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• prefacechapter one: An overview1.1. The basic categories: Actors, behavior, institutions, and equilibrium1.2. The purpose of microeconomic theory1.3. Scope, detail, emphasis, and complexity1.4. A précis of the plotpart I: Individual and social choicechapter two: The theory of consumer choice and demandPrologue to part I2.1. Preferences and choices2.2. Marshallian demand without derivatives2.3. Marshallian demand with derivatives2.4. Aggregate demand2.5. Bibliographic notes2.6. Problemschapter three: Choice under uncertainty3.1. Von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility3.2. On utility for money3.3. Applications to market demand3.4. States of nature and subjective probability3.5. Problems with these models3.6. Normative applications of the theory3.7. Bibliographic notes3.8. Problemschapter four: Dynamic choice4.1. Optimal dynamic strategies4.2. Menus and meals4.3. Bibliographic notes and discussion4.4. Problemschapter five: Social choice and efficiency5.1. The problem5.2. Pareto efficiency and optimality: Definitions5.3. Benevolent social dictators and social welfare functionals5.4. Characterizing efficient social outcomes5.5. Social choice rules and Arrow’s possibility theorem5.6. Bibliographic notes5.7. Problemspart II: The price mechanismchapter six: Pure exchange and general equilibriumPrologue to part II6.1. Pure exchange and price equilibrium6.2. Why (not) believe in Walrasian equilibrium?6.3. The efficiency of a general equilibrium6.4. Existence and the number of equilibria6.5. Time, uncertainty, and general equilibrium6.6. Bibliographic notes6.7. Problemschapter seven: The neoclassical firm7.1. Models of the firm’s technological capabilities7.2. The profit function7.3. Conditional factor demands and cost functions7.4. From profit or cost functions to technology sets7.5. Cost functions and -runs7.6. Bibliographic notes7.7. Problemschapter eight: The competitive firm and perfect competition8.1. A perfectly competitive market8.2. Perfect competition and -runs8.3. What’s wrong with partial equilibrium analysis?8.4. General equilibrium with firms8.5. Bibliographic notes8.6. Problemschapter nine: Monopoly9.1. The standard theory9.2. Maintaining monopoly9.3. Multigood monopoly9.4. Nonlinear pricing9.5. Monopoly power?9.6. Bibliographic notes9.7. Problemschapter ten: Imperfect competition10.1. The classic models of duopoly10.2. Bibliographic notes and discussion10.3. Problemspart III: Noncooperative game theorychapter eleven: Modeling competitive situationsPrologue to part III11.1. Games in extensive form: An example11.2. Games in extensive form: Formalities11.3. Games in normal or stategic form11.4. Mixed strategies and Kuhn’s theorem11.5. Bibliographic notes11.6. Problemschapter twelve: Solution concepts for noncooperative games12.1. Opening remarks12.2. Dominance and iterated dominance for normal form games12.3. Backwards induction in games of complete and perfect information12.4. Nash equilibrium12.5. Equilibria in mixed strategies12.6. Why might there be an obvious way to play a given game?12.7. Refinements of Nash equilibrium12.7.1. Weak dominance12.7.2. Subgame perfection (and iterated weak dominance)12.7.3. Sequential equilibrium12.7.4. Restrictions on out-of-equilibrium beliefs12.7.5. Trembling-hand perfection12.7.6. Proper equilibria and stable sets of equilibria12.8. Reprise: Classic duopoly12.9. Bibliographic notes12.10. Problemschapter thirteen: Incomplete information and irrationality13.1. Games of incomplete information13.2. An application: Entry deterrence13.3. Modeling irrationality13.4. More on refinements: Complete theories13.5. Bibliographic notes13.6. Problemschapter fourteen: Repeated play: Cooperation and reputation14.1. The prisoners’ dilemma14.2. Repeating games can yield cooperation: The folk theorem14.3. Noisy observables14.4. Implicit collusion in oligopoly14.5. Reputation14.6. Reputation redux: Incomplete information14.7. Bibliographic notes14.8. Problemschapter fifteen: Bilateral bargaining15.1. Simultaneous offers and indeterminancy15.2. Focal equilibria15.3. Rubinstein’s model15.4. The experimental evidence about alternating offers15.5. Models with incomplete information15.6. Bibliographic notes15.7. Problemspart IV: Topics in information economicschapter sixteen: Moral hazard and incentivesPrologue to part IV16.1. Introduction16.2. Effort incentives: A simple example16.3. Finitely many actions and outcomes16.4. Continuous actions: The first-order approach16.5. Bibliographic notes and variations16.6. Problemschapter seventeen: Adverse selection and market signaling17.1. Akerlof’s model of lemons17.2. Signaling quality17.3. Signaling and game theory17.4. Bibliographic notes and discussion17.5. Problemschapter eighteen: The revelation principle and mechanism design18.1. Optimal contracts designed for a single party18.2. Optimal contracts for interacting parties18.3. The pivot mechanism18.4. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem18.5. Bibliographic notes18.6. Problemspart V: Firms and transactionschapter nineteen: Theories of the firm19.1. The firm as a profit-maximizing entity19.2. The firm as a maximizing entity19.3. The firm as a behavioral entity19.4. Firms in the category of markets19.5. Bibliographic notes19.6. Problemschapter twenty: Transaction cost economics and the firm20.1. Transaction cost economics and firms20.2. Mathematical models of transaction cost economics20.3. Bibliographic notespostscriptappendix one: Constrained optimizationA1.1. A recipe for solving problemsA1.2. The recipe at work: An exampleA1.3. IntuitionA1.4. Bibliographic notesA1.5. Problemsappendix two: Dynamic programmingA2.1. An example with a finite horizonA2.2. Finite horizon dynamic programmingA2.3. An example with an infinite horizonA2.4. Stationary Markov decision problemsA2.5. Bibliographic notes and discussionA2.6. Problemsindex