On Constructivist Epistemology

Inbunden, Engelska, 2005

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Beskrivning

In his book On Foundationalism, Tom Rockmore reviewed the efforts to develop a cogent form of foundational realism and concluded that the doctrine is no longer viable and should be abandoned. In On Constructivist Epistemology, Rockmore expounds upon the idea of "constructivism" as introduced at the end of On Foundationalism. On Constructivist Epistemology belongs to an ongoing effort to call attention to the resources of a modern epistemological approach, which is focused in Kant and which is followed up virtually throughout the later debate. Rockmore traces the idea of constructivism and then proposes the outlines of an original constructivist approach to knowledge, building on the work of such thinkers as Hobbes, Vico, and Kant

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:2005-02-01
Mått:162 x 241 x 18 mm
Vikt:422 g
Format:Inbunden
Språk:Engelska
Antal sidor:164
Förlag:Bloomsbury Publishing Plc
ISBN:9780742543201

Utforska kategorier

Filosofi inom Filosofi och religion

Mer om författaren

Tom Rockmore is professor of philosophy at Duquesne University in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

Recensioner i media

This book provides a spirited defense and elaboration of Epistemological Constructivism, or EC.

Innehållsförteckning

Part 1 On Realism and ConstructivismChapter 2 Realism, Anti-Realism, and KnowledgeChapter 3 Realism and Other Approaches to KnowledgeChapter 4 On Direct Realism and Justifying Claims to KnowChapter 5 On Indirect, or Representational, Realism and KnowledgeChapter 6 Kant, Representationalism, and ConstructivismPart 7 On Forms of ConstructivismChapter 8 What is Constructivism?Chapter 9 On Hobbes, Vico, and Classical Modern ConstructivismChapter 10 Kantian ConstructivismChapter 11 German Idealism and Historical ConstructivismChapter 12 Recent Forms of ConstructivismPart 13 Thick SubjectivityChapter 14 Toward a New BeginningChapter 15 Cognitive Subjectivity: "Thick," "Thin," or "Null"?Chapter 16 The "Null" Subject: Heidegger, Foucault, and PostmodernismChapter 17 Foundationalism and Thin SubjectivityChapter 18 An Epistemological Subject?Chapter 19 Idealized SubjectivityChapter 20 Thin Subjectivity?Chapter 21 Is There a Unified Subject?Chapter 22 Thin Subjectivity All Alone?Chapter 23 Subjectivity and Knowledge: A Proteron Histeron?Chapter 24 Thick Subjectivity?Chapter 25 Thick Subjectivity Again: Descartes and VicoChapter 26 Thick Subjectivity and the "Existential" TurnChapter 27 Thick Subjectivity, the French Revolution, and German IdealismChapter 28 Cartesian Theory of Knowledge?Part 29 Thick Subjectivity and Knowledge as ContextualChapter 30 The Subject-Object DichotomyChapter 31 Psychologism vs. Anti-PsychologismChapter 32 Social Justification, Truth, and KnowledgeChapter 33 Realism and Knowledge as AppearanceChapter 34 Protagorean Relativism AgainChapter 35 Objective Cognition?Chapter 36 Realism vs. a Social Approach to Theories and FactsChapter 37 Constraints on Social JustificationChapter 38 The Social Subject: Singular or Plural?Part 39 Knowledge as HistoricalChapter 40 Science: Interpretation, Certainty, and HistoryChapter 41 Knowledge as HistoricalChapter 42 Is Science Historical?Chapter 43 Science as Historical and Objective CognitionChapter 44 Is Mathematics Historical?Chapter 45 Philosophy and the History of PhilosophyChapter 46 Philosophy as Historical?Part 47 Social Platonism? Social Reason, Social Relevance, and Social ResponsibilityChapter 48 Socrates, Plato and Social PlatonismChapter 49 Philosophical Doubts about Social PlatonismChapter 50 Kant as a Modern PlatonistChapter 51 Renewed Doubts about Social Platonism: Hegel, Marx, and PostmodernismChapter 52 Neo-Kantianism and Social RelevanceChapter 53 Philosophy as Relevant, Intellectuals as Responsible