Critical Studies in German Idealism – serie

This work - the first full-length account of its theme in English - identifies Kant’s doctrine of inner sense as a central, and problematic, element within the ‘architectonic of pure reason’ of the first Critique. Its exegesis exposes two, variant construals of the character and capacities of inner sense: the first, ‘positive’ construal functions in Kant’s account of the nature of knowledge in the Transcendental Analytic, while the second, ‘negative’ construal functions in Kant’s account of the limits of knowledge in the Transcendental Dialectic. Green shows how this variance underlies, and destabilizes, the basic intention of Kant’s theoretical philosophy, to give an account of both the nature, and the limits, of cognition. The work complements detailed analysis with an exhaustive review of English, French, and German scholarship on the doctrine. An Appendix on Kant’s recently discovered ‘Vom inneren Sinne’ fragment evinces Kant’s continued concern with this doctrine, and a Conclusion intimates the importance of Fichte’s and Schelling’s identification of the ‘aporia of inner sense’ to the subsequent development of transcendental idealism.

In Modern Individuality in Hegel’s Practical Philosophy, Erzsébet Rózsa aims to reconstruct Hegel’s theory of individuality in the light of his idea of modernity. Modern individuality is one of the central topics of Hegel’s practical philosophy, discussed systematically in the forms of subjectivity in subjective, objective, and practical spirit. Hegel interpreted modern existence and lifeworld in the context of law, politics, economy, and private life. “Infinite subjective freedom” is the historical principle of the “modern age”, as well as the basic determination of modern individual forms of existence and knowledge. Modern form of life and mentality based on the values and practical actions of self-knowledge and self-determination is an achievement of historical significance. This radical turn, however, gives a new perspective to the problem of good life: the normative role of substantial values is overshadowed by the stabilizing function of the “objective order” of institutions.

There has been an intensive debate in recent years, particularly in political philosophy, on how the concept of recognition ( Anerkennung) can bring insight into understanding social and political relationships and answering ethical questions. Proponents of this philosophy seek to apply German Idealism, especially Hegel, to the arguments of recognition in order to solve contemporary problems. However, does the present debate incorporate sufficiently the requirements of the idealist philosophy which it pretends to inherit and update? As a new paradigm for philosophy claiming to actualize German idealist philosophy, it provokes questions about the foundation of the principle of recognition itself as well as about which philosophical method provides the best means for addressing recognition. In Recognition -- German Idealism as an Ongoing Challenge, renowned authors address this fascinating and far-reaching questions in discussion with Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel.Contributors include: Robert Brandom, Paul Cobben, Simon Critchley, Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer, Kenneth Westphal, Klaus Vieweg, Erzsébet Rósza, Christian Krijnen, Heikki Ikäheimo, Donald Loose, Kurt Walter Zeidler, Jean-Christophe Merle, Sasa Josifovic, Arthur Kok, Emiliano Acosta

In Autonome Praxis und intelligible Welt: Die transzendental-praktische Freiheit in Kants Lehre vom höchsten Gut Walid Faizzada reconstructs Kant’s theory of freedom in light of modern debates about determinism and free will. Faizzada argues that the Kantian position is neither a kind of compatibilism nor incompatibilism. The theory of freedom includes the specific concept of intellectual causality as the power to act by principles and for practical reasons. The most innovative feature constitutes the self-determination of rational agents regarding the idea of the noumenal world. Kant’s philosophical approach to freedom culminates in the concept of so-called transcendental-practical freedom which prepares the ground for morality.

Grounds of Pragmatic Realism argues that Hegel’s philosophy from the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit through his last Berlin lectures on philosophical psychology demonstates how Kant’s critique of rational judgment across his Critical corpus can be disentangled from Kant’s failed Transcendental Idealism and developed into a cogent, pragmatic realism, within which the social and historical aspects of rational inquiry and justification are shown to justify realism about the objects of empirical knowledge. Hegel’s demonstration reveals how deeply contemporary epistemology remains beholden to pre-Critical options, none of which are adequate to the natural sciences, nor to commonsense. Hegel recognised and justified (independently) Kant’s semantics of singular cognitive reference to particulars within space and time. Hegel’s analysis of mutual recognition develops Kant’s insights into the self-critical and inter-subjective aspects of rational judgment and justification, to show that none of us can be properly rational judges, nor can we properly justify our judgments rationally, without constructive self-criticism and without acknowledging and benefitting from constructive critical assessment by others.

Dieser akribische Kommentar zu den ersten fünf Kapiteln der Phänomenologie des Geistes wird Absatz für Absatz durchgeführt und analysiert den logischen Aufbau dieses Werkes. Es wird herausgearbeitet, wie diese logische Struktur in der (kleinen) Logik der Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften explizit gemacht wird. Dies eröffnet in besonderer Weise den Zugang zu zwei zentralen Werken Hegels. Zunächst wird deutlich, inwiefern die Phänomenologie des Geistes ein Schlüssel ist, um Zugang zur Logik der Enzyklopädie zu erhalten. Umgekehrt hilft diese Logik aber auch, die Struktur der Phänomenologie des Geistes besser zu verstehen.In a meticulous commentary on the first five chapters of the Phenomenology of Spirit, which is carried out paragraph by paragraph, the logical structure of this work is analyzed. The book elaborates how this logical structure is made explicit in the (shorter) logic of the Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften. This opens up access to two of Hegel's central works in a special way. First of all, it becomes clear in what way the Phenomenology of Spirit is a key to gaining access to the logic of the Enzyklopädie. But conversely, this logic also helps to gain a better understanding of the structure of the Phenomenology of Spirit.

Was ist Wirklichkeit? Diese Frage wird unter Bezug auf den dritten Abschnitt Die Wirklichkeit der Wesenslogik von G.W.F. Hegel thematisiert. Hegels Methode des reinen Denkens wird bis zu der absoluten Substanz nachgezeichnet, die sich als bestimmtes Sein (to ti en einai), Zugrundeliegendes (hypokeimenon) und für-sich-Stehendes (choriston) selbstoffenbart. Die metaphysischen Strukturen des Textes werden dabei fortlaufend mit aristotelischen Substanzstrukturen verglichen. Zugleich wird die Kongruenz zu aristotelischen Substanzprinzipien an zentralen Begriffen herausgestellt. Hegels reines Denken wird als Neubelebung einer von Aristoteles geprägten Theorie der reinen Wirksamkeit (energeia) ausgewiesen.What is reality? This question is explored with reference to the third section, Reality, of G.W.F. Hegel’s Science of Logic. Hegel's method of pure thought is traced through to the concept of absolute substance, which reveals itself as determinate being (to ti en einai), underlying substrate (hypokeimenon), and self-standing entity (choriston). The metaphysical structures of Hegel's text are continually compared with Aristotelian structures of substance, while key concepts highlight the alignment with Aristotelian principles of substance. Hegel's notion of pure thought is identified as a revival of Aristotle's theory of pure actuality (energeia).

Hegel's Encyclopedia (“Lesser”) Logic and its Additions represent his definitive work (1830) on fundamental ontology, whose goal is to deduce purposive nature, the subject of the subsequent book in Hegel’s system, the Philosophy of Nature. While commentators have snubbed the “Lesser” Logic in favor of its “Greater” sibling, the Encyclopedia Logic’s posthumous, student-note Additions invite us into Hegel’s notoriously challenging metaphysical thought, offering lively references to his world and times. Further, in the Additions, we hear the thinker himself and feel the strength of his belief that even the most speculative philosophy is meant to be taught, understood and enjoyed.

In this book, you will discover the deep connection between the concepts of assimilation and consumption in Hegel’s philosophy. Tracing their development across Hegel’s system—from the Logic and Philosophy of Nature to the Phenomenology of Spirit and Philosophy of Right—the book shows that consumption is a fully actualized form of assimilation. It argues that consumption is not merely a social practice, but is rooted in ontological and normative structures, revealing consumption as a way of culturally assimilating nature and shaping modern ethical life.

Anhand des Konzepts der zweiten Natur bietet dieses Buch eine hegelsche Version des dialektischen Naturalismus, indem es die Zweideutigkeit der zweiten Natur in einem wesentlichen Zusammenhang mit der Frage nach der Verwirklichung der Freiheit oder der Freiheit als Verwirklichung analysiert. Es wird gezeigt, dass Freiheit sich ausschließlich in Form der zweiten Natur verwirklichen lässt. Gerade diese Notwendigkeit der zweiten Natur bei der Verwirklichung der Freiheit macht diese jedoch zugleich prekär. Die Zweideutigkeit begründet das notwendige Umschlagen von Freiheit in Unfreiheit. Aus Hegels dialektischem Naturalismus wird die Idee der versittlichten Teleologie herausgearbeitet, die es erlaubt, jenes Umschlagen freiheitlich umzudeuten.This book presents a Hegelian version of dialectical naturalism through the concept of second nature, analysing its ambiguity in relation to the question of freedom’s realisation—or freedom as realisation. It demonstrates that freedom can only be realised through the form of second nature. Precisely this necessity of second nature for the realisation of freedom renders it precarious. The ambiguity underpins the inevitable transition from freedom to unfreedom. From Hegel’s dialectical naturalism, the concept of sittlich teleology is derived, which is capable of reinterpreting this transition in a liberating manner.