State Strategies in International Bargaining

Play by the Rules or Change Them?

AvHeather Elko McKibben

Inbunden, Engelska, 2015

Del 134 i serien Cambridge Studies in International Relations

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Häftad

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Beskrivning

Bargaining between states in the international system is governed by rules which shape and constrain their bargaining behavior. However, these rules can be changed. When, why, and how do states bargain differently? Drawing on original qualitative and quantitative evidence, this book demonstrates how the rules of the game influence the cooperative or coercive nature of the strategies adopted by all states in a negotiation. These effects influence each state's incentives regarding whether to play by the rules or to change them. Examining these incentives, as well as the conditions under which states can act on them, McKibben explains the wide variation in states' bargaining strategies. Several bargaining interactions are analyzed, including decision-making in the European Union, multilateral trade negotiations, climate change negotiations, and negotiations over the future status of Kosovo. This book provides a rich understanding of the nuances of states' behavior in international bargaining processes.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:2015-01-26
Mått:155 x 231 x 28 mm
Vikt:590 g
Format:Inbunden
Språk:Engelska
Serie:Cambridge Studies in International Relations
Antal sidor:346
Förlag:Cambridge University Press
ISBN:9781107086098

Utforska kategorier

Internationella relationer inom Samhälle och politik

Mer om författaren

Heather Elko McKibben is an Assistant Professor at the University of California, Davis. She received her PhD in political science at the University of Pittsburgh. Prior to her current position, she held a postdoctoral research fellowship at the Niehaus Center for Globalization and Governance in the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, New Jersey.

Recensioner i media

'Uses extensive empirical research to cast fresh light on the understudied question of why states use different bargaining strategies at different times. Other scholars should read this interesting contribution.' John Odell, University of Southern California

Innehållsförteckning

1. Introduction: it's a question of strategies; Part I. Rule-Compliant/Rule-Changing Framework: 2. Typology of bargaining strategies; 3. How states play by the rules; 4. When and why states change the rules; Part II. Research Design and Empirical Tests: 5. Playing by the rules in European Union negotiations; 6. Playing by the rules in GATT/WTO negotiations; 7. Changing the rules in climate change negotiations; 8. Changing the rules in the Kosovo status process; 9. Bargaining strategies, and beyond.