Jim Rossi is the Harry M. Walborsky Professor and Associate Dean for Research at Florida State University College of Law. He holds an LLM from Yale Law School, along with a JD from the University of Iowa College of Law and a BA in economics from Arizona State University. He has also served as a faculty member at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill and has been a visiting faculty member at the University of Texas Law School. A recognized scholar in the fields of administrative and regulatory law, Professor Rossi's publications have appeared in Virginia Law Review, Michigan Law Review, Duke Law Journal, Texas Law Review, Northwestern University Law Review, Vanderbilt Law Review, and Energy Law Journal, among many other journals. He is co-author of the leading textbook on energy law, Energy, Economics, and the Environment (2000) and has served for over a decade as a consultant on economics and legal issues in infrastructure industries.

"The Strength of Regulatory Bargaining and Public Law resides in Professor Rossi's expert analysis of how existing public law doctrine must be assessed during this period of regulatory transition or deregulation. [It] will prove beneficial to scholars and practitioners of law, economics, and political science because it provides a valuable approach to understanding administrative law generally and economic regulation more generally." - Joseph Tomain, Dean Emeritus and Ziegler Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law

• 1. The scope of regulatory bargaining; Part I. Extending Incomplete Bargains from the Economics of the Firm to Public Governance: 2. Regulatory bargains and the stability of natural monopoly regulation; 3. The incompleteness of regulatory law: moving beyond the 'small world' of natural monopoly regulation; 4. Refin(anc)ing service obligations for a competitive environment; Part II. Incomplete Regulatory Bargains, Institutions, and the Role of Judicial Review in Deregulated Industries: 5. Deregulatory takings, incomplete regulatory bargains, and judicial review; 6. Incomplete regulatory tariffs and the role of courts; 7. Bargaining for state-assisted monopoly; 8. Overcoming bargaining failures in a federalist system; 9. Incomplete regulatory bargaining and the lessons for judicial review.

Jim Rossi is the Harry M. Walborsky Professor and Associate Dean for Research at Florida State University College of Law. He holds an LLM from Yale Law School, along with a JD from the University of Iowa College of Law and a BA in economics from Arizona State University. He has also served as a faculty member at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill and has been a visiting faculty member at the University of Texas Law School. A recognized scholar in the fields of administrative and regulatory law, Professor Rossi's publications have appeared in Virginia Law Review, Michigan Law Review, Duke Law Journal, Texas Law Review, Northwestern University Law Review, Vanderbilt Law Review, and Energy Law Journal, among many other journals. He is co-author of the leading textbook on energy law, Energy, Economics, and the Environment (2000) and has served for over a decade as a consultant on economics and legal issues in infrastructure industries.

"The Strength of Regulatory Bargaining and Public Law resides in Professor Rossi's expert analysis of how existing public law doctrine must be assessed during this period of regulatory transition or deregulation. [It] will prove beneficial to scholars and practitioners of law, economics, and political science because it provides a valuable approach to understanding administrative law generally and economic regulation more generally." - Joseph Tomain, Dean Emeritus and Ziegler Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law

• 1. The scope of regulatory bargaining; Part I. Extending Incomplete Bargains from the Economics of the Firm to Public Governance: 2. Regulatory bargains and the stability of natural monopoly regulation; 3. The incompleteness of regulatory law: moving beyond the 'small world' of natural monopoly regulation; 4. Refin(anc)ing service obligations for a competitive environment; Part II. Incomplete Regulatory Bargains, Institutions, and the Role of Judicial Review in Deregulated Industries: 5. Deregulatory takings, incomplete regulatory bargains, and judicial review; 6. Incomplete regulatory tariffs and the role of courts; 7. Bargaining for state-assisted monopoly; 8. Overcoming bargaining failures in a federalist system; 9. Incomplete regulatory bargaining and the lessons for judicial review.