Elements In the History of Philosophy and Theology in the West – serie

This Element analyzes the development of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's conception of religion through key textual evidence: fragments, lectures, and published works. The structure is largely chronological to allow readers to observe the evolution of Hegel's understanding from his early theological preoccupations to the systematic formulations of his mature period. One organizational exception-treating the 1830 Encyclopaedia (Section 5) before the Berlin lectures of the preceding decade (Section 6) - serves the clarifying purpose of better situating the lectures within the conceptual framework that guided them. Substantively, this Element challenges the common label 'philosophy of religion.' For Hegel, religion was not a discrete academic subfield to which philosophical conclusions were subsequently applied. Rather, alongside art and philosophy, it occupies the apex of his system, functioning as a mode of cognition in its own right and providing resources for understanding how human thought conceptualizes the relation between the finite and the Element absolute.

This Element analyzes the development of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's conception of religion through key textual evidence: fragments, lectures, and published works. The structure is largely chronological to allow readers to observe the evolution of Hegel's understanding from his early theological preoccupations to the systematic formulations of his mature period. One organizational exception-treating the 1830 Encyclopaedia (Section 5) before the Berlin lectures of the preceding decade (Section 6) - serves the clarifying purpose of better situating the lectures within the conceptual framework that guided them. Substantively, this Element challenges the common label 'philosophy of religion.' For Hegel, religion was not a discrete academic subfield to which philosophical conclusions were subsequently applied. Rather, alongside art and philosophy, it occupies the apex of his system, functioning as a mode of cognition in its own right and providing resources for understanding how human thought conceptualizes the relation between the finite and the Element absolute.

C. S. Lewis was an adamant atheist when he entered Oxford University as a student in 1917. By 1931, he was an Oxford don and a Christian. Lewis was someone who did not think highly of climates of opinion, and in his book The Problem of Pain he warned against uncritically going along with them: 'I take a very low view of 'climates of opinion'. In his own subject every man knows that all discoveries are made and all errors corrected by those who ignore the 'climate of opinion'.' A climate of opinion exists today that either intentionally or unintentionally disenchants or debunks C. S. Lewis. In this Element, the author explains Lewis' belief in the existence of the soul and how it related to his conviction that happiness consists of experiences of pleasure and is the purpose of life, God exists, and Christianity is true.

C. S. Lewis was an adamant atheist when he entered Oxford University as a student in 1917. By 1931, he was an Oxford don and a Christian. Lewis was someone who did not think highly of climates of opinion, and in his book The Problem of Pain he warned against uncritically going along with them: 'I take a very low view of 'climates of opinion'. In his own subject every man knows that all discoveries are made and all errors corrected by those who ignore the 'climate of opinion'.' A climate of opinion exists today that either intentionally or unintentionally disenchants or debunks C. S. Lewis. In this Element, the author explains Lewis' belief in the existence of the soul and how it related to his conviction that happiness consists of experiences of pleasure and is the purpose of life, God exists, and Christianity is true.

Participation has been central to the story of Western philosophy and theology for at least two millennia. It has been employed to conceptualise the relationship between God and creation, between universals and particulars, and between the One and the many. This Element approaches the concept systematically to acquire an appreciation of its breadth and depth under four fundamental themes: creation and the divine ideas, incarnation and salvation, being and multiplicity, and the human activities of naming, knowing and making. In doing so it examines some of the key thinkers in the participatory tradition, including Augustine, Irenaeus, Aquinas and Nicholas of Cusa. Readers will be introduced to the key contours and manifestations of participatory metaphysics, and its role in Christianity's self-articulation. Together, these considerations will demonstrate how the metaphysics of participation has shaped the Christian tradition.

Participation has been central to the story of Western philosophy and theology for at least two millennia. It has been employed to conceptualise the relationship between God and creation, between universals and particulars, and between the One and the many. This Element approaches the concept systematically to acquire an appreciation of its breadth and depth under four fundamental themes: creation and the divine ideas, incarnation and salvation, being and multiplicity, and the human activities of naming, knowing and making. In doing so it examines some of the key thinkers in the participatory tradition, including Augustine, Irenaeus, Aquinas and Nicholas of Cusa. Readers will be introduced to the key contours and manifestations of participatory metaphysics, and its role in Christianity's self-articulation. Together, these considerations will demonstrate how the metaphysics of participation has shaped the Christian tradition.

This Element aims to make good an imbalance in scholarly work on the thought of Karl Popper. Towards the end of his life he developed a dualistic view of the self, and connected to it, a model of reality consisting of three worlds: first the inorganic world; a second level domain of consciousness; and a third world of ideas, institutions and concepts. This third world develops beyond the ideas and understanding of its human inventors. The implications of these later developments has not been fully considered, nor has his idea that his critical rationalism rests on an irrational faith. These are considered against the context of his more famous work on science and the open society. Popper saw his late work in quasi-Platonic terms, and the similarities and differences here are explored. Does Popper's work as a whole tend in an unfulfiled Platonic direction or need a religious foundation?

This Element aims to make good an imbalance in scholarly work on the thought of Karl Popper. Towards the end of his life he developed a dualistic view of the self, and connected to it, a model of reality consisting of three worlds: first the inorganic world; a second level domain of consciousness; and a third world of ideas, institutions and concepts. This third world develops beyond the ideas and understanding of its human inventors. The implications of these later developments has not been fully considered, nor has his idea that his critical rationalism rests on an irrational faith. These are considered against the context of his more famous work on science and the open society. Popper saw his late work in quasi-Platonic terms, and the similarities and differences here are explored. Does Popper's work as a whole tend in an unfulfiled Platonic direction or need a religious foundation?

Iris Murdoch challenged the intellectual climate of her day. She transcended the reductive, behavioristic view of consciousness, sought to transcend the theory of values that focuses on will and desire, and defended instead a transcendent understanding of goodness and the Good that can transform us, leading us to renounce our egocentric nature. Her positive view of individual freedom and value led her to oppose strict gender roles and structuralism. Murdoch proposed that, ideally, our lives may be a pilgrimage toward the Good. She believed that the experience of beauty and art can enhance the pursuit of the Good. And yet Murdoch shunned the quest to discover some meaningful, transcendent reality (God or an impersonal, purposive force) to understand ourselves and the cosmos. In her words, 'we are simply here.' The authors ask whether Murdoch's foregoing a search for a broader transcendent reality to understand why we are here is compelling.

Iris Murdoch challenged the intellectual climate of her day. She transcended the reductive, behavioristic view of consciousness, sought to transcend the theory of values that focuses on will and desire, and defended instead a transcendent understanding of goodness and the Good that can transform us, leading us to renounce our egocentric nature. Her positive view of individual freedom and value led her to oppose strict gender roles and structuralism. Murdoch proposed that, ideally, our lives may be a pilgrimage toward the Good. She believed that the experience of beauty and art can enhance the pursuit of the Good. And yet Murdoch shunned the quest to discover some meaningful, transcendent reality (God or an impersonal, purposive force) to understand ourselves and the cosmos. In her words, 'we are simply here.' The authors ask whether Murdoch's foregoing a search for a broader transcendent reality to understand why we are here is compelling.

'Humanism' is among the most powerful terms in historical and contemporary political, religious, and philosophical debates. The term serves to position itself in ideological conflicts and to cement a claim to interpretation, but is highly contradictory. This Element addresses 'humanism' in its striking contradictions. Contemporary definitions are confronted with the historical contexts the term 'humanism' is applied to. Based on Niethammer's invention of 'humanism' as an anti-enlightenment pedagogical concept (1808), the book does not present a mere conceptual history, but rather a theoretically oriented discourse, an examination of the front positions, between which humanism has been constructed. In this way, its 'impossibility' is shown, which is rooted in its strict contextuality. Secondly, historiographical alternatives to this dilemma are pointed out, in order to finally give suggestions not only for an ethical-normative work of the historian of humanism, but for dealing with 'humanism' in general, in connection with discourse-theoretical suggestions. This title is also available as open access on Cambridge Core.

'Humanism' is among the most powerful terms in historical and contemporary political, religious, and philosophical debates. The term serves to position itself in ideological conflicts and to cement a claim to interpretation, but is highly contradictory. This Element addresses 'humanism' in its striking contradictions. Contemporary definitions are confronted with the historical contexts the term 'humanism' is applied to. Based on Niethammer's invention of 'humanism' as an anti-enlightenment pedagogical concept (1808), the book does not present a mere conceptual history, but rather a theoretically oriented discourse, an examination of the front positions, between which humanism has been constructed. In this way, its 'impossibility' is shown, which is rooted in its strict contextuality. Secondly, historiographical alternatives to this dilemma are pointed out, in order to finally give suggestions not only for an ethical-normative work of the historian of humanism, but for dealing with 'humanism' in general, in connection with discourse-theoretical suggestions. This title is also available as open access on Cambridge Core.

This Element examines the historical context and intellectual implications of the Thomistic revival inaugurated by Pope Leo XIII's encyclical Aeterni Patris, pursuing two principal objectives. First, this Element demonstrates that Aeterni Patris represented a decisive turning point in Catholic philosophical and theological thought: it not only revitalised Thomism but also brought an end to the doctrinal pluralism that had characterized nineteenth-century Catholicism. Second, the study argues that the Thomistic revival envisioned by Leo XIII was not a neutral academic enterprise concerned merely with a renewed engagement with Aquinas's doctrine, but rather an ideological initiative rooted in the framework of intransigent Catholicism, wherein the restoration of Thomism was conceived as instrumental to the formation of a new Christian worldview.

This Element examines the historical context and intellectual implications of the Thomistic revival inaugurated by Pope Leo XIII's encyclical Aeterni Patris, pursuing two principal objectives. First, this Element demonstrates that Aeterni Patris represented a decisive turning point in Catholic philosophical and theological thought: it not only revitalised Thomism but also brought an end to the doctrinal pluralism that had characterized nineteenth-century Catholicism. Second, the study argues that the Thomistic revival envisioned by Leo XIII was not a neutral academic enterprise concerned merely with a renewed engagement with Aquinas's doctrine, but rather an ideological initiative rooted in the framework of intransigent Catholicism, wherein the restoration of Thomism was conceived as instrumental to the formation of a new Christian worldview.

Augustine of Hippo (354-430 CE) is widely recognised as providing the foundational theological discussion of the natural law for Western Christianity. Yet his thinking on the natural law has not been examined in depth, despite the growing interest among contemporary theologians and philosophers in the natural law. For Christian thinkers, the idea of a natural moral law directly raises the question of the relationship between reason and revelation. In particular, the idea of the natural law needs to be reconciled with the idea of the divine law: that is, with the traditional Christian claim that knowing right from wrong is dependent in some way, or to some extent, on receiving God's self-revelation in Jesus Christ. This study revisits and revises our understanding of how Augustine reconciled reason and revelation in his discussion of the natural law.

Augustine of Hippo (354-430 CE) is widely recognised as providing the foundational theological discussion of the natural law for Western Christianity. Yet his thinking on the natural law has not been examined in depth, despite the growing interest among contemporary theologians and philosophers in the natural law. For Christian thinkers, the idea of a natural moral law directly raises the question of the relationship between reason and revelation. In particular, the idea of the natural law needs to be reconciled with the idea of the divine law: that is, with the traditional Christian claim that knowing right from wrong is dependent in some way, or to some extent, on receiving God's self-revelation in Jesus Christ. This study revisits and revises our understanding of how Augustine reconciled reason and revelation in his discussion of the natural law.

Traditionally, Christians have viewed unbelief as resulting from moral and/or cognitive shortcomings. However, a recent proposal such as John Schellenberg's 'divine hiddenness argument' for atheism has supported the idea that there is no-fault unbelief. In this Element, the author draws on important insights from medieval Christian thought to argue that both believers and non-believers should stop blaming each other based on mere evidence. Believers may recognise that no-fault unbelief can, in a sense, apply to them, too. They may find it perplexing that they neither believe nor achieve communion with God as much as they would like. Proponents of no-fault unbelief might focus on achieving communion with God rather than solely worrying about absolving themselves of blame. Ultimately, believers and non-believers alike might promote spiritual progress by setting aside the primacy of evidence and committing themselves to God and the good.