Rasmus Thybo Jensen – författare

How does the idea that perception must provide reasons for our empirical judgements constrain our conception of our perceptual experiences? This volume presents ten new essays on perception which in different ways address this fundamental question. Charles Travis and John McDowell debate whether we need to ascribe content to experience in order to understand how it can provide the subject with reasons. Other essays address issues such as the following: What exactlyis the Myth of the Given and why should it be worthwhile to try to avoid it? What constitutes our experiential reasons? Is it experiences themselves, the objects of experiences, or facts about our experiences? Should we conceive of experiential reasons as conclusive reasons? How should we conceive ofthe fallibility of our perceptual capacities if we think of experiences as capable of providing conclusive reasons? How should we conceive of the objects of experience? The contributors offer a variety of views on the reason-giving potential of experience, engaging explicitly and critically with each other''s work.

How does the idea that perception must provide reasons for our empirical judgements constrain our conception of our perceptual experiences? This volume presents ten new essays on perception which in different ways address this fundamental question. Charles Travis and John McDowell debate whether we need to ascribe content to experience in order to understand how it can provide the subject with reasons. Other essays address issues such as the following: What exactlyis the Myth of the Given and why should it be worthwhile to try to avoid it? What constitutes our experiential reasons? Is it experiences themselves, the objects of experiences, or facts about our experiences? Should we conceive of experiential reasons as conclusive reasons? How should we conceive ofthe fallibility of our perceptual capacities if we think of experiences as capable of providing conclusive reasons? How should we conceive of the objects of experience? The contributors offer a variety of views on the reason-giving potential of experience, engaging explicitly and critically with each other''s work.

How does the idea that perception must provide reasons for our empirical judgements constrain our conception of our perceptual experiences? This volume presents ten new essays on perception which in different ways address this fundamental question. Charles Travis and John McDowell debate whether we need to ascribe content to experience in order to understand how it can provide the subject with reasons. Other essays address issues such as the following: What exactly is the Myth of the Given and why should it be worthwhile to try to avoid it? What constitutes our experiential reasons? Is it experiences themselves, the objects of experiences, or facts about our experiences? Should we conceive of experiential reasons as conclusive reasons? How should we conceive of the fallibility of our perceptual capacities if we think of experiences as capable of providing conclusive reasons? How should we conceive of the objects of experience? The contributors offer a variety of views on the reason-giving potential of experience, engaging explicitly and critically with each other's work.

The 17 original essays of this volume explore the relevance of the phenomenological approach to contemporary debates concerning the role of embodiment in our cognitive, emotional and practical life. The papers demonstrate the theoretical vitality and critical potential of the phenomenological tradition both through critically engagement with other disciplines (medical anthropology, psychoanalysis, psychiatry, the cognitive sciences) and through the articulation of novel interpretations of classical works in the tradition, in particular the works of Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jean-Paul Sartre. The concrete phenomena analyzed in this book include: chronic pain, anorexia, melancholia and depression.