Why Adjudicate?

Christina L. Davis is associate professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University. She is the author of Food Fights over Free Trade: How International Institutions Promote Agricultural Trade Liberalization (Princeton).

Winner of the 2014 Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Prize, Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation Winner of the 2013 International Law Best Book Award, International Law Section of the International Studies Association Co-Winner of the 2013 Chadwick F. Alger Prize, International Studies Association "Why Adjudicate is a must-read for any scholar interested in legalization of world politics, the role of international courts and the mechanisms of trade policy. I am sure this book will inspire these research programs and the field of International Political Economy for years to come."--Manfred Elsig, Review of International Organizations "Christina L. Davis provides an insightful and careful analysis of the domestic underpinnings of international trade law litigation. Why Adjudicate? fills a real gap in the literature by examining the factors that both shape and determine when states pursue legal challenges before the World Trade Organization's dispute-settlement mechanism... Focusing on the United States and Japan as her primary case studies, she has completed an exceptional and valuable study that will be read by both scholars and professionals for years to come."--Jacqueline Krikorian, Perspectives on Politics "The book provides a cogent and compelling domestic logic... Davis' book, a solid contribution by one of today's leading trade scholars, is also valuable for directing greater attention to how members navigate the multilateral trade regime, which is as important as the judicial activism of its arbitration panels. The book's findings have implications not only for the future of WTO dispute settlement reform--less is better--but for the benefits of legalization more broadly."--Soo Yeon Kim, World Trade Review

• List of Figures ix List of Tables x Acknowledgments xi List of Abbreviations xv Chapter 1:.Introduction 1 The Enforcement of International Trade Law 6 Overview 20 Chapter 2: Domestic Constraints and Active Enforcement 26 Trade Institutions and Liberalization 29 Political Origins of Demand for Trade Enforcement 39 Hypotheses for Trade Strategies 57 Conclusion 60 Chapter 3. The Democratic Propensity for Adjudication 62 Why Are Democracies Litigious? 66 Data 72 Democratic Challengers 80 Democratic Defendants 88 Alliances and Dyadic Dispute Patterns 92 Conclusion 100 Chapter 4:The Litigious State: U.S. Trade Policy 102 U.S. Role as Enforcer of Multilateral Trade Rules 104 Legislative Constraints in U.S. Trade Policy 111 The Kodak-Fuji Film Dispute 118 Foreign Trade Barrier Dataset 123 Statistical Analysis of U.S. Forum Choice 132 Boeing-Airbus Dispute 138 The China Problem 158 Conclusion 182 Chapter 5: The Reluctant Litigant: Japanese Trade Policy 185 Defending Market Access for Japanese Exports 187 Delegation in Japanese Trade Policy 195 Statistical Analysis of Japanese Forum Choice 210 Active Adjudication Targeting U.S. Steel Protection 225 Other Solutions for China 233 Conclusion 241 Chapter 6: Conflict Management: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Adjudication 244 Solving Hard Cases 246 Analysis of Progress to Remove Barrier 248 Analysis of Trade Dispute Duration 253 Conclusion 256 Chapter 7: Level Playing Field? Adjudication by Developing Countries 258 Peru Challenges European Food Labeling 262 Vietnam and the Catfish Dispute 267 Conclusion 279 Chapter 8: Conclusion 281 The Political Role of Adjudication 281 Conflict and Cooperation 293 Toward a Broader Theory of Legalization 297 Bibliography 301 Index 319