Agency Theory and Executive Pay

The Remuneration Committee's Dilemma

Inbunden, Engelska, 2018

593 kr

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Beskrivning

This new book examines the relationship between agency theory and executive pay. An insightful and revolutionary read for those researching corporate governance, HRM and organisation theory, this useful book offers potential solutions to some of the problems with executive pay and the standard model of agency.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:2018-11-29
Mått:148 x 210 x 15 mm
Vikt:312 g
Format:Inbunden
Språk:Engelska
Antal sidor:133
Förlag:Springer International Publishing AG
ISBN:9783319999685

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Mer om författaren

Alexander Pepper is Professor of Management Practice at the London School of Economics and Political Science, UK. He previously had a long career at PwC, where he was a global leader of PwC’s Human Resource Services consulting practice from 2002-2006. He has authored two books, Senior Executive Reward (2006), and The Economic Psychology of Incentives published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2015.

Innehållsförteckning

1. Agency Costs, Coordination Problems and the Remuneration Committee's Dilemma.- 2. What's Wrong with Agency Theory?.- 3. What a Public Corporation Really Is.- 4. Executive Pay as a Collective Action Problem.- 5. Behavioural Agency Theory.- 6. The Modern Corporation's Final Chapter.