Contemporary metaphysics is most commonly approached in a piecemeal fashion, not systematically. Even those philosophers who end up with a metaphysical system tend to tackle issues one at a time, and do not presume that doing metaphysics systematically is a pre-condition for doing metaphysics. But it wasn't always that way. At various points throughout history, and in particular in the nineteenth century, philosophers argued that philosophy in general, and metaphysics in particular, must be done systematically and holistically if it is to be done at all. Systematic Metaphysics seeks to put systematicity back on the philosophical agenda. Featuring contributions from leading philosophers and historians of philosophy, the chapters tackle a host of meta-philosophical issues involving the notion of systematicity: What would it mean for metaphysics (or philosophy) to be systematic? Why would metaphysics have to be systematic? What are the epistemological implications of metaphysics being, or having to be, systematic? What explains the deep interconnectedness of philosophy's branches and sub-branches? Might reflection on these questions compel us to accept that philosophy can't be pursued at all? Because these issues have figured heavily in the history of philosophy, this volume includes both investigations of the place of, and reflection on, systematicity in the work of key historical figures, as well as contemporary explorations of the volume's themes.
