Melbourne International Philosophy Series – serie

The general purpose of this book differs from those of most of the works found traditionally in the field of political philosophy. Firstly, the present approach is in no way prescriptive or normative, as the interest centres on explication rather than an evaluative assess­ ment of this, that or another type of arrangement, or act. 1 It will be clear that I am in complete disagreement with Gewirth when he claims that "The central concern of political philosophy is the moral evaluation of political power. " It seems obvious that the under­ standing of political and social forms of life, and a fortiori of political power, must come before its evaluation. This cannot be provided by moral assessment alone. Thus an analytical or explicative approach which promotes such understanding must come first, and must be the "central concern" of the appropriate philosophical discipline. This is not to say that moral assessment is illegitimate, nor even that it cannot be one of the concerns of political philosophy, but it is to deny that it can be central, even though it might be somebody's central interest. To the extent to which this book is successful it will provide an argu­ mentin my favour - if the job can be done, obviously it is of primary importance. But we should not assume that it cannot be done unless we can show that there is no separate sphere of political and/or social phenomena.

Twardowski's little book - of which I here offer a translation - is one of the most remarkable works in the history of modern philosophy. It is concise, clear, and - in Findlay's words - "amazingly rich in ideas. "l It is therefore a paradigm of what some contemporary philosophers approvingly call "analytic philosophy. " But Twardowski's book is also of considerable historical significance. His views reflect Brentano's ear­ lier position and thus shed some light on this stage of Brentano's philo­ sophy. Furthermore, they form a link between this stage, on the one hand, and those two grandiose attempts to propagate rationalism in an age of science, on the other hand, which are known as Meinong's theory of entities and HusserI's phenomenology. Twardowski's views thus point to the future and introduce many of the problems which, through the influence of Meinong, HusserI, Russell, and Moore, have become standard fare in contemporary philosophy. In this introduc­ tion, I shall call attention to the close connection between some of Twardowski's main ideas and the corresponding thoughts of these four philosophers. 1. IDEAS AND THEIR INTENTIONS Twardowski's main contention is clear. He claims that we must dis­ tinguish between the act, the content, and the object of a presentation. The crucial German term is 'V orstellung. ' This term has a corresponding verb and allows for such expressions as 'das V orgestellte.

1. STRUCTURE AND REFERENCES 1.1. The main part of the dictionary consists of alphabetically arranged articles concerned with basic logical theories and some other selected topics. Within each article a set of concepts is defined in their mutual relations. This way of defining concepts in the context of a theory provides better understand­ ing of ideas than that provided by isolated short defmitions. A disadvantage of this method is that it takes more time to look something up inside an extensive article. To reduce this disadvantage the following measures have been adopted. Each article is divided into numbered sections, the numbers, in boldface type, being addresses to which we refer. Those sections of larger articles which are divided at the first level, i.e. numbered with single numerals, have titles. Main sections are further subdivided, the subsections being numbered by numerals added to the main section number, e.g. I, 1.1, 1.2, ... , 1.1.1, 1.1.2, and so on. A comprehensive subject index is supplied together with a glossary. The aim of the latter is to provide, if possible, short defmitions which sometimes may prove sufficient. As to the use of the glossary, see the comment preceding it.

Liberty is perhaps the most praised of all social ideals. Rare is the modern political movement which has not inscribed "liberty," "freedom," "liber­ ation," or "emancipation" prominently on its banners. Rarer still is the political leader who has spoken out against liberty, though, of course, some have condemned "license. " While there is overwhelming agreement on the value of liberty, however, there is a great deal of disagreement on what liberty is. It is this fact that explains how it is possible for the most violently opposed of political parties to pay homage to the "same" ideal. From among the many ways liberty is understood, this essay will be concerned with only two. The first takes liberty to be the absence of human interference with the individual's actions. This is the way liberty has been understood by the Anglo-American "liberal" tradition from Thomas Hobbes in the seventeenth century to l. S. Mill in the nineteenth to such contemporary, and very dissimilar, political philosophers as John Rawls and Robert Nozick. The "absence of interference" school is far from monolithic in its understanding of liberty, but it is united in its opposition to a rival account on which liberty is not taken to be the absence of human interference but rather the presence of diverse pos­ sibilities or opportunities.

Identity has for long been an important concept in philosophy and logic. Plato in his Sophist puts same among those fonns which "run through" all others. The scholastics inherited the idea (and the tenninology), classifying same as one of the "transcendentals", i.e. as running through all the categories. The work of Locke and l.eibniz made the concept a problematic one. But it is rather recently, i.e. since the importance of Frege has been generally recognized, that there has been a keen interest in the notion, fonnulated by him, of a criterion of identity. This, at first sight harmless as well as useful, has proved to be like a charge of dynamite. The seed had indeed been sown long ago, by Euclid. In Book V of his Elements he first gives a useless defmition of a ratio: "A ratio is a sort of relation between two magnitudes in respect of muchness". But then, in definition 5 he answers, not the question "What is a ratio?" but rather ''What is it for magnitudes to be in the same ratio?" and this is the definition that does the work.

1. STRUCTURE AND REFERENCES 1.1. The main part of the dictionary consists of alphabetically arranged articles concerned with basic logical theories and some other selected topics. Within each article a set of concepts is defined in their mutual relations. This way of defining concepts in the context of a theory provides better understand­ ing of ideas than that provided by isolated short defmitions. A disadvantage of this method is that it takes more time to look something up inside an extensive article. To reduce this disadvantage the following measures have been adopted. Each article is divided into numbered sections, the numbers, in boldface type, being addresses to which we refer. Those sections of larger articles which are divided at the first level, i.e. numbered with single numerals, have titles. Main sections are further subdivided, the subsections being numbered by numerals added to the main section number, e.g. I, 1.1, 1.2, ... , 1.1.1, 1.1.2, and so on. A comprehensive subject index is supplied together with a glossary. The aim of the latter is to provide, if possible, short defmitions which sometimes may prove sufficient. As to the use of the glossary, see the comment preceding it.

Identity has for long been an important concept in philosophy and logic. Plato in his Sophist puts same among those fonns which "run through" all others. The scholastics inherited the idea (and the tenninology), classifying same as one of the "transcendentals", i.e. as running through all the categories. The work of Locke and l.eibniz made the concept a problematic one. But it is rather recently, i.e. since the importance of Frege has been generally recognized, that there has been a keen interest in the notion, fonnulated by him, of a criterion of identity. This, at first sight harmless as well as useful, has proved to be like a charge of dynamite. The seed had indeed been sown long ago, by Euclid. In Book V of his Elements he first gives a useless defmition of a ratio: "A ratio is a sort of relation between two magnitudes in respect of muchness". But then, in definition 5 he answers, not the question "What is a ratio?" but rather ''What is it for magnitudes to be in the same ratio?" and this is the definition that does the work.

The history of aesthetics, like the histories of other sciences, may be treated in a two-fold manner: as the history of the men who created the field of study, or as the history of the questions that have been raised and resolved in the course of its pursuit. The earlier History of Aesthetics (3 volumes, 1960-68, English-language edition 1970-74) by the author of the present book was a history of men, of writers and artists who in centuries past have spoken up concerning beauty and art, form and crea­ tivity. The present book returns to the same subject, but treats it in a different way: as the history of aesthetic questions, concepts, theories. The matter of the two books, the previous and the present, is in part the same; but only in part: for the earlier book ended with the 17th century, while the present one brings the subject up to our own times. And from the 18th century to the 20th much happened in aesthetics; it was only in that period that aesthetics achieved recognition as a separate science, received a name of its own, and produced theories that early scholars and artists had never dreamed of.

Liberty is perhaps the most praised of all social ideals. Rare is the modern political movement which has not inscribed "liberty," "freedom," "liber­ ation," or "emancipation" prominently on its banners. Rarer still is the political leader who has spoken out against liberty, though, of course, some have condemned "license. " While there is overwhelming agreement on the value of liberty, however, there is a great deal of disagreement on what liberty is. It is this fact that explains how it is possible for the most violently opposed of political parties to pay homage to the "same" ideal. From among the many ways liberty is understood, this essay will be concerned with only two. The first takes liberty to be the absence of human interference with the individual's actions. This is the way liberty has been understood by the Anglo-American "liberal" tradition from Thomas Hobbes in the seventeenth century to l. S. Mill in the nineteenth to such contemporary, and very dissimilar, political philosophers as John Rawls and Robert Nozick. The "absence of interference" school is far from monolithic in its understanding of liberty, but it is united in its opposition to a rival account on which liberty is not taken to be the absence of human interference but rather the presence of diverse pos­ sibilities or opportunities.