- Inbunden (Hardback)
- Antal sidor
- 1st ed. 2021
- Springer Nature Switzerland AG
- 11 Illustrations, black and white; XVII, 291 p. 11 illus.; 11 Illustrations, black and white; XVII,
- 234 x 156 x 19 mm
- Antal komponenter
- 1 Hardback
- 613 g
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Empiricism and Philosophy of Physics1269
This book presents a thoroughly empiricist account of physics. By providing an overview of the development of empiricism from Ockham to van Fraassen the book lays the foundation for its own version of empiricism. Empiricism for the author consists of three ideas: nominalism, i.e. dismissing second order quantification as unnecessary, epistemological naturalism, and viewing classification of things in natural kinds as a human habit not in need for any justification. The book offers views on the realism-antirealism debate as well as on the individuation of theories as a thoroughly neglected aspect of underdetermination. The book next discusses a broad range of topics, including the predicates body, spatial distance and time interval, the ontology of electromagnetism, propensities, the measurement problem and other philosophical issues in quantum theory. Discussions about the direction of time and about string theory make up the final part of the book.
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Fler böcker av Lars-Goeran Johansson
This textbook offers an introduction to the philosophy of science. It helps undergraduate students from the natural, the human and social sciences to gain an understanding of what science is, how it has developed, what its core traits are, how to ...
Presenting a realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics and, in particular, a realistic view of quantum waves, this book defends, with one exception, Schrodinger's views on quantum mechanics. Johansson goes on to defend the view that the collap...
After receiving a Ph.D in theoretical philosophy from Stockholm University 1993 I was lecturer in theoretical philosophy at Linkoeping University 1995-2001, after which I moved to Uppsala University, where I became full professor 2008. My research interests are epistemology, philosophy of science and in particular philosophy of physics. I have extensively taught philosophy of science also at Karolinska Institute, Stockholm, Royal University of Technology in Stockholm and Swedish University for Agricultural Sciences in Uppsala.
Preface Part I. Background1. Problems in Philosophy of Physics1.1 Introduction1.2 Philosophical Questions in Physics1.3 Summary and General Methodology 2. Some Important Episodes in the History of Physics2.1 Introduction2.2 Aristotle's Physics2.3 From Aristotle's Physics to Classical Mechanics: Galilei and Newton2.4 Relativity Theory2.5 Quantum Theory Part II. General Philosophy of Science3. Empiricism from Ockham to van Fraassen3.1 Introduction3.2 Medieval Nominalism - an Empiricist Position3.3 Classical Empiricism3.4 Empiricism During the 19th Century3.4.1 Mach3.4.2 Poincare3.5 The Vienna Circle3.6 Quine3.7 Van Fraassen's Constructive Empiricism3.7.1 Van Fraassen's Empiricist Stance3.8 Evidence3.8.1 Evidence and Reasons3.8.2 Empirical Evidence3.8.3 Is Inconsistency Counter-Evidence Against a Theory?3.9 Classification - Natural Kinds3.10 My Empiricist Stance 4. Mathematical Knowledge and Mathematical Objects4.1 Introduction4.2 Kant and Quine on Objects4.3 Truth Value Gaps in Mathematics4.4 Are Numbers Universals?4.5 From Natural Numbers to Reals4.5.1 Against Reduction of Mathematics to Set Theory4.5.2 Platonism Versus Constructivism and Reals4.6 Constructions of Numbers4.6.1 Constructions of integers and rationals4.6.2 Reals and Infinity4.6.3 Constructive Analysis4.7 Goedel's First Incompleteness Theorem and the Law of Excluded Middle4.8 Summary 5. Induction and Concept Formation5.1 Induction in the naturalistic perspective5.2 Justification in the Naturalistic Perspective5.3 Evidence and Justification5.4 Induction and concept formation5.5 Induction as a heuristic device5.6 Summary 6. Explanation, Unification and Reduction6.1 Introduction6.2 Friedman on Unification6.3 Nagel on Theory Reduction6.4 Explanation and Understanding6.5 Summary 7. Realism, Theory-Equivalence and Underdetermination of Theories7.1 The Physical Content of Theories7.2 Arguments About Scientific Realism7.2.1 Defusing Underdetermination7.2.2 Structural Realism7.3 Existence7.4 Are Physical Quantities Real?7.4.1 Universals7.4.2 Physical Quantities7.5 The Use of 'Model' in physics7.6 Theories of Principle vs Constructive Theories7.7 Summary Part III. Philosophy of Physics8 Causation in Physics8.1 Introduction8.2 Causes and Laws8.2.1 Causation and Relativity Theory8.3 Are Forces Causes?8.4 Cause is Agent-Related8.5 Summary 9. Space, Time and Body; Three Fundamental Concepts9.1 Observations9.2 How Does a Theory Connect to the World?9.3 The Interdependence Between the Predicates place, time and body9.3.1 Bodies and Particles9.4 Fundamental Quantities9.5 Summary 10. Laws10.1 Introduction10.2 The Extension of the Predicate "Law of Nature"10.3 The Logical Form of Laws10.4 Semantics and ontology10.5 Induction, Concept Formation and Discovery of Fundamental Laws10.5.1 Laws, Physical Theories and Observations: Top-Down or Bottom-Up?10.6 Laws and Fundamental Quantities in Classical Mechanics10.6.1 The Discovery of Momentum Conservation and the Introduction of mass and force10.6.2 Types of Laws in Classical Mechanics10.7 Laws in Special Theory of Relativity10.8 Laws of Electromagnetism10.9 Fundamental Laws that Do Not Introduce New Quantities10.10 Lawhood and Necessity10.11 Summary 11. Electromagnetism: Fields or Particles?11.1 Introduction: What is Real: Fields, Particles or Both?11.2 Ontological Commitment11.2.1 Alternating the Ontology of a Theory11.3 Semantics of Classical Electromagnetism11.4 Inconsistency of Classical Electromagnetism?11.5 Why Not a Double Ontology?11.6 What Do We Observe?11.7 Relativistic Quantum Electrodynamics11.8 Summary 12. Propensities12.1 Introduction12.2 Objectivity and Chanciness12.3 Indeterminism and Objective Chance12.4 Conditional Propensities12.5 Conditionals vs Conditional Probabilities12.6 The Scope of Genuine Randomness12.7 Summary 13. Direction of Time13.1 Introduction13.2 Time Reversal and Dynamics of Motion13.2.1 Time Reversal in Classical Mechanics13.2.2 CPT Symmetry13.2.3 Time Asymmetry in Weak Interactions13.2.4 Time