...Twelve papers with comments study issues of institutional design in the context of environmental policy. Journal of Economic Literature

• Part A: The Law and Economics of Environmental Policy Making. Optimal procedure for policy making. The Aarhus Convention and the politics of process: The political economy of procedural environmental rights (S. Rose-Ackerman, A.A. Halpaap). Optimal information for policy making. Environmental regulatory decision-making under uncertainty (R.B. Stewart). Optimal use of economics in policy making. Can law and economics stand the purchase of moral satisfaction? (R.O. Zerbe). Individual preference based values and environmental decision making: Should valuation have its day in court? (A. Kontoleon et al.). Part B: The Law and Economics of Instrument Choice and Design. Optimal instrument choice. Toward a total-cost approach to environmental instrumental instrument choice (D.H. Cole, P.Z. Grossman). The choice of instruments for environmental policy: Liability or regulation? (M. Boyer, D. Porrini). Optimal instrument design. Environmental damage insurance in theory and practice (M. Faure). The design of marketable permit schemes to control local and regional pollutants (J.R. Nash, R.L. Revesz). Part C: The Law and Economics of Compliance and Enforcement. Optimal monitoring institutions. Monitoring for latent liabilities: When is it necessary and who should do it? (T. Swanson, R. Mason). Financial responsibility for environmental obligations: Are bonding and assurance rules fulfilling their promise? (J. Boyd). Optimal enforcement. Pollution and penalties (A. Ogus, C. Abbot). 8 things about enforcement that seem obvious but may not be (A. Heyes).

...Twelve papers with comments study issues of institutional design in the context of environmental policy. Journal of Economic Literature

• Part A: The Law and Economics of Environmental Policy Making. Optimal procedure for policy making. The Aarhus Convention and the politics of process: The political economy of procedural environmental rights (S. Rose-Ackerman, A.A. Halpaap). Optimal information for policy making. Environmental regulatory decision-making under uncertainty (R.B. Stewart). Optimal use of economics in policy making. Can law and economics stand the purchase of moral satisfaction? (R.O. Zerbe). Individual preference based values and environmental decision making: Should valuation have its day in court? (A. Kontoleon et al.). Part B: The Law and Economics of Instrument Choice and Design. Optimal instrument choice. Toward a total-cost approach to environmental instrumental instrument choice (D.H. Cole, P.Z. Grossman). The choice of instruments for environmental policy: Liability or regulation? (M. Boyer, D. Porrini). Optimal instrument design. Environmental damage insurance in theory and practice (M. Faure). The design of marketable permit schemes to control local and regional pollutants (J.R. Nash, R.L. Revesz). Part C: The Law and Economics of Compliance and Enforcement. Optimal monitoring institutions. Monitoring for latent liabilities: When is it necessary and who should do it? (T. Swanson, R. Mason). Financial responsibility for environmental obligations: Are bonding and assurance rules fulfilling their promise? (J. Boyd). Optimal enforcement. Pollution and penalties (A. Ogus, C. Abbot). 8 things about enforcement that seem obvious but may not be (A. Heyes).

...Twelve papers with comments study issues of institutional design in the context of environmental policy. Journal of Economic Literature

• Part A: The Law and Economics of Environmental Policy Making. Optimal procedure for policy making. The Aarhus Convention and the politics of process: The political economy of procedural environmental rights (S. Rose-Ackerman, A.A. Halpaap). Optimal information for policy making. Environmental regulatory decision-making under uncertainty (R.B. Stewart). Optimal use of economics in policy making. Can law and economics stand the purchase of moral satisfaction? (R.O. Zerbe). Individual preference based values and environmental decision making: Should valuation have its day in court? (A. Kontoleon et al.). Part B: The Law and Economics of Instrument Choice and Design. Optimal instrument choice. Toward a total-cost approach to environmental instrumental instrument choice (D.H. Cole, P.Z. Grossman). The choice of instruments for environmental policy: Liability or regulation? (M. Boyer, D. Porrini). Optimal instrument design. Environmental damage insurance in theory and practice (M. Faure). The design of marketable permit schemes to control local and regional pollutants (J.R. Nash, R.L. Revesz). Part C: The Law and Economics of Compliance and Enforcement. Optimal monitoring institutions. Monitoring for latent liabilities: When is it necessary and who should do it? (T. Swanson, R. Mason). Financial responsibility for environmental obligations: Are bonding and assurance rules fulfilling their promise? (J. Boyd). Optimal enforcement. Pollution and penalties (A. Ogus, C. Abbot). 8 things about enforcement that seem obvious but may not be (A. Heyes).