This book examines the lessons of the U.S.-Soviet experiment with detente in the 1970s, with particular attention to the effort to develop a basis for cooperating in crisis prevention. It provides a reconceptualization of the problem of moderating U.S.-Soviet rivalry.
Also of Interest -- Preface -- Introduction -- Détente: The Search for a Constructive Relationship -- Crisis Prevention in Nineteenth-Century Diplomacy -- Soviet Policy in the Middle East, 1967-1972: Unalterable Antagonism or Collaborative Competition? -- The Basic Principles Agreement of 1972: Origins and Expectations -- The Kremlin and Détente: Soviet Conceptions, Hopes, and Expectations -- The Arab-Israeli War of October 1973: Origins and Impact -- The African Terrain and U.S.-Soviet Conflict in Angola and Rhodesia: Some Implications for Crisis Prevention -- Missed Opportunities for Crisis Prevention: The War of Attrition and Angola -- The Ogaden War: Some Implications for Crisis Prevention -- Negotiated Limitations on Arms Transfers: First Steps Toward Crisis Prevention? -- Crisis Prevention in Cuba -- Why Détente Failed: An Interpretation -- The Strategy of Preventive Diplomacy in Third World Conflicts -- Crisis Prevention Reexamined
