Thomas H. Hammond is Professor of Political Science at Michigan State University. Reginald S. Sheehan is Professor of Political Science at Michigan State University. Chris W. Bonneau is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh.

"This book is a worthy step forward in the analysis of the justices' behavior and should stimulate focused empirical analysis and applications of modeling to other collegial courts."—Perspectives on Political Science "This book will almost certainly be a 'must read' in classes on judicial politics and in seminars on American political institutions."—Perspectives on Politics "The authors take a model that has been bandied about in the literature but which has not been seriously thought through and consistently employ it across the decision-making process of the Supreme Court to test the logic of 'strategic' and 'sincere' voting on the Court. I believe that this book will become the first choice of judicial scholars who want to develop an understanding of game theoretical models as they apply to the Supreme Court and for those who want to introduce their students to the models without the mathematical baggage that generally accompanies game theory."—Roy Flemming, Texas A & M University

• @fmct:Contents @toc4:List of Figures and Tables Preface Acknowledgments @toc1:Part I: Theories of Supreme Court Decision-Making @toc2:1Introduction @toc3:Plan of the Book @toc2:2Seven Distinctions in the Literature @toc3:Distinction #1: A Psychological Metaphor vs. A Rational-Choice Metaphor Distinction #2: Theories of Attitude Activation vs. Theories of Rational Choice Distinction #3: Theories of Choice vs. Theories of Measurement Distinction #4: Explaining Final Votes vs. Explaining What Final Opinion Is Adopted Distinction #5: Explaining Just the Final Vote vs. Explaining All Five Stages of Decision-Making Distinction #6: Theories of "Sincere" Rational Choice vs. Theories of "Strategic" Rational Choice Distinction #7: A "Status-Quo" Policy vs. No "Status-Quo" Policy Conclusion @toc2:3Assessing Previous Theories of Supreme Court Decision-Making @toc3:The Pioneers: Pritchett, Schubert, and Murphy Schubert's Attitude-Activation Model The Attitudinal Model Conceptual Problems with the Attitudinal Model Other Issues Involving the Attitudinal Model The Literature on Strategically-Rational Justices Conclusion @toc1:Part II: A Formal Model of Supreme Court Decision-Making @toc2:4Why Formal Models? @toc3:The Role of Theories and Models in Empirical Research Some Potential Benefits from Formal Modeling Potential Costs and Other Criticisms of Formal Modeling How Can We Be Sure That the Potential Benefits Exceed the Potential Costs? Conclusion @toc2:5Definitions and Assumptions @toc3:Lines, Points, and Utility Functions The Status Quo Policy Preferred-To Sets and Win-Sets The Number of Justices An Informational Assumption "Sincere" and "Strategic" Behavior The Independence of Cases Joining, Concurring, and Dissenting Costless Opinion Writing Conclusion @toc2:6Coalition Formation and the Final Vote @toc3:When Can the Status Quo Policy Be Upset? What Are the Constraints on the Set of Policies Which Could Be Adopted? What Policies Do Different Majority Coalitions Prefer to SQ? How Do Justices Behave When They Dislike the Majority Opinion? The Agenda-Control Version The Open-Bidding Version The Median-Holdout Version Comparison of the Agenda-Control, Open-Bidding, and Median-Holdout Versions Is Agenda-Control Behavior Unstable? Summary of Major Results @toc2:7Opinion Assignment @toc3:Self-Assignment As An Opinion-Assignment Strategy Alternative Opinion-Assignment Strategies Opinion Assignment by a Justice Outside WJmed(SQ) Opinion Assignment by a Justice Inside WJmed(SQ) Opinion Assignment by a Minority-Side Justice Would An Opinion Assigner Prefer Larger Coalitions? How Much Does Opinion Assignment Matter? Summary of Major Results @toc2:8The Conference Vote @toc3:Different Kinds of Strategic Behavior from Different Kinds of Justices Strategic Behavior by the Chief Justice Strategic Behavior by an Associate Justice Who Could Become the Opinion Assigner Strategic Behavior by a Low-Seniority Justice Who Cannot Become the Opinion Assigner What If Everyone Behaves Strategically? When Does the Chief Justice Self-Assign? Will the Chief Justice Trust What Other Justices Say on the Conference Vote? Summary of Major Results @toc2:9Certiorari @toc3:Sincere Behavior on Certiorari Decisions Strategic Behavior on Certiorari Decisions "Aggressive Granting" and "Defensive Denial" When Justices Are Strategic Summary of Major Results @toc1:Part III: Future Directions for Theories of Supreme Court Decision-Making @toc2:10Empirical Implications @toc3:Understanding the Five Stages of Supreme Court Decision-Making "Non-Strategic" or "Sincere" Behavior on the Supreme Court "Vote Switching" between the Original and Final Votes Problems of Empirical Measurement Conclusion @toc2:11Future Research @toc3:Do the Justices Have Perfect Information about Each Other's Preferences? Do the Justices Always Have Clear and Fixed Preferences? Are Supreme Court Cases Independent from Each Other? Regular and Special Concurrences How Many Issue Dimensions Are There? Costly Opinion-Writing Extensions of the Model Exogenous Preferences and the Impact of "The Law" Broader Applications Conclusion @toc4:Notes References Index

Thomas H. Hammond is Professor of Political Science at Michigan State University. Reginald S. Sheehan is Professor of Political Science at Michigan State University. Chris W. Bonneau is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh.

"This book is a worthy step forward in the analysis of the justices' behavior and should stimulate focused empirical analysis and applications of modeling to other collegial courts."—Perspectives on Political Science "This book will almost certainly be a 'must read' in classes on judicial politics and in seminars on American political institutions."—Perspectives on Politics "The authors take a model that has been bandied about in the literature but which has not been seriously thought through and consistently employ it across the decision-making process of the Supreme Court to test the logic of 'strategic' and 'sincere' voting on the Court. I believe that this book will become the first choice of judicial scholars who want to develop an understanding of game theoretical models as they apply to the Supreme Court and for those who want to introduce their students to the models without the mathematical baggage that generally accompanies game theory."—Roy Flemming, Texas A & M University

• @fmct:Contents @toc4:List of Figures and Tables Preface Acknowledgments @toc1:Part I: Theories of Supreme Court Decision-Making @toc2:1Introduction @toc3:Plan of the Book @toc2:2Seven Distinctions in the Literature @toc3:Distinction #1: A Psychological Metaphor vs. A Rational-Choice Metaphor Distinction #2: Theories of Attitude Activation vs. Theories of Rational Choice Distinction #3: Theories of Choice vs. Theories of Measurement Distinction #4: Explaining Final Votes vs. Explaining What Final Opinion Is Adopted Distinction #5: Explaining Just the Final Vote vs. Explaining All Five Stages of Decision-Making Distinction #6: Theories of "Sincere" Rational Choice vs. Theories of "Strategic" Rational Choice Distinction #7: A "Status-Quo" Policy vs. No "Status-Quo" Policy Conclusion @toc2:3Assessing Previous Theories of Supreme Court Decision-Making @toc3:The Pioneers: Pritchett, Schubert, and Murphy Schubert's Attitude-Activation Model The Attitudinal Model Conceptual Problems with the Attitudinal Model Other Issues Involving the Attitudinal Model The Literature on Strategically-Rational Justices Conclusion @toc1:Part II: A Formal Model of Supreme Court Decision-Making @toc2:4Why Formal Models? @toc3:The Role of Theories and Models in Empirical Research Some Potential Benefits from Formal Modeling Potential Costs and Other Criticisms of Formal Modeling How Can We Be Sure That the Potential Benefits Exceed the Potential Costs? Conclusion @toc2:5Definitions and Assumptions @toc3:Lines, Points, and Utility Functions The Status Quo Policy Preferred-To Sets and Win-Sets The Number of Justices An Informational Assumption "Sincere" and "Strategic" Behavior The Independence of Cases Joining, Concurring, and Dissenting Costless Opinion Writing Conclusion @toc2:6Coalition Formation and the Final Vote @toc3:When Can the Status Quo Policy Be Upset? What Are the Constraints on the Set of Policies Which Could Be Adopted? What Policies Do Different Majority Coalitions Prefer to SQ? How Do Justices Behave When They Dislike the Majority Opinion? The Agenda-Control Version The Open-Bidding Version The Median-Holdout Version Comparison of the Agenda-Control, Open-Bidding, and Median-Holdout Versions Is Agenda-Control Behavior Unstable? Summary of Major Results @toc2:7Opinion Assignment @toc3:Self-Assignment As An Opinion-Assignment Strategy Alternative Opinion-Assignment Strategies Opinion Assignment by a Justice Outside WJmed(SQ) Opinion Assignment by a Justice Inside WJmed(SQ) Opinion Assignment by a Minority-Side Justice Would An Opinion Assigner Prefer Larger Coalitions? How Much Does Opinion Assignment Matter? Summary of Major Results @toc2:8The Conference Vote @toc3:Different Kinds of Strategic Behavior from Different Kinds of Justices Strategic Behavior by the Chief Justice Strategic Behavior by an Associate Justice Who Could Become the Opinion Assigner Strategic Behavior by a Low-Seniority Justice Who Cannot Become the Opinion Assigner What If Everyone Behaves Strategically? When Does the Chief Justice Self-Assign? Will the Chief Justice Trust What Other Justices Say on the Conference Vote? Summary of Major Results @toc2:9Certiorari @toc3:Sincere Behavior on Certiorari Decisions Strategic Behavior on Certiorari Decisions "Aggressive Granting" and "Defensive Denial" When Justices Are Strategic Summary of Major Results @toc1:Part III: Future Directions for Theories of Supreme Court Decision-Making @toc2:10Empirical Implications @toc3:Understanding the Five Stages of Supreme Court Decision-Making "Non-Strategic" or "Sincere" Behavior on the Supreme Court "Vote Switching" between the Original and Final Votes Problems of Empirical Measurement Conclusion @toc2:11Future Research @toc3:Do the Justices Have Perfect Information about Each Other's Preferences? Do the Justices Always Have Clear and Fixed Preferences? Are Supreme Court Cases Independent from Each Other? Regular and Special Concurrences How Many Issue Dimensions Are There? Costly Opinion-Writing Extensions of the Model Exogenous Preferences and the Impact of "The Law" Broader Applications Conclusion @toc4:Notes References Index