Edited by Daniel Schwarcz, Professor, University of Minnesota Law School, US

‘Often considered quite diverse, law and economics impact on the insurance industry in almost equal measure, which means that this copiously footnoted two-volume work, with its extensive bibliographies, will offer perspectives on the economic implications of the law which will be useful to insurance lawyers, economists, academics and graduate students alike.’

• Contents:AcknowledgementsIntroduction Daniel Schwarcz PART I INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES IN THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE A. Adverse Selection 1. Amy Finkelstein and James Poterba (2002), ‘Selection Effects in the United Kingdom Individual Annuities Market’2. Peter Siegelman (2004), ‘Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat’B. Moral Hazard 3. Alma Cohen and Rajeev Dehejia (2004), ‘The Effect of Automobile Insurance and Accident Liability Laws on Traffic Fatalities’4. Tom Baker (1996), ‘On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard’PART II INTERPRETING, REGULATING AND ENFORCING INSURANCE POLICIES A. Interpreting and Construing Insurance Policies 5. Kenneth S. Abraham (1996), ‘A Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation’ 6. Michelle E. Boardman (2006), ‘Contra Proferentem: Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate’B. Regulating the Content of Insurance Policies 7. Russell Korobkin (1999), ‘The Efficiency of Managed Care “Patient Protection” Laws: Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure’8. Daniel Schwarcz (2007), ‘A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of Insurance Policies’C. Bad Faith Breach of Contract 9. Alan O. Sykes (1996), ‘”Bad Faith” Breach of Contract by First Party Insurers’PART III LIABILITY INSURANCE A. The Desirability of Liability Insurance 10. Steven Shavell (1982), ‘On Liability and Insurance’11. George L. Priest (1989), ‘Insurability and Punitive Damages’B. The Duty to Settle 12. Kent D. Syverud (1990), ‘The Duty to Settle’13. Alan O. Sykes (1994), ‘Judicial Limitations on the Discretion of Liability Insurers to Settle or Litigate: An Economic Critique’C. The Impact of Liability Insurance 14. Tom Baker and Sean J. Griffith (2007), ‘The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The Directors' & Officers' Liability Insurer’ 15. Kathryn Zeiler, Charles Silver, Bernard Black, David Hyman and William M. Sage (2007), ‘Physicians’ Insurance Limits and Malpractice Payments: Evidence From Texas Closed Claims, 1990–2003’Volume II: AcknowledgementsIntroduction An introduction by the editor appears in Volume I PART I REGULATING INSURANCE MARKETS A. The Structure of Insurance Regulation 1. Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller (1993), ‘The McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945: Reconceiving the Federal Role in Insurance Regulation’ 2. Martin F. Grace and Richard D. Phillips (2007), ‘The Allocation of Governmental Regulatory Authority: Federalism and the Case of Insurance Regulation’ B. Solvency Regulation 3. J. David Cummins, Scott E. Harrington and Robert Klein (1995), ‘Insolvency Experience, Risk-Based Capital, and Prompt Corrective Action in Property-Liability Insurance’4. Scott E. Harrington (2005), ‘Capital Adequacy in Insurance and Reinsurance’C. Regulation and Risk Classification 5. Kenneth S. Abraham (1985), ‘Efficiency and Fairness in Insurance Risk Classification’ 6. Michael Hoy and Michael Ruse (2005), ‘Regulating Genetic Information in Insurance Markets’D. Price Regulation in Insurance Markets 7. Henry Grabowski, W. Kip Viscusi and William N. Evans (1989), ‘Price and Availability Tradeoffs of Automobile Insurance Regulation’ 8. Mary A. Weiss, Sharon Tennyson and Laureen Regan (2010), ‘The Effects of Regulated Premium Subsidies on Insurance Costs: An Empirical Analysis of Automobile Insurance’9. Dwight M. Jaffee and Thomas Russell (2002), ‘Regulation of Automobile Insurance in California’E. Regulation and Insurance Policy Renewal 10. Mark V. Pauly, Howard Kunreuther and Richard Hirth (1995), ‘Guaranteed Renewability in Insurance’ 11. Ronen Avraham and K.A.D. Camara (2007), ‘The Tragedy of the Human Commons’F. Regulating Insurance Demand 12. Kyle D. Logue (2001), ‘The Current Life Insurance Crisis: How the Law Should Respond’13. Daniel Schwarcz (2010), ‘Regulating Consumer Demand in Insurance Markets’PART II PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE INSURANCE MARKETS A. Tort Law as Insurance 14. Richard A. Epstein (1985), ‘Products Liability as an Insurance Market’ 15. Jon D. Hanson and Kyle D. Logue (1990), ‘The First-Party Insurance Externality: An Economic Justification for Enterprise Liability’16. Kenneth S. Reinker and David Rosenberg (2007), ‘Unlimited Subrogation: Improving Medical Malpractice Liability by Allowing Insurers to Take Charge’B. Government Role in Catastrophe Insurance 17. Dwight M. Jaffee and Thomas Russell (1997), ‘Catastrophe Insurance, Capital Markets, and Uninsurable Risks’18. J. David Cummins (2006), ‘Should the Government Provide Insurance for Catastrophes?’ 19. Howard Kunruether and Mark Pauly (2006), ‘Rules Rather than Discretion: Lessons from Hurricane Katrina’

Edited by Daniel Schwarcz, Professor, University of Minnesota Law School, US

‘Often considered quite diverse, law and economics impact on the insurance industry in almost equal measure, which means that this copiously footnoted two-volume work, with its extensive bibliographies, will offer perspectives on the economic implications of the law which will be useful to insurance lawyers, economists, academics and graduate students alike.’

• Contents:AcknowledgementsIntroduction Daniel Schwarcz PART I INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES IN THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE A. Adverse Selection 1. Amy Finkelstein and James Poterba (2002), ‘Selection Effects in the United Kingdom Individual Annuities Market’2. Peter Siegelman (2004), ‘Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat’B. Moral Hazard 3. Alma Cohen and Rajeev Dehejia (2004), ‘The Effect of Automobile Insurance and Accident Liability Laws on Traffic Fatalities’4. Tom Baker (1996), ‘On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard’PART II INTERPRETING, REGULATING AND ENFORCING INSURANCE POLICIES A. Interpreting and Construing Insurance Policies 5. Kenneth S. Abraham (1996), ‘A Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation’ 6. Michelle E. Boardman (2006), ‘Contra Proferentem: Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate’B. Regulating the Content of Insurance Policies 7. Russell Korobkin (1999), ‘The Efficiency of Managed Care “Patient Protection” Laws: Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure’8. Daniel Schwarcz (2007), ‘A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of Insurance Policies’C. Bad Faith Breach of Contract 9. Alan O. Sykes (1996), ‘”Bad Faith” Breach of Contract by First Party Insurers’PART III LIABILITY INSURANCE A. The Desirability of Liability Insurance 10. Steven Shavell (1982), ‘On Liability and Insurance’11. George L. Priest (1989), ‘Insurability and Punitive Damages’B. The Duty to Settle 12. Kent D. Syverud (1990), ‘The Duty to Settle’13. Alan O. Sykes (1994), ‘Judicial Limitations on the Discretion of Liability Insurers to Settle or Litigate: An Economic Critique’C. The Impact of Liability Insurance 14. Tom Baker and Sean J. Griffith (2007), ‘The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The Directors' & Officers' Liability Insurer’ 15. Kathryn Zeiler, Charles Silver, Bernard Black, David Hyman and William M. Sage (2007), ‘Physicians’ Insurance Limits and Malpractice Payments: Evidence From Texas Closed Claims, 1990–2003’Volume II: AcknowledgementsIntroduction An introduction by the editor appears in Volume I PART I REGULATING INSURANCE MARKETS A. The Structure of Insurance Regulation 1. Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller (1993), ‘The McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945: Reconceiving the Federal Role in Insurance Regulation’ 2. Martin F. Grace and Richard D. Phillips (2007), ‘The Allocation of Governmental Regulatory Authority: Federalism and the Case of Insurance Regulation’ B. Solvency Regulation 3. J. David Cummins, Scott E. Harrington and Robert Klein (1995), ‘Insolvency Experience, Risk-Based Capital, and Prompt Corrective Action in Property-Liability Insurance’4. Scott E. Harrington (2005), ‘Capital Adequacy in Insurance and Reinsurance’C. Regulation and Risk Classification 5. Kenneth S. Abraham (1985), ‘Efficiency and Fairness in Insurance Risk Classification’ 6. Michael Hoy and Michael Ruse (2005), ‘Regulating Genetic Information in Insurance Markets’D. Price Regulation in Insurance Markets 7. Henry Grabowski, W. Kip Viscusi and William N. Evans (1989), ‘Price and Availability Tradeoffs of Automobile Insurance Regulation’ 8. Mary A. Weiss, Sharon Tennyson and Laureen Regan (2010), ‘The Effects of Regulated Premium Subsidies on Insurance Costs: An Empirical Analysis of Automobile Insurance’9. Dwight M. Jaffee and Thomas Russell (2002), ‘Regulation of Automobile Insurance in California’E. Regulation and Insurance Policy Renewal 10. Mark V. Pauly, Howard Kunreuther and Richard Hirth (1995), ‘Guaranteed Renewability in Insurance’ 11. Ronen Avraham and K.A.D. Camara (2007), ‘The Tragedy of the Human Commons’F. Regulating Insurance Demand 12. Kyle D. Logue (2001), ‘The Current Life Insurance Crisis: How the Law Should Respond’13. Daniel Schwarcz (2010), ‘Regulating Consumer Demand in Insurance Markets’PART II PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE INSURANCE MARKETS A. Tort Law as Insurance 14. Richard A. Epstein (1985), ‘Products Liability as an Insurance Market’ 15. Jon D. Hanson and Kyle D. Logue (1990), ‘The First-Party Insurance Externality: An Economic Justification for Enterprise Liability’16. Kenneth S. Reinker and David Rosenberg (2007), ‘Unlimited Subrogation: Improving Medical Malpractice Liability by Allowing Insurers to Take Charge’B. Government Role in Catastrophe Insurance 17. Dwight M. Jaffee and Thomas Russell (1997), ‘Catastrophe Insurance, Capital Markets, and Uninsurable Risks’18. J. David Cummins (2006), ‘Should the Government Provide Insurance for Catastrophes?’ 19. Howard Kunruether and Mark Pauly (2006), ‘Rules Rather than Discretion: Lessons from Hurricane Katrina’