Matthew Jones is Professor of International History at the London School of Economics and Political Science, UK, and author of, amongst other books, After Hiroshima: The United States, Race, and Nuclear Weapons in Asia, 1945–1965 (2010).

'The author had access to Government records and was able to interview some of the participants to cover the high-level politics. I was surprised to find it difficult to break off reading because it was compiled from extracts from files, letters and reports of meetings. Professor Jones has done a splendid job putting it all together as a readable story.'--Reg Milne, Afterburner

• Preface1. The making of a deterrent force, August 1945-November 19572. The rise of ballistic missile defence3. In the shadow of Sputnik: The nuclear sufficiency debate and the restoration of Anglo-American nuclear collaboration, March 1957-February 19594. Breaking the impasse? Polaris and deterrent policy, February 1959-March 19605. The future nuclear programme and the cancellation of Blue Streak, December 1959-April 19606. Skybolt, Polaris and the control of Western nuclear forces, March 1960-May 19617. An arms race intensifies: ABM defence, nuclear testing, and the criteria of deterrence, January 1961-January 19628. Revising the criteria, January-May 19629. The prelude to Nassau, June-December 196210. Securing Polaris: The Nassau negotiations, December 1962 – January 196311. The path to the Polaris Sales Agreement, January – April 196312. The origins of a Polaris improvement programme: HR 169 and the emergence of the Moscow ABM system13. The MLF, the size of the Polaris force, and the approach of the general election, May 1963 – October 1964

Matthew Jones is Professor of International History at the London School of Economics and Political Science, UK, and author of, amongst other books, After Hiroshima: The United States, Race, and Nuclear Weapons in Asia, 1945–1965 (2010).

'The author had access to Government records and was able to interview some of the participants to cover the high-level politics. I was surprised to find it difficult to break off reading because it was compiled from extracts from files, letters and reports of meetings. Professor Jones has done a splendid job putting it all together as a readable story.'--Reg Milne, Afterburner

• Preface1. The making of a deterrent force, August 1945-November 19572. The rise of ballistic missile defence3. In the shadow of Sputnik: The nuclear sufficiency debate and the restoration of Anglo-American nuclear collaboration, March 1957-February 19594. Breaking the impasse? Polaris and deterrent policy, February 1959-March 19605. The future nuclear programme and the cancellation of Blue Streak, December 1959-April 19606. Skybolt, Polaris and the control of Western nuclear forces, March 1960-May 19617. An arms race intensifies: ABM defence, nuclear testing, and the criteria of deterrence, January 1961-January 19628. Revising the criteria, January-May 19629. The prelude to Nassau, June-December 196210. Securing Polaris: The Nassau negotiations, December 1962 – January 196311. The path to the Polaris Sales Agreement, January – April 196312. The origins of a Polaris improvement programme: HR 169 and the emergence of the Moscow ABM system13. The MLF, the size of the Polaris force, and the approach of the general election, May 1963 – October 1964