Making and Breaking Governments

Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies

AvMichael Laver,Michael Laver

Inbunden, Engelska, 1996

Del i serien Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions

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Beskrivning

Making and Breaking Governments offers a theoretical argument about how parliamentary parties form governments, deriving from the political and social context of such government formation its generic sequential process. Based on their policy preferences, and their beliefs about what policies will be forthcoming from different conceivable governments, parties behave strategically in the game in which government portfolios are allocated. The authors construct a mathematical model of allocation of ministerial portfolios, formulated as a noncooperative game, and derive equilibria. They also derive a number of empirical hypotheses about outcomes of this game, which they then test with data drawn from most of the postwar European parliamentary democracies. The book concludes with a number of observations about departmentalistic tendencies and centripetal forces in parliamentary regimes.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:1996-01-26
Mått:155 x 235 x 23 mm
Vikt:539 g
Format:Inbunden
Språk:Engelska
Serie:Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions
Antal sidor:316
Förlag:Cambridge University Press
ISBN:9780521432450
Utmärkelser:American Political Science Association Prize

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"Laver and Shepsle have produced an expertly executed manuscript that will have a profound effect on the study of government coalitions for years to come....their focus on agenda powers is seminal, provocative, and profound." Kaare Strom, Legislative Studies Quarterly

Innehållsförteckning

Series editors' preface; Acknowledgements; Part I. The Context: 1. Theory, institutions, and government formation; 2. The social context of government formation; 3. The government formation process; Part II. The Model: 4. Government equilibrium; 5. Strong parties; Part III. Empirical Investigations: 6. Two cases: Germany, 1987; Ireland, 1992–3; 7. Theoretical implications, data, and operationalization; 8. Exploring the model: a comparative perspective; 9. A multivariate investigation of portfolio allocation; Part IV. Applications, Extensions, and Conclusions: 10. Party systems and cabinet stability; 11. Making the model more realistic; 12. Party politics and administrative reform; 13. Governments and parliaments; Bibliography.