Mathematical models in the social sciences have become increasingly sophisticated and widespread in the last decade. This period has also seen many critiques, most lamenting the sacrifices incurred in pursuit of mathematical rigor. If, as critics argue, our ability to understand the world has not improved during the mathematization of the social sciences, we might want to adopt a different paradigm. This book examines the three main fields of mathematical modeling - game theory, statistics, and computational methods - and proposes a new framework for modeling. Unlike previous treatments which view each field separately, the treatment provides a framework that spans and incorporates the different methodological approaches. The goal is to arrive at a new vision of modeling that allows researchers to solve more complex problems in the social sciences. Additionally, a special emphasis is placed upon the role of computational modeling in the social sciences.
Mathematical models in the social sciences have become increasingly sophisticated and widespread in the last decade. This period has also seen many critiques, most lamenting the sacrifices incurred in pursuit of mathematical rigor. If, as critics argue, our ability to understand the world has not improved during the mathematization of the social sciences, we might want to adopt a different paradigm. This book examines the three main fields of mathematical modeling - game theory, statistics, and computational methods - and proposes a new framework for modeling. Unlike previous treatments which view each field separately, the treatment provides a framework that spans and incorporates the different methodological approaches. The goal is to arrive at a new vision of modeling that allows researchers to solve more complex problems in the social sciences. Additionally, a special emphasis is placed upon the role of computational modeling in the social sciences.
Parliamentary democracy involves a never-ending cycle of elections, government formations, and the need for governments to survive in potentially hostile environments. These conditions require members of any government to make decisions on a large number of issues, some of which sharply divide them. Officials resolve these divisions by ''logrolling''– conceding on issues they care less about, in exchange for reciprocal concessions on issues to which they attach more importance. Though realistically modeling this ''governance cycle'' is beyond the scope of traditional formal analysis, this book attacks the problem computationally in two ways. Firstly, it models the behavior of “functionally rational” senior politicians who use informal decision heuristics to navigate their complex high stakes setting. Secondly, by applying computational methods to traditional game theory, it uses artificial intelligence to model how hyper-rational politicians might find strategies that are close to optimal.
Parliamentary democracy involves a never-ending cycle of elections, government formations, and the need for governments to survive in potentially hostile environments. These conditions require members of any government to make decisions on a large number of issues, some of which sharply divide them. Officials resolve these divisions by ''logrolling''– conceding on issues they care less about, in exchange for reciprocal concessions on issues to which they attach more importance. Though realistically modeling this ''governance cycle'' is beyond the scope of traditional formal analysis, this book attacks the problem computationally in two ways. Firstly, it models the behavior of “functionally rational” senior politicians who use informal decision heuristics to navigate their complex high stakes setting. Secondly, by applying computational methods to traditional game theory, it uses artificial intelligence to model how hyper-rational politicians might find strategies that are close to optimal.
Parliamentary democracy involves a never-ending cycle of elections, government formations, and the need for governments to survive in potentially hostile environments. These conditions require members of any government to make decisions on a large number of issues, some of which sharply divide them. Officials resolve these divisions by 'logrolling'- conceding on issues they care less about, in exchange for reciprocal concessions on issues to which they attach more importance. Though realistically modeling this 'governance cycle' is beyond the scope of traditional formal analysis, this book attacks the problem computationally in two ways. Firstly, it models the behavior of "functionally rational" senior politicians who use informal decision heuristics to navigate their complex high stakes setting. Secondly, by applying computational methods to traditional game theory, it uses artificial intelligence to model how hyper-rational politicians might find strategies that are close to optimal.
Parliamentary democracy involves a never-ending cycle of elections, government formations, and the need for governments to survive in potentially hostile environments. These conditions require members of any government to make decisions on a large number of issues, some of which sharply divide them. Officials resolve these divisions by 'logrolling'- conceding on issues they care less about, in exchange for reciprocal concessions on issues to which they attach more importance. Though realistically modeling this 'governance cycle' is beyond the scope of traditional formal analysis, this book attacks the problem computationally in two ways. Firstly, it models the behavior of "functionally rational" senior politicians who use informal decision heuristics to navigate their complex high stakes setting. Secondly, by applying computational methods to traditional game theory, it uses artificial intelligence to model how hyper-rational politicians might find strategies that are close to optimal.
The hidden patterns behind the way we make decisions Several recent books, from Blink to Freakonomics to Predictably Irrational, have examined how people make choices. But none explain why different people have such different styles of decision making—and why those styles seem consistent across many contexts. For instance, why is a gambler always a gambler, whether at work, on the highway, or in a voting booth? Scott de Marchi and James T. Hamilton present a new theory about how we decide, based on an extensive survey of more than thirty thousand subjects. They show that each of us possesses six core traits that shape every decision, from what to have for lunch to where to invest. We go with “the usual” way of deciding whenever there’s a trade-off between current and future happiness, when facing the risk of a bad outcome, or when a choice might hurt other people. We’re also consistent about how much information we want and how much we care about the opinions of others. Readers can determine their own decision-making profile with a test in the book. Once they understand the six core traits, they’ll have a big advantage in their marketing campaigns, management strategies, investments, and many other contexts.