Häftad, Engelska, 2014

The Political Economy of the United Nations Security Council

Money and Influence

Av James Raymond Vreeland, Axel Dreher

504 kr

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Beskrivning

Trades of money for political influence persist at every level of government. Not surprisingly, governments themselves trade money for political support on the international stage. Strange, however, is the tale of this book. For, in this study, legitimacy stands as the central political commodity at stake. The book investigates the ways governments trade money for favors at the United Nations Security Council - the body endowed with the international legal authority to legitimize the use of armed force to maintain or restore peace. With a wealth of quantitative data, the book shows that powerful countries, such as the United States, Japan, and Germany, extend financial favors to the elected members of the Security Council through direct foreign aid and through international organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. In return, developing countries serving on the Security Council must deliver their political support ... or face the consequences.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum: 2014-05-29
Mått: 152 x 229 x 18 mm
Vikt: 460 g
Format: Häftad
Språk: Engelska
Antal sidor: 312
Förlag: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521740067
Utmärkelser: Short-listed for William H. Riker Book Award, Political Economy Section, American Political Science Association 2015

Utforska kategorier

Internationella relationer

Mer om författaren

James Raymond Vreeland is Professor of International Relations at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service and holds a joint appointment in the Department of Government. Axel Dreher is Professor of International and Development Politics at Heidelberg University.

Recensioner i media

'Vreeland and Dreher provocatively but convincingly demonstrate that United Nations Security Council votes can and are bought through increased foreign aid. Great powers want the United Nations to approve and legitimate their actions; minor countries care more about development or regime stability than the intricacies of high-stakes diplomacy. In often subtle, implicit, and difficult-to-trace ways, UNSC votes are traded for aid, and vice versa, undermining the efficacy of aid in general. This is a fascinating 'whodunit' with at least some of the suspense of a good murder mystery. Vreeland and Dreher pull back the curtain on an unseemly but perhaps necessary side of international diplomacy.' David A. Lake, Jerri-Ann and Gary E. Jacobs Professor of Social Sciences and Distinguished Professor of Political Science, University of California, San Diego

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