In response to the fear that conventional arms control is difficult to verify, the author outlines a plausible arms control agreement and examines the complement of conventional arms control monitoring tools it would require. He details how verification could be accomplished with feasible co-operative monitoring arrangements and existing monitoring tools, including information exchanges, tagging, unmanned sensors, changes in operations and the more familiar methods of national technical means.

In response to the fear that conventional arms control is difficult to verify, the author outlines a plausible arms control agreement and examines the complement of conventional arms control monitoring tools it would require. He details how verification could be accomplished with feasible co-operative monitoring arrangements and existing monitoring tools, including information exchanges, tagging, unmanned sensors, changes in operations and the more familiar methods of national technical means.

In response to the fear that conventional arms control is difficult to verify, the author outlines a plausible arms control agreement and examines the complement of conventional arms control monitoring tools it would require. He details how verification could be accomplished with feasible co-operative monitoring arrangements and existing monitoring tools, including information exchanges, tagging, unmanned sensors, changes in operations and the more familiar methods of national technical means.