Corporate governance is an active area of research and public debate. The recent generalization of 'shareholder value' ideas and institutional investment, the establishment of codes of best practice for boards of directors, and the controversy about whether market oriented or bank-relations oriented systems are better for economic performance provide cogent examples. The outcome of the debate is important for industrialized nations, developing countries, and transition economies. The volume takes stock of research in the topic, criticizes the standard agency view, and presents ideas and analysis about the role of competition, the political economy of corporate governance, the effects of different systems on growth and performance, the governance system by venture capital in the Silicon Valley, and human capital and control in the new corporation.

Corporate governance is an active area of research and public debate. The recent generalization of 'shareholder value' ideas and institutional investment, the establishment of codes of best practice for boards of directors, and the controversy about whether market oriented or bank-relations oriented systems are better for economic performance provide cogent examples. The outcome of the debate is important for industrialized nations, developing countries, and transition economies. The volume takes stock of research in the topic, criticizes the standard agency view, and presents ideas and analysis about the role of competition, the political economy of corporate governance, the effects of different systems on growth and performance, the governance system by venture capital in the Silicon Valley, and human capital and control in the new corporation.

Corporate governance is an active area of research and public debate. The recent generalization of 'shareholder value' ideas and institutional investment, the establishment of codes of best practice for boards of directors, and the controversy about whether market oriented or bank-relations oriented systems are better for economic performance provide cogent examples. The outcome of the debate is important for industrialized nations, developing countries, and transition economies. The volume takes stock of research in the topic, criticizes the standard agency view, and presents ideas and analysis about the role of competition, the political economy of corporate governance, the effects of different systems on growth and performance, the governance system by venture capital in the Silicon Valley, and human capital and control in the new corporation.