Joseph Jupille is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Colorado, Boulder. Walter Mattli is Professor of International Political Economy in the Department of Politics and International Relations, Oxford University and a Fellow of St John's College, Oxford. Duncan Snidal is Professor of International Relations in the Department of Politics and International Relations, Oxford University and a Fellow of Nuffield College, Oxford.

'Jupille, Mattli, and Snidal have written a pathbreaking book on the politics of institutional choice relating to global commerce. Developing a novel approach grounded in bounded rationality, the authors demonstrate why the process of institutional change is often piece-meal, disjointed, and inefficient judged by standards of global efficiency.' James Caporaso, Director of the European Union Center for Excellence, University of Washington, Seattle

• Part I: 1. Introduction: institutional choice and global commerce; 2. International institutional choice: cooperation, alternatives, and strategies; 3. Building Theseus' ship: why the ITO failed, the GATT succeeded, and the WTO emerged; Part II: 4. Creating the first international court of commercial dispute resolution: the Mixed Courts of Egypt; 5. Commercial complexity and institutional choice in the GATT era; 6. Institutional choice in global accounting governance; Part III: 7. Conclusion: overview and institutional theories compared.

Joseph Jupille is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Colorado, Boulder. Walter Mattli is Professor of International Political Economy in the Department of Politics and International Relations, Oxford University and a Fellow of St John's College, Oxford. Duncan Snidal is Professor of International Relations in the Department of Politics and International Relations, Oxford University and a Fellow of Nuffield College, Oxford.

'Jupille, Mattli, and Snidal have written a pathbreaking book on the politics of institutional choice relating to global commerce. Developing a novel approach grounded in bounded rationality, the authors demonstrate why the process of institutional change is often piece-meal, disjointed, and inefficient judged by standards of global efficiency.' James Caporaso, Director of the European Union Center for Excellence, University of Washington, Seattle

• Part I: 1. Introduction: institutional choice and global commerce; 2. International institutional choice: cooperation, alternatives, and strategies; 3. Building Theseus' ship: why the ITO failed, the GATT succeeded, and the WTO emerged; Part II: 4. Creating the first international court of commercial dispute resolution: the Mixed Courts of Egypt; 5. Commercial complexity and institutional choice in the GATT era; 6. Institutional choice in global accounting governance; Part III: 7. Conclusion: overview and institutional theories compared.