Jan J.T. Srzednicki – författare

Philosophy flourished in Australia after the war. There was spectacular growth in both the number of departments and the number of philosophers. On top of this philosophy spread beyond the philosophy departments. Serious studies, and interest in philosophy is now common in faculties as diverse as law, science and education. Neither is this development merely quantitative, the Australian researcher has come of age and contributes widely to international debates. At least one movement originated in Australia. This makes the study of philosophy in Australia timely, evidenced by the number of articles concerned with this area that begin to appear in international journals. In Australia itself there is growing interest in the history of the country's philosophical development. There are discussions in conferences and meetings: the matter is now the subject of courses.

The theory presented here represents a radical departure from current treatments of the theory of knowledge. It makes the point that all such work is based on the false assumption that what makes knowledge possible is in itself knowable in some way, whereas in fact it is below the threshold of any cognitive consciousness. It is therefore necessary to seek the basis of the possibility of knowledge on entirely different levels, and in entirely novel ways. "To Know or Not to Know" is aimed at the general philosopher, and the specialist in the field of epistemology, but relevant to anyone who would understand how it is possible to know anything at all.

In the period between the two World Wars, Stanislaw Lesniewski, a prominent Polish logician, created his system of the foundations of mathematics, a system comprising three deductive theories: protothetic, ontology, and mereology. Lesniewski initiated his research programme in the foundations of mathematics in 1914 with his studies on a general theory of sets (to be later renamed "mereology"). The construction of ontology in the period between 1919 and 1921 marked the next step in the formation of Lesniewski's system. In order to combine mereology and ontology into a logically rigorous system, he constructed protothetic - the system of "first principles". Lesniewski's system of the foundations of mathematics was the "most thorough, original, and philosophically significant attempt to provide a logically secure foundation for the whole of mathematics" (Z. Jordan). This volume is a collection of the major contributions to protothetic, and includes the protothetic bibliography.

Franz Brentano 1 was an important philosopher, but for a long time his importance was under-estimated. At least in the English speaking countries, he came to be remembered best as the initiator of a philoso­ phical position which he in fact abandoned for good and sufficient 2 reasons. His ultimate and most important contributions passed almost unnoticed. Even such a well-informed and well-prepared book as Passmore's IOO Years of Philosophy (Duckworth, I957), is open to the same comment; Passmore concentrated his attention on the early Brentano, because he regarded his influence on the British philo­ sophical scene as being confined to Brentano's early work. Brentano's pupils, e. g. , Husserl, Meinong, Marty and Twardowski, were often influential and, often enough, they departed from the strict common­ sense and advisedly cautious attitude of their great teacher. Thus even on the continent, the public image of Brentano tended to be incomplete (and sometimes distorted), outside the narrower circle of pupils, followers, and people with special interest. This, or very nearly this, was still the case in I955, when my contacts with the followers of Twardowski made me turn towards the study of Brentano. Since then there has been a gratifying revival of interest in his work. His early book on Aristotle was reprinted in German and two of his main positions, Psychologie and Wahrheit und Evidenz, are appearing in English translations. Translations into other languages, e. g.

The general purpose of this book differs from those of most of the works found traditionally in the field of political philosophy. Firstly, the present approach is in no way prescriptive or normative, as the interest centres on explication rather than an evaluative assess­ ment of this, that or another type of arrangement, or act. 1 It will be clear that I am in complete disagreement with Gewirth when he claims that "The central concern of political philosophy is the moral evaluation of political power. " It seems obvious that the under­ standing of political and social forms of life, and a fortiori of political power, must come before its evaluation. This cannot be provided by moral assessment alone. Thus an analytical or explicative approach which promotes such understanding must come first, and must be the "central concern" of the appropriate philosophical discipline. This is not to say that moral assessment is illegitimate, nor even that it cannot be one of the concerns of political philosophy, but it is to deny that it can be central, even though it might be somebody's central interest. To the extent to which this book is successful it will provide an argu­ mentin my favour - if the job can be done, obviously it is of primary importance. But we should not assume that it cannot be done unless we can show that there is no separate sphere of political and/or social phenomena.

The book is divided into chapters, but several themes run across them. This is, in fact, the reason for writing a book rather than a number of independent articles; for it appears that several moments of Kant's work are characterized by similar problems, and consequently we might be unable to see the impact of these on a more 1 i mi ted canvas. But further, and perhaps no less importantly, the shared problems are likely to be indicative of the nature of the whole area under discussion. Given this, to concentrate our attention on them should provide clarification not accessible in any other way. It is one of the objects of the present book to obtai n thi s clarification, and to apply it to the area itself, rather than merely to utilize the results in Kantian exegesis and elucidation. Thus the aim is not predominantly historical. Of the various themes, the theme of Space and Time turns out to be of prime importance to the whole picture presented, and within it, the theme of space. This is not perhaps surprising, for Kant's central task is to provide for objectivity; i. e. , to explain how a "subjective" stream of perceptions can amount to a perception of the world in which there are both subjective and objective moments.

Stanislaw Lesniewski (1886-1939) was one of the leading Polish logicians and founders of the Warsaw School of Logic whose membership included, beside himself, Jan Lukasiewicz, Tadeusz Kotarbinski, Alfred Tarski, and many others. In his lifetime LeSniewski published only a few hundred pages. He produced many important results in many areas of mathematics; these stood in various relations to each other, and to materials produced by others, and, in time, created more and more editorial problems. Very many were left unpublished at the time of his death. Then in 1944 in the fire of Warsaw the whole of this material was burned and lost -a considerable loss since a great deal of what is important could have been reconstructed from these notes. The present publication aims at presenting unique Lesniewski's materials from alternative sources comprising lecture notes taken during some of Lesniewski's lectures and seminars delivered at the University of Warsaw be­ tween the two world wars. The editors are aware of the limitations of student notes which cannot compensate for the loss of the original materials. However, they are unique in reflecting Lesniewski's ideas as he himself presented them. Already at the time of his death it was realized that these notes would provide a unique access to Lesniewski's own thought as well as a valuable record of some of the activities of the Warsaw School of Logic.

Section 1 One of the big problems facing us is the need to plan for the betterment and improvement of society. In any status quo there are many unsatisfactory moments and experience shows that with changing conditions, even those elements of our communal structure that work well will often get out of step and become a problem. We need then to introduce devices both to alleviate present troubles and, if possible, to anticipate future ones. On the whole, it might appear to the untutored eye that the matter is relatively simple. For instance, if we keep increasing prices of commodities without increasing incomes, and especially if we allow inflation to proceed unfettered as well, the situation will certainly deteriorate. What we need to

Philosophy flourished in Australia after the war. There was spectacular growth in both the number of departments and the number of philosophers. On top of this philosophy spread beyond the philosophy departments. Serious studies, and interest in philosophy is now common in faculties as diverse as law, science and education. Neither is this development merely quantitative, the Australian researcher has come of age and contributes widely to international debates. At least one movement originated in Australia. This makes the study of philosophy in Australia timely, evidenced by the number of articles concerned with this area that begin to appear in international journals. In Australia itself there is growing interest in the history of the country's philosophical development. There are discussions in conferences and meetings: the matter is now the subject of courses.

l. THE GENERAL PROBLEM OF EPISTEMOLOGY There is a philosophical issue that surely precedes all other possible questions. It concerns the very possibility of our thinking about some­ thing to some purpose. Short of this no philosophy, theory or research would be possible. But it is not immediately clear that we are assured that what purports to be effective thought, and cognition is such in reality. What guarantee is there for instance that when one is under the impression that one is thinking that "the cat is on the mat" it is in fact the case that one is thinking this? One could not be thinking at all, only having a misleading mystic experience. And then even if one was thinking, one might not be really thinking of the cat being on the mat, but only that one wishes there was a cat, and wonders whether if there was it would be on the mat, and yet the subjective impression was that one was thinking: "The cat is on the mat" (the same picture might stand for both the thoughts mentioned). Then one might in some way try to think 'the cat is on the mat. ' yet be mistaken in that there aren't any material objects at all, and all one does is to inventory god's perceptions. And so on, and so on! These are of course the kind of problem that the layman habitually views with disdainful alarm.

Stanislaw Lesniewski (1886-1939) was one of the leading Polish logicians and founders of the Warsaw School of Logic whose membership included, beside himself, Jan Lukasiewicz, Tadeusz Kotarbinski, Alfred Tarski, and many others. In his lifetime LeSniewski published only a few hundred pages. He produced many important results in many areas of mathematics; these stood in various relations to each other, and to materials produced by others, and, in time, created more and more editorial problems. Very many were left unpublished at the time of his death. Then in 1944 in the fire of Warsaw the whole of this material was burned and lost -a considerable loss since a great deal of what is important could have been reconstructed from these notes. The present publication aims at presenting unique Lesniewski''s materials from alternative sources comprising lecture notes taken during some of Lesniewski''s lectures and seminars delivered at the University of Warsaw be­ tween the two world wars. The editors are aware of the limitations of student notes which cannot compensate for the loss of the original materials. However, they are unique in reflecting Lesniewski''s ideas as he himself presented them. Already at the time of his death it was realized that these notes would provide a unique access to Lesniewski''s own thought as well as a valuable record of some of the activities of the Warsaw School of Logic.

Section 1 One of the big problems facing us is the need to plan for the betterment and improvement of society. In any status quo there are many unsatisfactory moments and experience shows that with changing conditions, even those elements of our communal structure that work well will often get out of step and become a problem. We need then to introduce devices both to alleviate present troubles and, if possible, to anticipate future ones. On the whole, it might appear to the untutored eye that the matter is relatively simple. For instance, if we keep increasing prices of commodities without increasing incomes, and especially if we allow inflation to proceed unfettered as well, the situation will certainly deteriorate. What we need to

The book is divided into chapters, but several themes run across them. This is, in fact, the reason for writing a book rather than a number of independent articles; for it appears that several moments of Kant''s work are characterized by similar problems, and consequently we might be unable to see the impact of these on a more 1 i mi ted canvas. But further, and perhaps no less importantly, the shared problems are likely to be indicative of the nature of the whole area under discussion. Given this, to concentrate our attention on them should provide clarification not accessible in any other way. It is one of the objects of the present book to obtai n thi s clarification, and to apply it to the area itself, rather than merely to utilize the results in Kantian exegesis and elucidation. Thus the aim is not predominantly historical. Of the various themes, the theme of Space and Time turns out to be of prime importance to the whole picture presented, and within it, the theme of space. This is not perhaps surprising, for Kant''s central task is to provide for objectivity; i. e. , to explain how a "subjective" stream of perceptions can amount to a perception of the world in which there are both subjective and objective moments.

The book is divided into chapters, but several themes run across them. This is, in fact, the reason for writing a book rather than a number of independent articles; for it appears that several moments of Kant's work are characterized by similar problems, and consequently we might be unable to see the impact of these on a more 1 i mi ted canvas. But further, and perhaps no less importantly, the shared problems are likely to be indicative of the nature of the whole area under discussion. Given this, to concentrate our attention on them should provide clarification not accessible in any other way. It is one of the objects of the present book to obtai n thi s clarification, and to apply it to the area itself, rather than merely to utilize the results in Kantian exegesis and elucidation. Thus the aim is not predominantly historical. Of the various themes, the theme of Space and Time turns out to be of prime importance to the whole picture presented, and within it, the theme of space. This is not perhaps surprising, for Kant's central task is to provide for objectivity; i. e. , to explain how a "subjective" stream of perceptions can amount to a perception of the world in which there are both subjective and objective moments.

The general purpose of this book differs from those of most of the works found traditionally in the field of political philosophy. Firstly, the present approach is in no way prescriptive or normative, as the interest centres on explication rather than an evaluative assess­ ment of this, that or another type of arrangement, or act. 1 It will be clear that I am in complete disagreement with Gewirth when he claims that "The central concern of political philosophy is the moral evaluation of political power. " It seems obvious that the under­ standing of political and social forms of life, and a fortiori of political power, must come before its evaluation. This cannot be provided by moral assessment alone. Thus an analytical or explicative approach which promotes such understanding must come first, and must be the "central concern" of the appropriate philosophical discipline. This is not to say that moral assessment is illegitimate, nor even that it cannot be one of the concerns of political philosophy, but it is to deny that it can be central, even though it might be somebody''s central interest. To the extent to which this book is successful it will provide an argu­ mentin my favour - if the job can be done, obviously it is of primary importance. But we should not assume that it cannot be done unless we can show that there is no separate sphere of political and/or social phenomena.

Franz Brentano 1 was an important philosopher, but for a long time his importance was under-estimated. At least in the English speaking countries, he came to be remembered best as the initiator of a philoso­ phical position which he in fact abandoned for good and sufficient 2 reasons. His ultimate and most important contributions passed almost unnoticed. Even such a well-informed and well-prepared book as Passmore''s IOO Years of Philosophy (Duckworth, I957), is open to the same comment; Passmore concentrated his attention on the early Brentano, because he regarded his influence on the British philo­ sophical scene as being confined to Brentano''s early work. Brentano''s pupils, e. g. , Husserl, Meinong, Marty and Twardowski, were often influential and, often enough, they departed from the strict common­ sense and advisedly cautious attitude of their great teacher. Thus even on the continent, the public image of Brentano tended to be incomplete (and sometimes distorted), outside the narrower circle of pupils, followers, and people with special interest. This, or very nearly this, was still the case in I955, when my contacts with the followers of Twardowski made me turn towards the study of Brentano. Since then there has been a gratifying revival of interest in his work. His early book on Aristotle was reprinted in German and two of his main positions, Psychologie and Wahrheit und Evidenz, are appearing in English translations. Translations into other languages, e. g.

Between the two world wars, Stanislaw Lesniewski (1886-1939), created the famous and important system of foundations of mathematics that comprises three deductive theories: Protothetic, Ontology, and Mereology. His research started in 1914 with studies on the general theory of sets (later named `Mereology'). Ontology followed between 1919 and 1921, and was the next step towards an integrated system. In order to combine these two systematically he constructed Protothetic - the system of `first principles'. Together they amount to what Z. Jordan called `... most thorough, original, and philosophically significant attempt to provide a logically secure foundation for the whole of mathematics'. The volume collects many of the most significant commentaries on, and contributions to, Protothetic. A Protothetic Bibliography is included.

Stanislaw Lesniewski (1886-1939) was one of the leading Polish logicians and founders of the Warsaw School of Logic whose membership included, beside himself, Jan Lukasiewicz, Tadeusz Kotarbinski, Alfred Tarski, and many others. In his lifetime LeSniewski published only a few hundred pages. He produced many important results in many areas of mathematics; these stood in various relations to each other, and to materials produced by others, and, in time, created more and more editorial problems. Very many were left unpublished at the time of his death. Then in 1944 in the fire of Warsaw the whole of this material was burned and lost -a considerable loss since a great deal of what is important could have been reconstructed from these notes. The present publication aims at presenting unique Lesniewski's materials from alternative sources comprising lecture notes taken during some of Lesniewski's lectures and seminars delivered at the University of Warsaw be­ tween the two world wars. The editors are aware of the limitations of student notes which cannot compensate for the loss of the original materials. However, they are unique in reflecting Lesniewski's ideas as he himself presented them. Already at the time of his death it was realized that these notes would provide a unique access to Lesniewski's own thought as well as a valuable record of some of the activities of the Warsaw School of Logic.

Section 1 One of the big problems facing us is the need to plan for the betterment and improvement of society. In any status quo there are many unsatisfactory moments and experience shows that with changing conditions, even those elements of our communal structure that work well will often get out of step and become a problem. We need then to introduce devices both to alleviate present troubles and, if possible, to anticipate future ones. On the whole, it might appear to the untutored eye that the matter is relatively simple. For instance, if we keep increasing prices of commodities without increasing incomes, and especially if we allow inflation to proceed unfettered as well, the situation will certainly deteriorate. What we need to