Kant's Antinomies of Reason

Analyzes the origin, structure and resolution of Kant's antinomies of reason from a systematic rather than a historical perspective, exploring the relationship between the theoretical antinomies and the practical antinomy in order to indicate their similarities and differences and to suggest the dependence of the latter on the former. The author focuses attention on four points: 1) The author discusses the antinomies in Kant's three Critiques in terms of their logical and transcendental characteristics in the hope of locating criteria for Kantian antinomies, 2) The antinomies are found to arise from an ambiguity common to their highest objects, 3) The resolution of the theoretical antinomies is found to be essentially different from the resolution of the practical antinomy in spite of Kant's claim that the solution to the practical antinomy is the same as the solution to the third theoretical antinomy, and 4) It is shown that the practical antinomy depends on the theoretical antinomies and consequently that the functioning of practical reason is facilitated by theoretical reason. The author concludes that the third and fourth theoretical antinomies contribute to the resolution of the practical antinomy by reinforcing the idea of a supersensible realm. For advanced undergraduate and graduate courses in Kantian philosophy.