Alexander G. Nikolaev, PhD, is associate professor in the Department of Culture and Communication at Drexel University.

This book provides a broad lens for viewing the intricate dynamics of international negotiation. By knitting together theories of domestic politics with culture and communication, Alexander Nikolaev links the structural perspectives of IR with the process emphasis of communication studies. His rendition of the two-level game extends the idea to take account of information exchange processes. This is a valuable theoretical contribution. But the author goes further: He demonstrates its applicability through analyses of several complex historical and recent cases. A lesson learned from these analyses is that all the approaches are useful but the way they are combined in analysis differs from one case to another. Both theorists and practitioners will benefit from this book.

• Chapter 1 IntroductionPart 2 Part I: TheoryChapter 3 Chapter 1: The Development of Negotiation Theory and the Communication PerspectiveChapter 4 Chapter 2: Two-Level-Game TheoryChapter 5 Chapter 3: The Extension and Transformation of the Two-Level-Game TheoryPart 6 Part II: International Negotiations with Known OutcomesChapter 7 Chapter 4: Negotiations on the Admittance of Russia into the World Trade OrganizationChapter 8 Chapter 5: Start I: The First Nuclear War Won by the AmericansPart 9 Part III: Negotiations with Still Unknown OutcomesChapter 10 Chapter 6: The North Korean Nuclear ProblemChapter 11 Chapter 7: The Iranian Nuclear Problem Multilateral NegotiationsPart 12 Part IV: CultureChapter 13 Chapter 8: Culture and NegotiationsChapter 14 ConclusionChapter 15 Appendix: Numerical Data Analysis and Hypotheses Development

Alexander G. Nikolaev, PhD, is associate professor in the Department of Culture and Communication at Drexel University.

This book provides a broad lens for viewing the intricate dynamics of international negotiation. By knitting together theories of domestic politics with culture and communication, Alexander Nikolaev links the structural perspectives of IR with the process emphasis of communication studies. His rendition of the two-level game extends the idea to take account of information exchange processes. This is a valuable theoretical contribution. But the author goes further: He demonstrates its applicability through analyses of several complex historical and recent cases. A lesson learned from these analyses is that all the approaches are useful but the way they are combined in analysis differs from one case to another. Both theorists and practitioners will benefit from this book.

• Chapter 1 IntroductionPart 2 Part I: TheoryChapter 3 Chapter 1: The Development of Negotiation Theory and the Communication PerspectiveChapter 4 Chapter 2: Two-Level-Game TheoryChapter 5 Chapter 3: The Extension and Transformation of the Two-Level-Game TheoryPart 6 Part II: International Negotiations with Known OutcomesChapter 7 Chapter 4: Negotiations on the Admittance of Russia into the World Trade OrganizationChapter 8 Chapter 5: Start I: The First Nuclear War Won by the AmericansPart 9 Part III: Negotiations with Still Unknown OutcomesChapter 10 Chapter 6: The North Korean Nuclear ProblemChapter 11 Chapter 7: The Iranian Nuclear Problem Multilateral NegotiationsPart 12 Part IV: CultureChapter 13 Chapter 8: Culture and NegotiationsChapter 14 ConclusionChapter 15 Appendix: Numerical Data Analysis and Hypotheses Development

Alexander G. Nikolaev, PhD, is associate professor in the Department of Culture and Communication at Drexel University.

This book provides a broad lens for viewing the intricate dynamics of international negotiation. By knitting together theories of domestic politics with culture and communication, Alexander Nikolaev links the structural perspectives of IR with the process emphasis of communication studies. His rendition of the two-level game extends the idea to take account of information exchange processes. This is a valuable theoretical contribution. But the author goes further: He demonstrates its applicability through analyses of several complex historical and recent cases. A lesson learned from these analyses is that all the approaches are useful but the way they are combined in analysis differs from one case to another. Both theorists and practitioners will benefit from this book.

• Chapter 1 IntroductionPart 2 Part I: TheoryChapter 3 Chapter 1: The Development of Negotiation Theory and the Communication PerspectiveChapter 4 Chapter 2: Two-Level-Game TheoryChapter 5 Chapter 3: The Extension and Transformation of the Two-Level-Game TheoryPart 6 Part II: International Negotiations with Known OutcomesChapter 7 Chapter 4: Negotiations on the Admittance of Russia into the World Trade OrganizationChapter 8 Chapter 5: Start I: The First Nuclear War Won by the AmericansPart 9 Part III: Negotiations with Still Unknown OutcomesChapter 10 Chapter 6: The North Korean Nuclear ProblemChapter 11 Chapter 7: The Iranian Nuclear Problem Multilateral NegotiationsPart 12 Part IV: CultureChapter 13 Chapter 8: Culture and NegotiationsChapter 14 ConclusionChapter 15 Appendix: Numerical Data Analysis and Hypotheses Development