Oxford Ethics Series - Böcker

In choosing between moral alternatives -- choosing between various forms of ethical action -- we typically make calculations of the following kind: A is better than B; B is better than C; therefore A is better than C. These inferences use the principle of transitivity and are fundamental to many forms of practical and theoretical theorizing, not just in moral and ethical theory but in economics. Indeed they are so common as to be almost invisible. What Larry Temkin's book shows is that, shockingly, if we want to continue making plausible judgments, we cannot continue to make these assumptions. Temkin shows that we are committed to various moral ideals that are, surprisingly, fundamentally incompatible with the idea that "better than" can be transitive. His book develops many examples where value judgments that we accept and find attractive, are incompatible with transitivity. While this might seem to leave two options -- reject transitivity, or reject some of our normative commitments in order to keep it -- Temkin is neutral on which path to follow, only making the case that a choice is necessary, and that the cost either way will be high. Temkin's book is a very original and deeply unsettling work of skeptical philosophy that mounts an important new challenge to contemporary ethics.

The Moral Target: Aiming at Right Conduct in War and Other Conflicts comprises essays that discuss aspects of war and other conflicts in the light of both nonconsequentialist ethical theory and the views of such theorists as Barbara Herman, Jeff McMahan, Avishai Margalit, and Michael Walzer. The first essay deals with the relation between states of affairs whose termination justifies war and states of affairs that once achieved should put an end to war. The next few essays deal with conduct in war. They first consider the implications of general moral principles (including the Doctrine of Double Effect and Principle of Permissible Harm) for the permissibility of harm to combatants and noncombatants, and then whether factors unique to war should alter what is permissible. In particular, if the context of war should affect the relative violability of different combatants and different noncombatants, if terror killing combatants and/or noncombatants should ever be permissible, and if there is liability to harm in virtue of belonging to a group. The fifth essay examines how recent discussions by nonconsequentialists about redirection of threats (as in the famous Trolley Problem) may illuminate the moral status of collaboration that took place with Nazis during the Holocaust. What justice requires after conflict and how our ability to provide it affects the permissibility of starting war, is the next topic. Truth and reconciliation commissions and retribution post-conflict are discussed, and whether harm to civilians stemming from such procedures (and how the harm arises) bear on the permissibility of instituting the procedures. The three concluding essays deal with moral aspects of conflicts outside of standard war, including those involving the threat of terrorism, resistance to communal injustice (for example, in the case of the Taliban women), and the use of nuclear weapons for deterrence.

Bioethical Prescriptions collects F.M. Kamm's articles on bioethics, which have appeared over the last twenty-five years and which have made her among the most influential philosophers in this area. Kamm is known for her intricate, sophisticated, and painstaking philosophical analyses of moral problems generally and of bioethical issues in particular. This volume showcases these articles -- revised to eliminate redundancies -- as parts of a coherent whole. A substantive introduction identifies important themes than run through the articles. Section headings include Death and Dying; Early Life (on conception and use of embryos, abortion, and childhood); Genetics and Other Enhancements (on cloning and other genetic technologies); Allocating Scarce Resources; and Methodology (on the relation of moral theory and practical ethics).

Frances Kamm's book deals with the question of the badness of death. Death is generally felt to be the worst wrong that can happen to one. Philosophers from Epicurus onwards have argued, on the contrary, that as death involves the absence of experience, and bad things involve bad sensations, death cannot be bad; also, for something to be bad, it must be bad for someone, yet as we cease to exist when we die, it cannot be bad for us.Kamm discusses this view and the objections made to it by Nagel, Williams, and others, and considers the question of whether there is an asymmetry between dying and never having come into existence; and she goes on to consider the question of saving lives, and whether it is better to save more lives at a lower level of happiness or fewer lives at a higher level of happiness. The final section of the book deals with the question of organ transplantation and the distribution of resources which are unequally available.The book contains much theoretical and methodological argument, but is firmly grounded in practical ethical issues, and is illustrated throughout by examples.

In this book Larry Temkin examines the concepts of equality and inequality, and addresses one particular question in depth: how can we judge between different sorts of inequality? When is one inequality worse than another? Temkin shows that there are many different factors underlying and influencing our egalitarian judgements and that the notion of inequality is surprisingly complex. He looks at inequality as applied to individuals and to groups, and at the standard measures of inequality employed by economists and others, and considers whether inequality matters more in a poor society than a rich one. The arguments of non-egalitarians are also examined.Temkin's book presents a new way of thinking about equality and inequality which challenges the assumptions of philosophers, welfare economists, and others concerned with these notions on a practical as well as a theoretical level.

This magisterial work is the first comprehensive study of the ethics of killing, where the moral status of the individual is uncertain or controversial. Drawing on philosophical notions of personal identity and the immorality of killing, McMahan looks carefully at a host of practical issues, including abortion, infanticide, the killing of animals, assisted suicide, and euthanasia.

Continuing the examination of life and death that F.M. Kamm began in Morality, Mortality, Volume I, this second volume begins with a discussion of the questions of the moral (in)equivalence of killing and letting die, harming and not aiding, intending and foreseeing harm, and also focuses on the methodology used in analysing these questions. This discussion includes consideration of such problems as the effect of contextual interaction, agent regret, and conflicting measures of the relative stringency of acts. Part II offers an examination of the so-called Survival Lottery and Trolley Problem, and some other closely related dilemmatic situations, for the purpose of developing a principled account of when harming some to save others is permissable and impermissable. Part III is concerned with the further examination of the relation between restrictions on conduct and prerogatives not to make sacrifices, and the contrast between a victim-focused and agent-relative account of rights. Kamm attempts to find the relation between these topics and both the existence of entities with significant status and the existence of valuable states of affairs, forging a link between deontological and consequentialist theories.

Perfectionism is one of the great moralities of the Western tradition. It holds that certain states of humans, such as knowledge, achievement, and friendship, are good apart from any pleasure they may bring, and that the morally right act is always the one that most promotes these states. Defined more narrowly, perfectionism identifies the human good by reference to human nature: if knowledge and achievement are good, it is because they realize aspects of human nature. This book gives an account of perfectionism, first in the narrower sense, analysing its central concepts and defending a theory of human nature in which rationality plays a central role. It then uses this theory to construct an elaborate account of the intrinsic value of beliefs and actions that embody rationality, and applies this account to political questions about liberty and equality. The book attempts to formulate the most defensible version of perfectionism, using contemporary analytic techniques. It aims both to regain for perfectionism a central place in contemporary moral debate and to shed light on the writings of classical perfectionists such as Aristotle, Aquinas, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, and T.H. Green.

Larry Temkin examines the concepts of equality and inequality, and addresses one particular question in depth: when is one inequality worse than another? He shows that there are many different factors underlying and influencing our egalitarian judgments and that the notion of inequality is surprisingly complex. He looks at inequality as applied to individuals and to groups, and considers whether inequality matters more in a poor society than a rich one. The arguments of non-egalitarians are also examined. Temkin presents a new way of thinking about equality and inequality which challenges the assumptions of philosophers, welfare economists, and others concerned with these notions on a practical as well as a theoretical level.

This book is about the duty to relieve suffering. Jamie Mayerfield argues that this duty is far stronger than most of us acknowledge - an argument with far-reaching implications for how we should live. He begins by offering an account of the meaning of suffering. From there he moves on to a discussion of the measurement and moral significance of suffering. Mayerfield argues that the prima facie duty (which may be overridden by other duties) to relieve suffering arises directly from the badness of suffering. The alleviation of suffering, he claims, is morally more important than the promotion of happiness. He goes on to examine the proper resolution of trade-offs internal to the duty to relieve suffering: e.g., what should we do when we can eliminate the suffering of one group of people or another, but not both? Finally, Mayerfield addresses the question of how to identify those occasions when the relief of suffering is not morally required or is indeed wrong.

Why is death bad for us, even on the assumption that it involves the absence of experience? Whom should we save from death if we cannot save everyone? Kamm considers these questions, critically examining some answers other philosophers have given. She also examines specifically what differences between persons are relevant to the distribution of any scarce resources, e.g. bodily organs for transplantaion.

In Morality, Mortality, Volume II, Kamm continues to explore questions of life and death as illustrations of general issues in moral theory. Resuming her development of non- consequentialist ethical theory and its application to practical ethical problems, she explores the distinction between killing and letting die, between harming and not aiding, and between intending and foreseeing harm. Throughout this examination, she focues on the methodology used in analyzing these questions. Kamm develops a principled account of when harming some to save others is permissable and impermissable. In the process, she discusses the "Survival Lottery and Trolley Problem," and other related dilemmatic situations. Kamm then covers the concepts of rights and prerogatives, contrasting a victim-focused ccount of rights with that of an agent-relative account. Here, she considers the problem of minimizing rights violations, and the significance of the status of inviolability. She concludes Volume II by assessing whether agreements or superogatory conduct may permissably override restrictions, and what their doing or not doing indicates about morality, duties, and prerogatives.

In this original study, Jamie Mayerfeld undertakes a careful inquiry into the meaning and moral significance of suffering. Understanding suffering in hedonistic terms as an affliction of feeling, he addresses difficulties associated with its identification and measurement. He then turns to an examination of the duty to relieve suffering: its content, its weight relative to other moral considerations, and the role it should play in our lives. Among the claims defended in the book are that suffering needs to be distinguished from both physical pain and the frustration of desire, that interpersonal comparisons of the intensity of happiness and suffering are possible, that several psychological processes hinder our awareness of other people's suffering, and that the prevention of suffering should often be pursued indirectly. Mayerfeld concludes his discussion by arguing that the reduction of suffering is morally more important than the promotion of happiness, and that most of us greatly underestimate the force of the duty to prevent suffering. As the first systematic book-length inquiry into the moral significance of suffering, Suffering and Moral Responsibility makes an important contribution to moral philosophy and political theory, and will interest specialists in each of these areas.

This magisterial work is the first comprehensive study of the ethics of killing, where the moral status of the individual killed is uncertain. Drawing on philosophical notions of personal identity and the immorality of killing, McMahan looks carefully at a host of practical issues, including abortion, infanticide, the killing of animals, assisted suicide, and euthanasia.

Is there a limit to the legitimate demands of morality? In particular, is there a limit to people's responsibility to promote the well-being of others, either directly or via social institutions? Utilitarianism admits no such limit, and is for that reason often said to be an unacceptably demanding moral and political view. In this original new study, Murphy argues that the charge of excessive demands amounts to little more than an affirmation of the status quo. The real problem with utilitarianism is that it makes unfair demands on people who comply with it in our world of non-ideal compliance. Murphy shows that this unfairness does not arise on a collective understanding of our responsibility for others' well being. Thus, according to Murphy, while there is no general problem to be raised about the extent of moral demands, there is a pressing need to acknowledge the collective nature of the demands of beneficence.

F.M. Kamm is one of the leading ethical theorists working in philosophy today. She has become well known for her brand of exacting analysis, largely in defense of a non-consequentialist perspective - the view that some actions are right or wrong by virtue of something other than their consequences. In Intricate Ethics, Kamm questions the moral importance of some non-consequentialist distinctions and then introduces and argues for the moral importance of other distinctions. The first section provides a general introduction to non-consequentialist ethical theory followed by more detailed discussion of distinctions relevant to instrumental rationality and to the famous "Trolley Problem"; the second deals with the notions of moral status and rights; the third takes up the notions of responsibility and complicity, and discusses new issues in non-consequentialist theory including the "problem of distance." Finally, adding to the first section's discussions of the views of Warren Quinn and Peter Unger, the fourth section analyzes the views of others in the non-consequentialist and consequentialist camps such as Peter Singer, Daniel Kahnemann, Bernard Gert, and Thomas Scanlon.

F.M. Kamm is one of the leading ethical theorists working in philosophy today. She has become well known for her brand of exacting analysis, largely in defense of a non-consequentialist perspective - the view that some actions are right or wrong by virtue of something other than their consequences. In Intricate Ethics, Kamm questions the moral importance of some non-consequentialist distinctions and then introduces, and argues for the moral importance of, other distinctions. The first section provides a general introduction to non-consequentialist ethical theory followed by more detailed discussion of distinctions relevant to instrumental rationality and to the famous "Trolley Problem"; the second deals with the notions of moral status and rights; the third takes up the notions of responsibility and complicity, and discusses new issues in non-consequentialist theory including the "problem of distance." Finally, adding to the first section's discussions of the views of Warren Quinn and Peter Unger, the fourth section analyzes the views of others in the non-consequentialist and consequentialist camps such as Peter Singer, Daniel Kahnemann, Bernard Gert, and Thomas Scanlon.

Most of us believe that there are limits to the sacrifices that morality can demand of us. We also think that certain types of acts are simply forbidden, even when necessary for promoting the overall good. Here Kagan argues that attempts to defend these sorts of moral limit are inadequate. In thus rejecting two of the most fundamental features of commonsense morality, the book offers a sustained attack on our ordinary moral views.

In choosing between moral alternatives -- choosing between various forms of ethical action -- we typically make calculations of the following kind: A is better than B; B is better than C; therefore A is better than C. These inferences use the principle of transitivity and are fundamental to many forms of practical and theoretical theorizing, not just in moral and ethical theory but in economics. Indeed they are so common as to be almost invisible. What Larry Temkin's book shows is that, shockingly, if we want to continue making plausible judgments, we cannot continue to make these assumptions. Temkin shows that we are committed to various moral ideals that are, surprisingly, fundamentally incompatible with the idea that "better than" can be transitive. His book develops many examples where value judgments that we accept and find attractive, are incompatible with transitivity. While this might seem to leave two options -- reject transitivity, or reject some of our normative commitments in order to keep it -- Temkin is neutral on which path to follow, only making the case that a choice is necessary, and that the cost either way will be high. Temkin's book is a very original and deeply unsettling work of skeptical philosophy that mounts an important new challenge to contemporary ethics.

In a world of limited resources, competition between the young and old prompt difficult questions of justice. In countries with public pension and health care systems, or with aging populations, there is often a concern that members of different generations are not always treated fairly. Dennis McKerlie's monograph examines justice between age-groups with the ultimate goal of a new theory of justice that effectively grapples with those questions. In the realm of public policy and medical ethics this is an important and timely topic, but surprisingly one that has received relatively little attention from moral philosophers. McKerlie develops a comprehensive view of fairness between age groups that applies the egalitarian values of equality, or priority for the badly off, to temporal parts of lives -- not just to complete lives.