The Limits of Judicial Independence

AvTom S. Clark

Häftad, Engelska, 2010

Del i serien Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions

346 kr

Beställningsvara. Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar. Fri frakt över 249 kr.

Fler format och utgåvor

Inbunden

661 kr

Beskrivning

This book investigates the causes and consequences of congressional attacks on the US Supreme Court, arguing that the extent of public support for judicial independence constitutes the practical limit of judicial independence. First, the book presents a historical overview of Court-curbing proposals in Congress. Then, building on interviews with Supreme Court justices, members of Congress, and judicial and legislative staffers, the book theorizes that congressional attacks are driven by public discontent with the Court. From this theoretical model, predictions are derived about the decision to engage in Court-curbing and judicial responsiveness to Court-curbing activity in Congress. The Limits of Judicial Independence draws on illustrative archival evidence, systematic analysis of an original dataset of Court-curbing proposals introduced in Congress from 1877 onward and judicial decisions.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:2010-11-22
Mått:152 x 228 x 20 mm
Vikt:480 g
Format:Häftad
Språk:Engelska
Serie:Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions
Antal sidor:356
Förlag:Cambridge University Press
ISBN:9780521135054

Utforska kategorier

Konstitution: stat och regering inom Samhälle och politik
Ekonomisk politik inom Ekonomi och Ledarskap
Rättsordning inom Juridik

Mer om författaren

Tom S. Clark is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Emory University. His research interests include American judicial institutions and the interaction between courts and other political actors. His research has been published in numerous journals, including the American Journal of Political Science, the Journal of Politics, the Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, and the Journal of Theoretical Politics. His dissertation, on which this book is based, was awarded the 2009 Carl Albert Award for the Best Dissertation from the Legislative Studies Section of the American Political Science Association. Clark received his Ph.D. and MA from Princeton University and BA from Rutgers University.

Recensioner i media

'… the strength of [this] book lies in its recognition that judicial independence is ultimately as much about politicians as judges. Real world politics are at the heart of Clark's book, together with his recognition that many congressional practices, even those that lack any formal legal effect, hold profound significance for lawyers and judges. By drawing attention to what we might term 'the politics of judicial independence', this book is an important contribution to the regrettably still too thin literature on judicial independence.' Graham Gee, Public Law

Innehållsförteckning

1. Introduction; 2. A political history of Court-curbing; 3. Conditional self-restraint; 4. Court-curbing and the electoral connection; 5. Public support and judicial review; 6. Ideological implications of Court-curbing; 7. The limits of judicial independence.