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Scott de Marchi, Michael Laver - The Governance Cycle in Parliamentary Democracies, Häftad

Häftad, Engelska, 2023

The Governance Cycle in Parliamentary Democracies

A Computational Social Science Approach

Av Scott de Marchi, Michael Laver

Del i serien Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics

487 kr

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Beskrivning
Parliamentary democracy involves a never-ending cycle of elections, government formations, and the need for governments to survive in potentially hostile environments. These conditions require members of any government to make decisions on a large number of issues, some of which sharply divide them. Officials resolve these divisions by 'logrolling'- conceding on issues they care less about, in exchange for reciprocal concessions on issues to which they attach more importance. Though realistically modeling this 'governance cycle' is beyond the scope of traditional formal analysis, this book attacks the problem computationally in two ways. Firstly, it models the behavior of "functionally rational" senior politicians who use informal decision heuristics to navigate their complex high stakes setting. Secondly, by applying computational methods to traditional game theory, it uses artificial intelligence to model how hyper-rational politicians might find strategies that are close to optimal.
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Scott de Marchi is Professor of Political Science and Director of Decision Science at Duke University. He is a principal investigator for the for the National Science Foundation's Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models program and his research focuses on decision-making in contexts that include Congress, coalition and crisis bargaining, and interstate conflict. Michael Laver is Emeritus Professor of Politics at New York University. He has published 20 books, including Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe (1991), Making and Breaking Governments (1996), and Party Competition: An Agent-Based Model (2014).

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'When what works in theory fails in practice, it is time to think differently. Here, de Marchi and Laver develop a new theoretical approach for understanding the governance cycle in parliamentary democracies. By skillfully melding ideas from fields such as game theory, behavioral decision making, AI, and the computational modeling of complex systems, they produce key new insights into the behavior of political systems while also providing a masterful demonstration of the theoretical potential of 21st century social science.' John Miller, Carnegie Mellon

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