James Raymond Vreeland is Professor of International Relations at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service and holds a joint appointment in the Department of Government. Axel Dreher is Professor of International and Development Politics at Heidelberg University.

'Vreeland and Dreher provocatively but convincingly demonstrate that United Nations Security Council votes can and are bought through increased foreign aid. Great powers want the United Nations to approve and legitimate their actions; minor countries care more about development or regime stability than the intricacies of high-stakes diplomacy. In often subtle, implicit, and difficult-to-trace ways, UNSC votes are traded for aid, and vice versa, undermining the efficacy of aid in general. This is a fascinating 'whodunit' with at least some of the suspense of a good murder mystery. Vreeland and Dreher pull back the curtain on an unseemly but perhaps necessary side of international diplomacy.' David A. Lake, Jerri-Ann and Gary E. Jacobs Professor of Social Sciences and Distinguished Professor of Political Science, University of California, San Diego

• 1. Money and politics on the international stage; 2. A theory of trading Security Council votes for aid; 3. Examples of punishments, threats, and rewards; 4. Who wins election to represent the world?; 5. Statistical evidence of trading finance for favors; 6. Consequences of politically motivated foreign aid; 7. Reforming the security council?

James Raymond Vreeland is Professor of International Relations at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service and holds a joint appointment in the Department of Government. Axel Dreher is Professor of International and Development Politics at Heidelberg University.

'Vreeland and Dreher provocatively but convincingly demonstrate that United Nations Security Council votes can and are bought through increased foreign aid. Great powers want the United Nations to approve and legitimate their actions; minor countries care more about development or regime stability than the intricacies of high-stakes diplomacy. In often subtle, implicit, and difficult-to-trace ways, UNSC votes are traded for aid, and vice versa, undermining the efficacy of aid in general. This is a fascinating 'whodunit' with at least some of the suspense of a good murder mystery. Vreeland and Dreher pull back the curtain on an unseemly but perhaps necessary side of international diplomacy.' David A. Lake, Jerri-Ann and Gary E. Jacobs Professor of Social Sciences and Distinguished Professor of Political Science, University of California, San Diego

• 1. Money and politics on the international stage; 2. A theory of trading Security Council votes for aid; 3. Examples of punishments, threats, and rewards; 4. Who wins election to represent the world?; 5. Statistical evidence of trading finance for favors; 6. Consequences of politically motivated foreign aid; 7. Reforming the security council?

James Raymond Vreeland is Professor of International Relations at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service and holds a joint appointment in the Department of Government. Axel Dreher is Professor of International and Development Politics at Heidelberg University.

'Vreeland and Dreher provocatively but convincingly demonstrate that United Nations Security Council votes can and are bought through increased foreign aid. Great powers want the United Nations to approve and legitimate their actions; minor countries care more about development or regime stability than the intricacies of high-stakes diplomacy. In often subtle, implicit, and difficult-to-trace ways, UNSC votes are traded for aid, and vice versa, undermining the efficacy of aid in general. This is a fascinating 'whodunit' with at least some of the suspense of a good murder mystery. Vreeland and Dreher pull back the curtain on an unseemly but perhaps necessary side of international diplomacy.' David A. Lake, Jerri-Ann and Gary E. Jacobs Professor of Social Sciences and Distinguished Professor of Political Science, University of California, San Diego

• 1. Money and politics on the international stage; 2. A theory of trading Security Council votes for aid; 3. Examples of punishments, threats, and rewards; 4. Who wins election to represent the world?; 5. Statistical evidence of trading finance for favors; 6. Consequences of politically motivated foreign aid; 7. Reforming the security council?