David K. Henderson is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Memphis State University.

"This book promises to make an extremely important contribution in breaking a major logjam in the philosophy of social science and interpretation generally. It integrates a wealth of related philosophical literature and draws upon, and applies itself to, scientific material in an effective way." — Robert Feleppa, Wichita State University"This book is the first of which I know to attempt a comprehensive assessment of Davidson's philosophy for key issues in the philosophy of social science. In addition, and equally importantly, the author offers an in-depth assessment of arguments regarding the nature of explanation in social science and the relation of these explanations to those in the natural sciences. No other work, so far as I am aware, offers an analysis of recent work on explanation matching the breadth and depth of Henderson's. The issues which he discusses, both with regard to interpretation and explanation, are at the very center of both traditional and current debate." — Paul A. Roth, University of Missouri, St. Louis

• Acknowledgments1. Interpretation and Explanation: Claims and Concerns2. Standard Accounts of Interpretation and the Principle of Charity2.1: Standard Accounts of Interpretation2.1.1: The Holism of Interpretation2.1.2: A Fundamental Principle of Charity2.2: Common Refinements to the Principle of Charity2.2.1: Modifications Related to Stages of Interpretation2.2.2: Modifications Related to Types of Error3. A Better Codification of the Constraints on Interpretation3.1: The Primacy of the Principle of Explicability: The Central Argument3.2: Two Concrete Illustrations3.2.1: The Treatment of Observation Sentences3.2.2: The Treatment of Truth-Functions3.3: Elaboration3.3.1: Empirical Adequacy3.3.2: Rules of Thumb3.3.3: Solving the Problem of Irrationality4. On the Supposed A Priori Status of Minimal Rationality4.1: The View that Rationality is Constitutive of Intentional States4.1.1: A Priori Truths and "The Subject" as a Conceptual Matter4.1.2: Needed Perspective: An Extensional Notion of "The Subject"4.2: On an Argument from Measurement4.3: On the Argument from Charity in Interpretation4.4: Is Minimal Rationality Preponderant Rationality: What is Central to Present Theory?4.5: Summary and Significance4.6: Further Reflection on Minimal Rationality: Stich's Concerns4.6.1: Empirical Versus Conceptual Truths Revisited4.6.2: Acceptable and Unacceptable Similarity Bases for Interpretation5. On the Supposed Privileged Place of Rationalizing Explanation5.1: Preliminaries5.1.1: The Basic Issue and What Is Sought to Resolve It5.1.2: The Rudimentary Received Model of Rationalizing Explanation5.1.3: On Theory-Dependent Versus Transcendent Preferred Statuses5.2: Rationalizing Explanation in Light of a General Account of Intentional Explanation5.2.1: Dispositions, Functional Analysis, and Semantic Interpretability5.2.2: Rationalizing Explanation and Nomic Generalizations5.2.3: Rationalizing Explanation and Irrationalizing Explanation are Epistemologically on a Par6. Rationalizing Explanation and the Scientific Explanation of Events6.1: Restating Our Issue6.2: Why Explanations are Non-extensional and Why Normative Principles are Explanatorily Impotent6.3: Applications To International Explanations7. The Nomic Status of Psychological Generalizations: Handling Rosenberg's Refinability Problem7.1: Rosenberg's Challenge: Nomicity and Refinability7.2: An Illustrative Casev7.3: Bootstrap Testing: Using our Theoretical Resources8. In Defense of Heteronomic or Soft Laws8.1: The Issue: Can Psychological Generalizations Be Nomic?8.2: Davidson's Suggestion That Heteronomic Generalizations Do Not Cite Causal Factors and Thus Cannot Be Nomic8.3: The Prima Facie Case for There Being Nomic Heteronomic Generalizations Citing Causal Factors8.4: Psychological Factors Can Be Causally Relevant: The Basic Solution to the Explanatory Exclusion Problem8.5: Kim's Misstep into Reductionism9. SummaryNotesBibliographyName IndexSubject Index