Stefan E. Weishaar, Professor of Law and Economics, University of Groningen, the Netherlands

’This volume is long overdue. Integrated legal and economic analysis of competition law is crucial given the nature of the sector. However to carry this off successfully, one either needs intensive editorial work to bring different teams together; or one has to rely on the few who master both economic and legal analysis to a tee. Stefan Weishaar's analysis not only looks at a stubborn issue in competition law. He does so in three jurisdictions, in detailed yet clear fashion, with clear insight and ditto conclusions. Over and above its relevance to academic analysis, this book can go straight into competition authorities' decision making, and therefore also in compliance and remediation advice.’

• Contents: 1. Introduction Part I: Economic Theory 2. Economic Theory on Optimal Deterrence and Enforcement 3. Industrial Economics 4. Auction Theory and Collusion Part II: Legal Analysis 5. The Effectiveness of the Legal Regime Applicable to Bid Rigging in the European Union 6. Application of Auction Theory in Europe 7. The Effectiveness of the Legal Regime Applicable to Bid Rigging in China 8. Application of Auction Theory in China 9. The Effectiveness of the Legal Regime Applicable to Bid Rigging in Japan 10. The Japanese Construction Sector 11. Limits of Economic Theories and Concluding Remarks Appendix 1. Europe – An Overview of Public Procurement Law Appendix 2. China – An Overview of Public Procurement Law Appendix 3. History of Japanese Antitrust Legislation References Index

Stefan E. Weishaar, Professor of Law and Economics, University of Groningen, the Netherlands

’This volume is long overdue. Integrated legal and economic analysis of competition law is crucial given the nature of the sector. However to carry this off successfully, one either needs intensive editorial work to bring different teams together; or one has to rely on the few who master both economic and legal analysis to a tee. Stefan Weishaar's analysis not only looks at a stubborn issue in competition law. He does so in three jurisdictions, in detailed yet clear fashion, with clear insight and ditto conclusions. Over and above its relevance to academic analysis, this book can go straight into competition authorities' decision making, and therefore also in compliance and remediation advice.’

• Contents: 1. Introduction Part I: Economic Theory 2. Economic Theory on Optimal Deterrence and Enforcement 3. Industrial Economics 4. Auction Theory and Collusion Part II: Legal Analysis 5. The Effectiveness of the Legal Regime Applicable to Bid Rigging in the European Union 6. Application of Auction Theory in Europe 7. The Effectiveness of the Legal Regime Applicable to Bid Rigging in China 8. Application of Auction Theory in China 9. The Effectiveness of the Legal Regime Applicable to Bid Rigging in Japan 10. The Japanese Construction Sector 11. Limits of Economic Theories and Concluding Remarks Appendix 1. Europe – An Overview of Public Procurement Law Appendix 2. China – An Overview of Public Procurement Law Appendix 3. History of Japanese Antitrust Legislation References Index