Elements in the Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche – serie

This Element argues for an interpretation of Nietzsche on virtue according to which he believes that because different people have different constellations of instincts and other drives, and because instincts and drives can only be shaped and redirected within boundaries, he recommends different virtues as fitting and conducive to flourishing for different types of people. In his own way, these include curiosity, intellectual courage, the pathos of distance, having a sense of humor, and solitude. This interpretation is supported by both a digital humanities methodology and close readings of passages from Nietzsche's middle, mature, and late works.

Suffering is a theme throughout Nietzsche's writings. His views are often controversial and challenging. He explores ways of understanding suffering not as an 'objection to life', but as something that can enhance life. This Element examines Nietzsche's views on suffering from different angles: his early claim that the representation of suffering in the art form of tragedy enabled the ancient Greeks to affirm life, his analysis of cruelty as an expression of will to power, and his critique of 'the morality of compassion' which he claims would impoverish life by removing its suffering. Nietzsche views suffering as necessary for psychological growth and great human achievement. It is neither good nor bad in itself, and its value depends on who suffers and in what context. Although Nietzsche's rhetoric sometimes glorifies suffering and cruelty irresponsibly, his work advances our understanding of suffering by viewing it through different perspectives and affective attitudes.

Why is Nietzsche's thought and philosophy still regarded as relevant today? There are a large number of possible answers to a question like this, but one of the most important and persuasive is that Nietzsche questioned and discussed the nature, character and value of our values. Nietzsche frequently turns other questions such as epistemological and ontological ones into axiological ones, making values pivotal in his thought. It is possible to argue that the revaluation of all values is both the most important and today the most relevant of Nietzsche's main philosophical themes and projects. Furthermore, the theme is intimately involved with what Nietzsche regarded as his most important work, his magnum opus (that he called his Hauptwerk), for a long period called The Will to Power but later Revaluation of All Values.

The idea of the eternal recurrence is that we will live the exact same lives again an infinite number of times. Nietzsche appreciates that this would multiply the value of a single life by infinity, justifying intense emotional responses. His unpublished notes provide a cosmological argument for the eternal recurrence that anticipates Poincaré's recurrence theorem. Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra describes its hero discovering this idea and struggling to accept the recurrence of all bad things. He eventually comes to love the eternal recurrence because it will bring back all the joys of his life, and teaches this idea to others.

Nietzsche's critique of pity is, by his own account, the initiating move in his broad-scale critique of morality. Despite this, it has received limited scholarly attention. This Element develops and defends a detailed account of three different kinds of argument that Nietzsche makes against pity, which build progressively to form a unified critique. First, there is a psychological investigation, in which Nietzsche reveals pity's dark subconscious motives. Second, Nietzsche addresses pity in its interpersonal dimensions, arguing that it constitutes a disrespectful form of relation to another person. Finally, Nietzsche argues that pity will lead to nihilism. Nietzsche's critique is genuinely radical, demanding that we question and abandon many moral convictions we hold dear. But it is also revealed to be deeply compelling: Nietzsche objects to pity for reasons that we should take extremely seriously.

Nietzsche's critique of pity is, by his own account, the initiating move in his broad-scale critique of morality. Despite this, it has received limited scholarly attention. This Element develops and defends a detailed account of three different kinds of argument that Nietzsche makes against pity, which build progressively to form a unified critique. First, there is a psychological investigation, in which Nietzsche reveals pity's dark subconscious motives. Second, Nietzsche addresses pity in its interpersonal dimensions, arguing that it constitutes a disrespectful form of relation to another person. Finally, Nietzsche argues that pity will lead to nihilism. Nietzsche's critique is genuinely radical, demanding that we question and abandon many moral convictions we hold dear. But it is also revealed to be deeply compelling: Nietzsche objects to pity for reasons that we should take extremely seriously.

If one were asked to name Nietzsche's primary concepts (e.g. will to power, death of God, eternal recurrence), education would likely appear near the bottom of the list. Nevertheless, Nietzsche was intensely occupied with the topic. To see how Nietzsche formulates his basic questions about the nature and aim of education, I begin with his lectures On the Future of our Educational Institutions. I then move to his third Untimely Meditation, 'Schopenhauer as Educator,' where he articulates his fundamental idea of "culture" and the educational means required to produce and sustain it. In continuous dialogue with SE and later works, I ask: Which educational practices are most apt to produce the philosopher? What is involved in aesthetic education and the production of the artist? Are there educational paths to the saint? If so, what do they look like? My conclusion probes Nietzsche's sharp distinction between real education and its counterfeits.

If one were asked to name Nietzsche's primary concepts (e.g. will to power, death of God, eternal recurrence), education would likely appear near the bottom of the list. Nevertheless, Nietzsche was intensely occupied with the topic. To see how Nietzsche formulates his basic questions about the nature and aim of education, I begin with his lectures On the Future of our Educational Institutions. I then move to his third Untimely Meditation, 'Schopenhauer as Educator,' where he articulates his fundamental idea of "culture" and the educational means required to produce and sustain it. In continuous dialogue with SE and later works, I ask: Which educational practices are most apt to produce the philosopher? What is involved in aesthetic education and the production of the artist? Are there educational paths to the saint? If so, what do they look like? My conclusion probes Nietzsche's sharp distinction between real education and its counterfeits.

This Element argues for an interpretation of Nietzsche on virtue according to which he believes that because different people have different constellations of instincts and other drives, and because instincts and drives can only be shaped and redirected within boundaries, he recommends different virtues as fitting and conducive to flourishing for different types of people. In his own way, these include curiosity, intellectual courage, the pathos of distance, having a sense of humor, and solitude. This interpretation is supported by both a digital humanities methodology and close readings of passages from Nietzsche's middle, mature, and late works.

The idea of the eternal recurrence is that we will live the exact same lives again an infinite number of times. Nietzsche appreciates that this would multiply the value of a single life by infinity, justifying intense emotional responses. His unpublished notes provide a cosmological argument for the eternal recurrence that anticipates Poincaré's recurrence theorem. Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra describes its hero discovering this idea and struggling to accept the recurrence of all bad things. He eventually comes to love the eternal recurrence because it will bring back all the joys of his life, and teaches this idea to others.

Why is Nietzsche's thought and philosophy still regarded as relevant today? There are a large number of possible answers to a question like this, but one of the most important and persuasive is that Nietzsche questioned and discussed the nature, character and value of our values. Nietzsche frequently turns other questions such as epistemological and ontological ones into axiological ones, making values pivotal in his thought. It is possible to argue that the revaluation of all values is both the most important and today the most relevant of Nietzsche's main philosophical themes and projects. Furthermore, the theme is intimately involved with what Nietzsche regarded as his most important work, his magnum opus (that he called his Hauptwerk), for a long period called The Will to Power but later Revaluation of All Values.

Suffering is a theme throughout Nietzsche's writings. His views are often controversial and challenging. He explores ways of understanding suffering not as an 'objection to life', but as something that can enhance life. This Element examines Nietzsche's views on suffering from different angles: his early claim that the representation of suffering in the art form of tragedy enabled the ancient Greeks to affirm life, his analysis of cruelty as an expression of will to power, and his critique of 'the morality of compassion' which he claims would impoverish life by removing its suffering. Nietzsche views suffering as necessary for psychological growth and great human achievement. It is neither good nor bad in itself, and its value depends on who suffers and in what context. Although Nietzsche's rhetoric sometimes glorifies suffering and cruelty irresponsibly, his work advances our understanding of suffering by viewing it through different perspectives and affective attitudes.

This Element explores Nietzsche's thinking about fate. As a doctrine, fatalism asserts that whatever happens does so necessarily. 'Fate', however, implies an overall pattern for every individual life which imposes its own necessity on the events of that life, although with some contribution from chance. Nietzsche's ideas on fate were influenced by other thinkers, notably Emerson and the ancient Stoics, whom he treats with both sympathy and exasperation. After discussing this context, the Element turns to two of Nietzsche's key themes: amor fati and 'becoming what you are'. In a striking way, each of these 'formulae' presents two contrasted elements standing in a close but tense relationship. Behind them is a conflict between the givenness of fate and our capacity to live our lives in our own way. At the same time, each promises an answer to the question: how are we to live with fate?