Competitive Governments

An Economic Theory of Politics and Public Finance

AvAlbert Breton

Inbunden, Engelska, 1996

956 kr

Beställningsvara. Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar. Fri frakt över 249 kr.

Fler format och utgåvor

Häftad

523 kr

Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar

Beskrivning

Competitive Governments, explores in a systematic way the hypothesis that governments are internally competitive, that they are competitive in their relations with each other and in their relations with other institutions in society which, like them, supply consuming households with goods and services. Breton contends that competition not only serves to bring the political system to an equilibrium, but it also leads to a revelation of the households' true demand functions for publicly provided goods and services and to the molding of a link between the quantities and the qualities demanded and supplied and the tax prices paid for these goods and services. In the real world where information is costly, the links may not be first-best, but they will be efficient if competition is vigorous.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:1996-03-29
Mått:152 x 229 x 27 mm
Vikt:730 g
Format:Inbunden
Språk:Engelska
Antal sidor:404
Förlag:Cambridge University Press
ISBN:9780521481021

Utforska kategorier

Nationalekonomi inom Ekonomi och Ledarskap

Recensioner i media

"Breton traverses an impressive array of disciplines and scholars....an optimistic look at the possibility of efficient solutions within the context of current democratic political structures." Choice

Innehållsförteckning

Preface; Part I. Compound Governments: 1. The conceptual framework; 2. Demand and its revelation; 3. Checks and balances; 4. Budgetary processes; 5. Consent, suffrage, and support; 6. Hierarchy and bureaucracy; Part II. Governmental Systems: 7. A retrospective overview; 8. The organization of governmental systems; 9. Competition, stability, and central governments; 10. The world order; Part III. Socio-Political Structures: 11. The size of the nonmarket sector; 12. The growth of governments; Conclusion; Appendices: A. Long-term budget deficits; B. The power of 'small' groups; C. The independence of judiciaries; D. Information and pressure; R. An empirical Wicksellian connection?; F. Overlap and duplication; G. Structure and stability of federal states; References; Name index; Subject index.