Mind Association Occasional Series – serie

This collection explores one of the most rapidly growing area of philosophy: political epistemology. Epistemological issues are at the center of our political lives. It has become increasingly difficult to discern legitimate sources of evidence, misinformation spreads faster than ever, and the role of truth in politics has allegedly decayed in recent years. It is therefore no coincidence that political discourse is currently saturated with epistemic notions like “post-truth,” “fake news,” “truth decay,” “echo chambers,” and “alternative facts.”Political Epistemology brings together leading philosophers to explore ways in which the analytic and conceptual tools of epistemology bear on political philosophy, and vice versa. It is organized around three broad themes: truth and knowledge in politics; epistemic problems for democracy; and disagreement and polarization. The contributors provide new and rich insights on topics such as: propaganda, fake news, weaponized skepticism, belief polarization, political disagreement, the epistemic value of democracy, voter ignorance, irrationality in politics, and identity politics. A premise underlying the development of political epistemology is that progress on certain foundational issues in both political philosophy and epistemology cannot be achieved without sharing insights across fields, beyond a certain point. This will be a foundational text for philosophers, political scientists, and political psychologists for years to come.

Metaphysical and ontological debates, concerning what exists and the nature of reality, are perennial features of the philosophical landscape. However, some have argued that ontological debates are non-substantive, pointless, trivial, incoherent, or impossible. Debates about whether tables exist, for example, or about the nature of reality, are taken to be in some way deficient. This has led to a burgeoning literature studying the nature of metaphysical and ontological disputes themselves. One major debate within this context concerns the language of ontology. The central question is whether the nature of language influences or limits our ability to engage productively in ontological disputes. While we typically think that our language describes the world, or at least can accurately describe the world, there have been many who have argued that the nature of language inherently influences and limits our attempts to understand the nature of reality-that our claims about what exists are, in fact, merely a reflection of how we happen to speak or think. The Language of Ontology collects chapters from established participants in the debate alongside new voices, to explore the range of issues relating to our ability or inability to get beyond the limits of our language.

This book is an important collection of new essays on various topics relating to realism and its rivals in metaphysics, logic, metaethics, and epistemology. The contributors include some of the leading authors in these fields and in several cases their essays constitute definitive statements of their views. In some cases authors write in response to the essays of other contributors, in other cases they proceed independently. Although not primarily historical this collection includes discussions of philosophers from the middle ages to the present day, from Aquinas to Wittgenstein.No one seriously interested in questions about realism, whether as a general philosophical outlook or as a particular position within specific debates, can afford to be without this collection.Contributors: Ian McFetridge, Mark Johnston, John Skorupski, Christopher Peacocke, Michael Williams, Edward Craig, Michael Smith, John Campbell, Peter Railton, David Wiggins, Bob Hale, Simon Blackburn, John Haldane, Crispin Wright

This is the first of two volumes of essays in commemoration of Alan Turing, whose pioneering work in the theory of artificial intelligence and computer science continues to be widely discussed today. A group of prominent academics from a wide range of disciplines focus on three questions famously raised by Turing: What, if any, are the limits on machine `thinking'? Could a machine be genuinely intelligent? Might we ourselves be biological machines, whose thought consists essentially in nothing more than the interaction of neurons according to strictly determined rules? The discussion of these fascinating issues is accessible to non-specialists and stimulating for all readers.

This is the second of two volumes of essays in commemoration of Alan Turing; it celebrates his intellectual legacy within the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. A distinguished international cast of contributors focus on the relationship beteen a scientific, computational image of the mind and a common-sense picture of the mind as an inner arena populated by concepts, beliefs, intentions, and qualia. Topics covered include the causal potency of folk- psychological states, the connectionist reconception of learning and concept formation, the understanding of the notion of computation itself, and the relation between philosophical and psychological theories of concepts.

Appearance versus Reality is a collection of new studies of the work of F. H. Bradley, a leading British philosopher of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, and one of the key figures in the emergence of Anglo-American analytic philosophy. In recent years there has been a widespread revaluation of Bradley's philosophy: it has been found to offer alternative approaches to those inherited from Frege, Descartes, the British Empiricists, and Quinean naturalism, which have dominated analytic philosophy for some time. The nine well-known contributors to this volume, from Britain, North America, and Australia, focus on Bradley's views on truth, meaning, knowledge, and reality. These essays show that his work not only was crucial to the development of twentieth-century philosophy, but can illuminate contemporary debates in metaphysics, logic, and epistemology.

Self-knowledge is the focus of considerable attention from philosophers: Knowing Our Own Minds gives a much-needed overview of current work on the subject, bringing together new essays by leading figures. Knowledge of one's own sensations, desires, intentions, thoughts, beliefs, and other attitudes is characteristically different from other kinds of knowledge, such as knowledge of other people's mental attributes: it has greater immediacy, authority, and salience. The first six chapters examine philosophical questions raised by these features of self-knowledge. The next two look at the role of our knowledge of our own psychological states in our functioning as rational agents. The third group of essays examine the tension between the distinctive characteristics of self-knowledge and arguments that psychological content is externally--socially and environmentally--determined. The final pair of chapters extend the discussion to knowledge of one's own language. Together these original, stimulating, and closely interlinked essays demonstrate the special relevance of self-knowledge to a broad range of issues in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language.

Fourteen new essays by a distinguished team of authors offer a broad and stimulating re-examination of transcendental arguments. This is the philosophical method of arguing that what is doubted or denied by the opponent must be the case, as a condition for the possibility of experience, language, or thought. The line-up of contributors features leading figures in the field from both sides of the Atlantic; they discuss the nature of transcendental arguments, and consider their role and value. In particular, they consider how successful such arguments are as a response to sceptical problems. The editor's introduction provides historical context and philosophical orientation for the discussions. This is the first major appraisal of transcendental arguments since the 1970s; they have continued to play a significant role in philosophy, and recent developments in epistemology and metaphysics have raised new questions and challenges for them. Transcendental Arguments will be essential reading for anyone interested in this area of philosophy, and the starting-point for future work.

This is the second of two volumes of essays in commemoration of Alan Turing; it celebrates his intellectual legacy within the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. A distinguished international cast of contributors focus on the relationship beteen a scientific, computational image of the mind and a common-sense picture of the mind as an inner arena populated by concepts, beliefs, intentions, and qualia. Topics covered include the causal potency of folk-psychological states, the connectionist reconception of learning and concept formation, the understanding of the notion of computation itself, and the relation between philosophical and psychological theories of concepts. Also available in paperback is the companion volume, Machines and Thought, edited by Peter Millican and Andy Clark, which focuses on Turing's main innovations in artificial intelligence.

This is the first of two volumes of essays in commemoration of Alan Turing, whose pioneering work in the theory of artificial intelligence and computer science continues to be widely discussed today. A group of prominent academics from a wide range of disciplines focus on three questions famously raised by Turing: What, if any, are the limits on machine 'thinking'? Could a machine be genuinely intelligent? Might we ourselves be biological machines, whose thought consists essentially in nothing more than the interaction of neurons according to strictly determined rules? The discussion of these fascinating issues is accessible to non-specialists and stimulating for all readers. Also available in paperback is the companion volume: Connectionism, Concepts, and Folk Psychology, edited by Andy Clark and Peter Millican. While Volume 1 concentrates on Turing's main innovations in artificial intelligence, Volume 2 looks more broadly at his intellectual legacy in philosophy and cognitive science.

The papers in this collection provide views on central aspects of Thomas Hobbes's (1588-1679) life and work. The collection testifies to his enduring importance as a major philosopher four hundred years after his birth, and helps to unravel aspects of his intellectual biography which are relevant to a proper appreciation of his philosophy. The contributors are: G. A. J. Rogers, Alan Ryan, David Gauthier, Noel Malcolm, Arrigo Pacchi, David Raphael, Tom Sorrell, François Tricaud, and Richard Tuck.This is the first volume in a new series sponsored by the Mind Association.

The notion of the highest good used to occupy a primary role in ethical theorising, but has largely disappeared from the contemporary landscape. The notion was central to both Aristotle's and Kant's ethical theories, however--a surprising observation given that their approaches to ethics are commonly conceived as being diametrically opposed. The essays in this collection provide a comprehensive treatment of the highest good in Aristotle and Kant and show that, even though there are important differences in terms of content, there are also important similarities in terms of the structural features of Aristotle's and Kant's value theories. By carefully analysing Aristotle's and Kant's theories of the highest good, a team of experts in the field shed light on their respective ethical theories and highlight the richness, complexity, and fruitfulness of the notion of the highest good.

Logical consequence is the relation that obtains between premises and conclusion(s) in a valid argument. Orthodoxy has it that valid arguments are necessarily truth-preserving, but this platitude only raises a number of further questions, such as: how does the truth of premises guarantee the truth of a conclusion, and what constraints does validity impose on rational belief? This volume presents thirteen essays by some of the most important scholars in the field of philosophical logic. The essays offer ground-breaking new insights into the nature of logical consequence; the relation between logic and inference; how the semantics and pragmatics of natural language bear on logic; the relativity of logic; and the structural properties of the consequence relation.

This volume offers a fresh view of the work of Thomas Reid, a leading figure in the history of eighteenth-century philosophy. A team of leading experts in the field explore the significance of Reid's thought in his time and ours, focusing in particular on three broad themes: mind, knowledge, and value. Together, they argue that Reid's philosophy is about developing agents in a rich world of objects and values, agents with intellectual and active powers whose regularity is productive. Though such agents are equipped at first with rudimentary abilities, those abilities are responsive. Our powers consist in a fundamental and on-going engagement with the world, a world that calls on us to be flexible, sensitive, astute, and ultimately, practical. Thomas Reid on Mind, Knowledge, and Value represents both the vitality of Reid's work, and the ways in which current philosophers are engaging with his ideas.

This volume presents thirteen original essays which explore both traditional and contemporary aspects of the metaphysics of relations. It is uncontroversial that there are true relational predications-'Abelard loves Eloise', 'Simmias is taller than Socrates', 'smoking causes cancer', and so forth. More controversial is whether any true relational predications have irreducibly relational truthmakers. Do any of the statements above involve their subjects jointly instantiating polyadic properties, or can we explain their truths solely in terms of monadic, non-relational properties of the relata? According to a tradition dating back to Plato and Aristotle, and continued by medieval philosophers, polyadic properties are metaphysically dubious. In non-symmetric relations such as the amatory relation, a property would have to inhere in two things at once-lover and beloved-but characterise each differently, and this puzzled the ancients. More recent work on non-symmetric relations highlights difficulties with their directionality. Such problems offer clear motivation for attempting to reduce relations to monadic properties. By contrast, ontic structural realists hold that the nature of physical reality is exhausted by the relational structure expressed in the equations of fundamental physics. On this view, there must be some irreducible relations, for its fundamental ontology is purely relational. The Metaphysics of Relations draws together the work of a team of leading metaphysicians, to address topics as diverse as ancient and medieval reasons for scepticism about polyadic properties; recent attempts to reduce causal and spatiotemporal relations; recent work on the directionality of relational properties; powers ontologies and their associated problems; whether the most promising interpretations of quantum mechanics posit a fundamentally relational world; and whether the very idea of such a world is coherent. From those who question whether there are relational properties at all, to those who hold they are a fundamental part of reality, this book covers a broad spectrum of positions on the nature and ontological status of relations, from antiquity to the present day.

What makes up reality, and how? What kinds of entity are fundamental to reality, and how do dependent entities depend on the fundamental ones? How does one entity metaphysically ground another? These questions are central to contemporary metaphysics. The papers in this collection, written by a new generation of metaphysicians, address these and related questions. They investigate the metaphysical concepts of grounding and fundamentality, and the relationship between the fundamental and all the other parts of reality. Together, these papers represent the cutting-edge of a central topic in contemporary metaphysics.

Social epistemology has been flourishing in recent years, expanding and making connections with political philosophy, virtue epistemology, philosophy of science, and feminist philosophy. The philosophy of the social world too is flourishing, with burgeoning work in the metaphysics of the social world, collective responsibility, group action, and group belief. The new philosophical vista now more clearly presenting itself is collective epistemology--the epistemology of groups and institutions. Groups engage in epistemic activity all the time--whether it be the active collective inquiry of scientific research groups or crime detection units, or the evidential deliberations of tribunals and juries, or the informational efforts of the voting population in general--and yet in philosophy there is still relatively little epistemology of groups to help explore these epistemic practices and their various dimensions of social and philosophical significance. The aim of this book is to address this lack, by presenting original essays in the field of collective epistemology, exploring these regions of epistemic practice and their significance for Epistemology, Political Philosophy, Ethics, and the Philosophy of Science.

Interest in the contribution made by women to the history of philosophy is burgeoning. Intense research is underway to recover their works which have been lost or overlooked. At the forefront of this revival is Mary Wollstonecraft. While she has long been studied by feminists, and later discovered by political scientists, philosophers themselves have only recently begun to recognise the value of her work for their discipline. This volume brings together new essays from leading scholars, which explore Wollstonecraft's range as a moral and political philosopher of note, both taking a historical perspective and applying her thinking to current academic debates. Subjects include Wollstonecraft's ideas on love and respect, friendship and marriage, motherhood, property in the person, and virtue and the emotions, as well as the application her thought has for current thinking on relational autonomy, and animal and children's rights. A major theme within the book places her within the republican tradition of political theory and analyses the contribution she makes to its conceptual resources.

Philosophical reflection on the emotions has a long history stretching back to classical Greek thought, even though at times philosophers have marginalized or denigrated them in favour of reason. Fourteen leading philosophers here offer a broad survey of the development of our understanding of the emotions. The thinkers they discuss include Aristotle, Aquinas, Ockham, Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza, Hobbes, Hume, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Kant, Schiller, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, James, Brentano, Stumpf, Scheler, Heidegger, and Sartre. Central issues include the taxonomy of the emotions; the distinction between emotions, passions, feelings and moods; the relation between the emotions and reason; the relationship between the self and the emotions. At a metaphilosophical level, the collection also raises issues about the value of historical study of the discipline, and what light it can shed on contemporary concerns. Thinking about the Emotions is a fascinating and illuminating collective study of how philosophers have grappled with this most intriguing part of our nature as beings who feel as well as think and act.

This volume presents new essays on art, mind, and narrative inspired by the work of the late Peter Goldie, who was Samuel Hall Professor of Philosophy at the University of Manchester until 2011. Its three sections cover Narrative Thinking; Emotion, Mind, and Art; and Art, Value, and Ontology. Within these sections, leading authorities in the philosophy of mind, aesthetics and the emotions offer the reader entry points into many of the most exciting contemporary debates in these areas of philosophy. Topics covered include the role that narrative thinking plays in our lives, our imaginative engagement with fiction, the emotions and their role in the motivation of action, the connection between artistic activity and human well-being, and the appreciation and ontological status of conceptual artworks.

Common sense philosophy was one of eighteenth-century Scotland's most original intellectual products. It developed as a viable alternative to modern philosophical scepticism, known as the 'Ideal Theory' or 'the way of ideas'. The nine specially written essays in this volume explore the philosophical and historical significance of common sense philosophy in the Scottish Enlightenment. Thomas Reid and David Hume feature prominently as influential authors of competing ideas in the history and philosophy of common sense. The contributors recover anticipations of Reid's version of common sense in seventeenth-century Scottish scholasticism; revaluate Reid's position in the realism versus sentimentalism dichotomy; shed new light on the nature of the 'constitution' in the anatomy of the mind; identify changes in the nature of sense perception throughout Reid's published and unpublished works; examine Reid on the non-theist implications of Hume's philosophy; show how 'polite' literature shaped James Beattie's version of common sense; reveal Hume's response to common sense philosophers; explore English criticisms of the Scottish 'school', and how Dugald Stewart's refashioning of common sense responded to a new age and the British reception of German Idealism. In recovering the ways in which Scottish common sense philosophy developed during the long eighteenth century, this volume takes an important step toward a more complete understanding of 'the Scottish philosophy' and British philosophy more broadly in the age of Enlightenment.

Evaluation is ubiquitous. Indeed, it isn't an exaggeration to say that we assess actions, character, events, and objects as good, cruel, beautiful, etc., almost every day of our lives. Although evaluative judgement - for instance, judging that an institution is unjust - is usually regarded as the paradigm of evaluation, it has been thought by some philosophers that a distinctive and significant kind of evaluation is perceptual. For example, in aesthetics, some have claimed that adequate aesthetic judgement must be grounded in the appreciator's first hand-hand perceptual experience of the item judged. In ethics, reference to the existence and importance of something like ethical perception is found in a number of traditions, for example, in virtue ethics and sentimentalism. This volume brings together philosophers working in aesthetics, epistemology, ethics, philosophy of mind, and value theory to investigate what we call 'evaluative perception'. Specifically, they engage with (1) Questions regarding the existence and nature of evaluative perception: Are there perceptual experiences of values? If so, what is their nature? Are perceptual experiences of values sui generis? Are values necessary for certain kinds of perceptual experience? (2) Questions about epistemology: Can evaluative perceptual experiences ever justify evaluative judgements? Are perceptual experiences of values necessary for certain kinds of justified evaluative judgements? (3) Questions about value theory: Is the existence of evaluative perceptual experience supported or undermined by particular views in value theory? Are particular views in value theory supported or undermined by the existence of evaluative perceptual experience?

The Actual and the Possible presents new essays by leading specialists on modality and the metaphysics of modality in the history of modern philosophy from the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries. It revisits key moments in the history of modern modal doctrines, and illuminates lesser-known moments of that history. The ultimate purpose of this historical approach is to contextualise and even to offer some alternatives to dominant positions within the contemporary philosophy of modality. Hence the volume contains not only new scholarship on the early-modern doctrines of Baruch Spinoza, G. W. F. Leibniz, Christian Wolff and Immanuel Kant, but also work relating to less familiar nineteenth-century thinkers such as Alexius Meinong and Jan Lukasiewicz, together with essays on celebrated nineteenth- and twentieth-century thinkers such as G. W. F. Hegel, Martin Heidegger and Bertrand Russell, whose modal doctrines have not previously garnered the attention they deserve. The volume thus covers a variety of traditions, and its historical range extends to the end of the twentieth century, addressing the legacy of W. V. Quine's critique of modality within recent analytic philosophy.

Art and Belief presents twelve new essays at the intersection of philosophy of mind and philosophy of art, particularly to do with the relation between belief and truth in our experience of art. Several contributors discuss the cognitive contributions artworks can make and the questions surrounding these. Can authors of fiction testify to their readers? If they can, are they culpable for the false beliefs of their readers formed in response to their work? If they cannot, that is, if the testimonial powers of authors of fiction are limited, is there some non-testimonial epistemic role that fiction can play? And in any case, is such a role relevant when determining the value of the work?Also explored are issues concerned with the phenomenon of fictional persuasion, specifically, what is the nature of the attitude involved in such cases (those in which we form beliefs about the real world in response to reading fiction)? If these attitudes are typically unstable, unjustified, and unreliable, does this put pressure on the view that they are beliefs? If these attitudes are beliefs, does this put pressure on the view that all beliefs are aimed at truth? The final pair of papers in the volume take different stances on the nature of aesthetic testimony, and whether testimony of this kind is a legitimate source of beliefs about aesthetic properties and value.

How does the idea that perception must provide reasons for our empirical judgements constrain our conception of our perceptual experiences? This volume presents ten new essays on perception which in different ways address this fundamental question. Charles Travis and John McDowell debate whether we need to ascribe content to experience in order to understand how it can provide the subject with reasons. Other essays address issues such as the following: What exactly is the Myth of the Given and why should it be worthwhile to try to avoid it? What constitutes our experiential reasons? Is it experiences themselves, the objects of experiences, or facts about our experiences? Should we conceive of experiential reasons as conclusive reasons? How should we conceive of the fallibility of our perceptual capacities if we think of experiences as capable of providing conclusive reasons? How should we conceive of the objects of experience? The contributors offer a variety of views on the reason-giving potential of experience, engaging explicitly and critically with each other's work.

Magnanimity is a virtue that has led many lives. Foregrounded early on by Plato as a philosophical virtue par excellence, it became one of the crown jewels in Aristotle's account of human excellence and was accorded equally salient place by other ancient thinkers. It is one of the most distinctive elements of the ancient tradition to filter into the medieval Islamic and Christian worlds. It sparked important intellectual engagements and went on to carve deep tracks through several of the later philosophies to inherit from this tradition. Under changing names and reworked forms, it would continue to breathe in the thought of Descartes and Hume, Kant, and Nietzsche. Its many lives have been joined by important continuities, yet they have also been fragmented by discontinuities -- discontinuities reflecting larger shifts in ethical perspectives and competing answers to questions about the nature of the good life, the moral nature of human beings, and their relationship to the social and natural world they inhabit. They have also been punctuated by moments of intense controversy in which the vision of human greatness has itself been called into doubt. The aim of this volume is to provide an insight into the complex trajectory of a virtue whose glitter has at times been as dazzling as it has been divisive. By exploring the many lives it has lived, we will be in a better position to evaluate whether this is a virtue we still want to make central to our own ethical lives, and why.

W.V. Quine, a champion of philosophical naturalism and pioneer of mathematical logic, was one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century. Contemporary thought in ontology, epistemology, and the philosophy of logic and language owes much to his influence, yet recent work in these areas has become increasingly dismissive of his views. This is often because of mistaken or overly simplified conceptions of his philosophy which overlook the development of his views over time, in particular the growing importance of a kind of structuralism to his system as it evolved. This volume provides a fuller, richer picture of Quine's views and their development. With contributions from leading philosophers in a range of subfields including philosophical logic, philosophy of language, history of philosophy, mathematics, philosophy of time, and set theory, it is the first to investigate Quine's views on structure and how it permeates and shapes his attitude to a range of philosophical questions.

This volume brings together recent work on the nature of belief, imagination, and delusion. Whilst philosophers of mind and epistemology employ notions of belief and imagination in their theorizing, parallel work seeking to make these notions more precise continues. Delusions are standardly taken to be bizarre beliefs occurring in the clinical population, which do not respond to evidence. The purpose of this collection of essays is to get clearer on the nature of belief and imagination, the ways in which they relate to one another, and how they might be integrated into accounts of delusional belief formation. The jumping off point is the idea that recent work in philosophy of mind and epistemology which has sought to characterize the nature of belief and imagination allows us to formulate the issues with new precision, by, for example, drawing on work concerning how imagination is involved in delusion formation, or work concerning how to properly distinguish imagination from belief.The volume also considers questions concerning imagination's architecture, the role of metacognitive error in our mental lives, how best to understand delusional experience, and the relationship between delusion and evidence. The contributors are ideally placed to explore these issues, both individually and as a collective. With interests spanning different disciplines (philosophy, psychology, cognitive science), and approaches (theoretical, empirically informed), the result is a rich and varied collection of insights.

The past few decades have witnessed an intense focus on the notion of normativity. We orientate ourselves to think about normativity by asking a range of questions. There are ways we act and think, and ways in which the world is. But as well as what there is and what we do, what should or ought we to do? What reasons are there for acting and thinking? What values do certain ways of being have? What authority is had by the norms and standards that govern our behaviour and thought? At the heart of these debates are other questions. How should we characterize normative notions such as reason and value? What are the relations between them? Are they all properly normative? The Future of Normativity brings together work by a set of leading philosophers to consider what normative thought could and should be. These questions gain additional colour and point by being considered within different areas of our lives, such as the areas concerned with ethics, aesthetics, and epistemology. Further issues then come to the fore. Reasons and obligations in some areas seem to have more authority than in others, but why and how? Is there a 'unity of normativity' across different areas? This volume therefore considers familiar questions afresh while also introducing new questions and topics, all of which bear on the future of normativity.