Four years after the end of the Cold War, the United States and its European allies have still not agreed on a new security system to deal with war in Yugoslavia, a restless eastern Europe, and an unstable Russia. The contributors to this timely volume evaluate reforms in the North Atlantic Alliance, the new European Union, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). They also explore a number of critical issues: Why is it that NATO cannot end the Yugoslav conflict? Why do the Americans and West Europeans quarrel over a European Security and Defense Identity? Why is it that the states of Central and Eastern Europe cannot simply join NATO? Is the CSCE becoming the pan-European security organization that will bear responsibility for preventing or managing future conflicts? The book offers careful analysis of the pivotal years of reform between 1989 and 1992. In the first section, the contributors assess those developments from the viewpoint of the key institutions—NATO, CSCE, the European Union, and its security arm, the Western European Union (WEU). They then examine the policies of the key allies—the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France. The book concludes that the current problems in European security affairs are directly explained by the discord, divergences, and contradictions that have characterized the crucial formative years of these newly significant organizations. In the closing chapter, the editors suggest pragmatic political initiatives for strengthening these groups in the near future.
