After Divestiture

The Political Economy of State Telecommunications Regulation

AvPaul Teske

Häftad, Engelska, 1990

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Beskrivning

This book analyzes the politics of state regulatory decision-making in telecommunications after the AT&T divestiture in 1984. The author takes a political-economy approach that explains how interest groups and institutional factors have shaped different state policies. He shows that the structure and composition of state regulatory institutions have important effects on pricing and competition in the telecommunications industry. The innovative methodology of this work combines qualitative empirical analysis from the entire U.S. with case studies of eight states. It identifies the deregulation winners and losers by examining the impact of changes in local and long-distance price structures on different groups, including users of telecommunications services, small businesses, residential consumers, and rural residents. The book includes recommendations for improving state policy.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:1990-07-05
Mått:150 x 230 x 10 mm
Vikt:249 g
Format:Häftad
Språk:Engelska
Serie:SUNY series in Public Administration
Antal sidor:162
Förlag:State University of New York Press
ISBN:9780791403242

Utforska kategorier

Media och underhållning inom Ekonomi och Ledarskap

Mer om författaren

Paul E. Teske is Assistant Professor of Political Science and Public Management at the State University of New York at Stony Brook, and is an Affiliated Research Fellow with the Center for Telecommunications and Information Studies of Columbia University.

Recensioner i media

"Teske's work avoids the pitfalls of previous work and exhibits the methodological quality now found in good empirical political science. He shows excellent command of economics and political science as well as a nuanced careful understanding of empirical methods. He orchestrates his conclusions using a variety of multivariate and case-study techniques such that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. His most important finding is that regulatory orientation matters." — Peter VanDoren, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University

Innehållsförteckning

Preface Acknowledgments 1. Telecommunications Regulatory History HistoryDivestiturePolicy Issues After DivestitureConclusions2. Political Economic Theories of Deregulation Theories of Regulation and DeregulationTheoretical SummaryConclusions3. Telecommunications Economics and State Regulatory Options Telecommunications EconomicsState Regulatory OptionsActual Policy After 1982Conclusions4. Interest Group Formation General Benefits and CostsGroup Benefits and CostsGeographic Benefits and CostsInterest Group Incentives5. Quantitative Analysis of State Decisions MethodologyIndependent Variables and HypothesesResults for Pricing DecisionsResults for Competitive Entry DecisionsInterpretationsConclusions6. Comparative Case Study: New Jersey and New York Multivariate ComparisonActual Policy ChoicesRegulatory Agencies and the Policy ProcessExplanationsConclusions7. Case Studies of Innovative States: Illinois, Virginia, and Vermont IllinoisVirginiaVermontConclusions8. Bypassing the Regulators: U S West U S West's Regulatory StrategyNebraskaArizonaIdahoConclusions9. Conclusions Theoretical ImplicationsPolicy ImplicationsFutureNotes Selected Bibliography Index