional ontological argument for the existence of God, and his own argument that God must exist to ground all possibility. The second half examines why Kant reoriented his theory of possibility around the transcendental question, what this question means, and how Kant answered it in the Critical philosophy. Stang shows that, despite this reorientation, Kants basic scheme for thinking about possibility remains constant from the pre-Critical period through the Critical system. What had been an ontological theory of possible being is reinterpreted, in the Critical system, as a theory of how we must represent possible objects, given the nature of our intellect.

The Sensible and Intelligible Worlds represents a new wave of interest in ''the metaphysical Kant''. In recent decades Kant scholars have increasingly become skeptical of interpreting Kant as a philosopher who wished to truly "leave metaphysics behind". The contributors to this volume share a common commitment to the idea that Kant''s philosophy cannot be properly understood without careful attention to its metaphysical presuppositions and, in particular, to how those metaphysical presuppositions are compatible with Kant''s critique of more "dogmatic" forms of metaphysical thought. The authors approach Kant''s thought from a wide variety of different perspectives - emphasizing not just the familiar Leibnizian background to Kant''s metaphysics, but also its broadly Aristotelian underpinnings and its relationship with metaphysical themes in post-Kantian German Idealism. Similarly, although most of the essays in this volume relate in some way to the familiar question of how best to interpret Kant''s transcendental idealism, they also deal with a wide range of other topics, including Kant''s modal metaphysics, his views on the continuum, his epistemology of the a priori, and the foundations of his "metaethical" views.

The Sensible and Intelligible Worlds represents a new wave of interest in ''the metaphysical Kant''. In recent decades Kant scholars have increasingly become skeptical of interpreting Kant as a philosopher who wished to truly "leave metaphysics behind". The contributors to this volume share a common commitment to the idea that Kant''s philosophy cannot be properly understood without careful attention to its metaphysical presuppositions and, in particular, to how those metaphysical presuppositions are compatible with Kant''s critique of more "dogmatic" forms of metaphysical thought. The authors approach Kant''s thought from a wide variety of different perspectives - emphasizing not just the familiar Leibnizian background to Kant''s metaphysics, but also its broadly Aristotelian underpinnings and its relationship with metaphysical themes in post-Kantian German Idealism. Similarly, although most of the essays in this volume relate in some way to the familiar question of how best to interpret Kant''s transcendental idealism, they also deal with a wide range of other topics, including Kant''s modal metaphysics, his views on the continuum, his epistemology of the a priori, and the foundations of his "metaethical" views.

What is possible and why? What is the difference between the merely possible and the actual? In Kants Modal Metaphysics Nicholas Stang examines Kants lifelong engagement with these questions and their role in his philosophical development. This is the first book to trace Kants theory of possibility all theway from the so-called pre-Critical writings of the 1750s and 1760s to the Critical system of philosophy inaugurated by the Critique of Pure Reason in 1781. Stang argues that the key to understanding both the change and the continuity between Kants pre-Critical and Critical theory of possibility is his transformation of the ontological question about possibility-what is it for a being to be possible?-into a question in transcendental philosophy-what is it to represent an object as possible? The first half of Kants Modal Metaphysics explores Kants pre-Critical theory of possibility, including his answer to the ontological question about the nature of possibility, his rejection of the traditional ontological argument for the existence of God, and his own argument that God must exist to ground all possibility. The second half examines why Kant reoriented his theory of possibility around the transcendental question, what this question means, and how Kant answered it in the Critical philosophy. Stang shows that, despite this reorientation, Kants basic scheme for thinking about possibility remains constant from the pre-Critical period through the Critical system. What had been an ontological theory of possible being is reinterpreted, in the Critical system, as a theory of how we must represent possible objects, given the nature of our intellect.

Contemporary metaphysics is most commonly approached in a piecemeal fashion, not systematically. Even those philosophers who end up with a metaphysical system tend to tackle issues one at a time, and do not presume that doing metaphysics systematically is a pre-condition for doing metaphysics. But it wasn't always that way. At various points throughout history, and in particular in the nineteenth century, philosophers argued that philosophy in general, and metaphysics in particular, must be done systematically and holistically if it is to be done at all. Systematic Metaphysics seeks to put systematicity back on the philosophical agenda. Featuring contributions from leading philosophers and historians of philosophy, the chapters tackle a host of meta-philosophical issues involving the notion of systematicity: What would it mean for metaphysics (or philosophy) to be systematic? Why would metaphysics have to be systematic? What are the epistemological implications of metaphysics being, or having to be, systematic? What explains the deep interconnectedness of philosophy's branches and sub-branches? Might reflection on these questions compel us to accept that philosophy can't be pursued at all? Because these issues have figured heavily in the history of philosophy, this volume includes both investigations of the place of, and reflection on, systematicity in the work of key historical figures, as well as contemporary explorations of the volume's themes.