Elements in European Politics – serie

Western Europe is experiencing growing levels of political polarization between parties of the New Left and the Far Right. The authors argue that this antagonism reflects the emergence of a social cleavage between universalism and particularism. To understand cleavage formation in the midst of party system fragmentation and the proliferation of new competitors, they emphasize the crucial role of group identities. Anchored in social structure, group identities help us understand why specific party appeals resonate with certain groups, thereby mediating the link between socio-structural change and broader party blocks defined by their distinctive ideologies along the new cleavage. Based on original survey data from France, Germany, Switzerland, and the UK, this Element presents evidence for the formation of a universalism-particularism cleavage across European party systems that diverge strongly on institutional and political characteristics. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

In multilevel governance systems, member states work together to address cross-border problems, yet people still lack a clear understanding of how and why their policies differ or converge. Existing research offers many explanations but often treats them separately or overstates the EU's independent influence. This Element brings these perspectives together in a single framework of policy dynamics. It distinguishes policy areas shaped mainly by EU institutions or member states, or by their interaction. It introduces an actor-centered typology of policy dynamics - stable patterns of actors, incentives, and mechanisms that shape policy over time. The Element shows that these dynamics matter only when governments, interest groups, and NGOs have the incentives, capacity, and leverage to build coalitions and pursue goals. The policy dynamics framework helps learners identify likely causal mechanisms and supports clearer comparison, explanation, and teaching of EU policymaking. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

This Element documents long-term changes in the political attitudes of occupational groups, shifts in the salience of economic and cultural issues, and the movement of political parties in the electoral space from 1990 to 2018 in eight Western democracies. We evaluate prominent contentions about how electoral contestation has changed and why support for mainstream parties has declined while support for challenger parties has increased. We contribute a new analysis of how the viability of the types of electoral coalitions assembled by center-left, center-right, radical-right, and Green parties changes over these decades. We find that their viability is affected by changes over time in citizens' attitudes to economic and cultural issues and shifts in the relative salience of those issues. We examine the contribution these developments make to declining support for mainstream center-left and center-right coalitions and increasing support for coalitions underpinning radical-right and Green parties.

There is a broad consensus that the ideological space of Western democracies consists of two distinct dimensions: one economic and the other cultural. In this Element, the authors explore how ordinary citizens make sense of these two dimensions. Analyzing novel survey data collected across ten Western democracies, they employ text analysis techniques to investigate responses to open-ended questions. They examine variations in how people interpret these two ideological dimensions along three levels of analysis: across countries, based on demographic features, and along the left-right divide. Their results suggest that there are multiple two-dimensional spaces: that is, different groups ascribe different meanings to what the economic and cultural political divides stand for. They also find that the two dimensions are closely intertwined in people's minds. Their findings make theoretical contributions to the study of electoral politics and political ideology.

Western Europe is experiencing growing levels of political polarization between parties of the New Left and the Far Right. The authors argue that this antagonism reflects the emergence of a social cleavage between universalism and particularism. To understand cleavage formation in the midst of party system fragmentation and the proliferation of new competitors, they emphasize the crucial role of group identities. Anchored in social structure, group identities help us understand why specific party appeals resonate with certain groups, thereby mediating the link between socio-structural change and broader party blocks defined by their distinctive ideologies along the new cleavage. Based on original survey data from France, Germany, Switzerland, and the UK, this Element presents evidence for the formation of a universalism-particularism cleavage across European party systems that diverge strongly on institutional and political characteristics. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine came on the heels of a series of crises that tested the resilience of the EU as a compound polity and arguably reshaped European policymaking at all levels. This Element investigates the effects of the invasion on public support for European polity building across four key policy domains: refugee policy, energy policy, foreign policy, and defence. It shows how support varies across four polity types (centralized, decentralized, pooled, reinsurance) stemming from a distinction between policy and polity support. In terms of the drivers of support and its evolution over time, performance evaluations and ideational factors appear as strong predictors, while perceived threat and economic vulnerability appear to matter less. Results show strong support for further resource pooling at the EU level in all domains that can lead to novel and differentiated forms of polity-building. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine came on the heels of a series of crises that tested the resilience of the EU as a compound polity and arguably reshaped European policymaking at all levels. This Element investigates the effects of the invasion on public support for European polity building across four key policy domains: refugee policy, energy policy, foreign policy, and defence. It shows how support varies across four polity types (centralized, decentralized, pooled, reinsurance) stemming from a distinction between policy and polity support. In terms of the drivers of support and its evolution over time, performance evaluations and ideational factors appear as strong predictors, while perceived threat and economic vulnerability appear to matter less. Results show strong support for further resource pooling at the EU level in all domains that can lead to novel and differentiated forms of polity-building. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

This Element compares crisis-specific policymaking, its causes and consequences, at the two levels of the EU polity during the COVID-19 and the refugee crisis 2015-16. In both crises, EU policymaking responded to exogenous pressure and was dominated by executive decision-making. Still, it also differed in three critical aspects: it was much more salient, consensual, and effective during the COVID-19 than the refugee crisis. The present study accounts for both similarities and differences, which it attempts to explain by features of the nature of the crises. The key argument of the study is that the policymaking process during crises is, to a large extent, determined by the crisis situation - the crisis-specific functional problem pressure, the institutional context (of the EU polity), and the corresponding political pressure at the origin of a given crisis. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

This Element compares crisis-specific policymaking, its causes and consequences, at the two levels of the EU polity during the COVID-19 and the refugee crisis 2015-16. In both crises, EU policymaking responded to exogenous pressure and was dominated by executive decision-making. Still, it also differed in three critical aspects: it was much more salient, consensual, and effective during the COVID-19 than the refugee crisis. The present study accounts for both similarities and differences, which it attempts to explain by features of the nature of the crises. The key argument of the study is that the policymaking process during crises is, to a large extent, determined by the crisis situation - the crisis-specific functional problem pressure, the institutional context (of the EU polity), and the corresponding political pressure at the origin of a given crisis. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

There is a broad consensus that the ideological space of Western democracies consists of two distinct dimensions: one economic and the other cultural. In this Element, the authors explore how ordinary citizens make sense of these two dimensions. Analyzing novel survey data collected across ten Western democracies, they employ text analysis techniques to investigate responses to open-ended questions. They examine variations in how people interpret these two ideological dimensions along three levels of analysis: across countries, based on demographic features, and along the left-right divide. Their results suggest that there are multiple two-dimensional spaces: that is, different groups ascribe different meanings to what the economic and cultural political divides stand for. They also find that the two dimensions are closely intertwined in people's minds. Their findings make theoretical contributions to the study of electoral politics and political ideology.

This Element introduces the theory of segmented polity to address the misfit between dominant state-centric political theories and the hybrid realities of contemporary governance. Segmented polities are contested, partial, and constrained but nonetheless develop autonomous policymaking capacities and distinct social constituencies. The EU exemplifies this form, blending supranational and intergovernmental traits within a statist political order. Grounded in organization theory and institutionalism, the Element provides empirical analysis of the internal market and security segments showing how segmented polities operate across functional domains and generate bounded epistemic communities. While enabling policy efficiency, they also exhibit democratic deficits. The Element presents segmented polities as evolutionary responses to governance complexity and outlines implications for political science, international relations, European integration theory, and democracy studies, and proposes a research agenda focused on longitudinal, actor-based, and comparative studies of polity segmentation beyond the EU. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

This Element introduces the theory of segmented polity to address the misfit between dominant state-centric political theories and the hybrid realities of contemporary governance. Segmented polities are contested, partial, and constrained but nonetheless develop autonomous policymaking capacities and distinct social constituencies. The EU exemplifies this form, blending supranational and intergovernmental traits within a statist political order. Grounded in organization theory and institutionalism, the Element provides empirical analysis of the internal market and security segments showing how segmented polities operate across functional domains and generate bounded epistemic communities. While enabling policy efficiency, they also exhibit democratic deficits. The Element presents segmented polities as evolutionary responses to governance complexity and outlines implications for political science, international relations, European integration theory, and democracy studies, and proposes a research agenda focused on longitudinal, actor-based, and comparative studies of polity segmentation beyond the EU. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

In multilevel governance systems, member states work together to address cross-border problems, yet people still lack a clear understanding of how and why their policies differ or converge. Existing research offers many explanations but often treats them separately or overstates the EU's independent influence. This Element brings these perspectives together in a single framework of policy dynamics. It distinguishes policy areas shaped mainly by EU institutions or member states, or by their interaction. It introduces an actor-centered typology of policy dynamics - stable patterns of actors, incentives, and mechanisms that shape policy over time. The Element shows that these dynamics matter only when governments, interest groups, and NGOs have the incentives, capacity, and leverage to build coalitions and pursue goals. The policy dynamics framework helps learners identify likely causal mechanisms and supports clearer comparison, explanation, and teaching of EU policymaking. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

The rise of political extremism is often attributed to citizens' economic and cultural grievances. Less is known about how the state itself may facilitate extremism in contemporary democracies, despite frequent claims that elected leaders fail to contain it. How valid is this critique? Analyzing thousands of documents on the behavior of political parties, intelligence agencies, and the police in Germany across decades and states, the authors show that blind spots in combating extremism are widespread and deeply partisan. In parliamentary debates and election manifestos, right-wing parties devote less attention to right-wing extremist crimes than their prevalence warrants, while left-wing parties often downplay left-wing extremism. Similar divisions appear within ostensibly neutral intelligence agencies and the police. Across institutions, partisanship and ideology shape how state actors address extremist threats, raising concerns about the state's capacity to safeguard public safety and democracy. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

The rise of political extremism is often attributed to citizens' economic and cultural grievances. Less is known about how the state itself may facilitate extremism in contemporary democracies, despite frequent claims that elected leaders fail to contain it. How valid is this critique? Analyzing thousands of documents on the behavior of political parties, intelligence agencies, and the police in Germany across decades and states, the authors show that blind spots in combating extremism are widespread and deeply partisan. In parliamentary debates and election manifestos, right-wing parties devote less attention to right-wing extremist crimes than their prevalence warrants, while left-wing parties often downplay left-wing extremism. Similar divisions appear within ostensibly neutral intelligence agencies and the police. Across institutions, partisanship and ideology shape how state actors address extremist threats, raising concerns about the state's capacity to safeguard public safety and democracy. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

This Element argues that the 2008 financial crisis marked a turning point for populism in Europe by extending economic insecurity to the middle class. As insecurity spread, trust in institutions and markets declined, bringing a large new group of disillusioned voters into the political arena. The authors show that this expansion of middle-class anxiety accounts for a substantial share of the rise in populist voting. The political impact was strongest in countries with limited fiscal space, where governments lacked credible tools to cushion economic losses. As voters' demand for protection grew, both new and established parties adjusted their platforms, with populist and protectionist positions becoming more prominent. Using a novel empirical strategy based on differences in occupational exposure to financial constraints, the authors identify the causal effect of crisis-driven insecurity and explain why populism has persisted in European politics. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.