Barbara Koremenos is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan. She has published in both political science and law journals, including the American Political Science Review, International Organization, the Journal of Conflict Resolution, the Journal of Legal Studies, and Law and Contemporary Problems. Koremenos received a National Science Foundation CAREER Award for her research - the first such winner to study international relations and law. She has been invited to give seminars at academic institutions in the United States, Canada, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Spain and Switzerland, and has spoken at the American Embassy in Copenhagen as well as forming part of a small-group panel at the State Department to discuss issues of nuclear proliferation.

'International lawyers (and students of international governance) take note: this book is one of the most significant contributions yet from the growing interaction of international relations and international law. Barbara Koremenos shows how states carefully design and apply the technical provisions of treaties - from duration to monitoring to precision - to address incentives, constraints and actor characteristics. An analytical tour de force, the book sheds new light on legalized cooperation.' Kenneth W. Abbott, Jack E. Brown Professor of Law, Arizona State University

• 1. (Re)discovering the continent; Part I. Coil's Building Blocks: Theory and Data: Introduction to Part I; 2. Theoretical framework; 3. The coil sample; Appendix to chapter 3 coding rules; Part II. Flexibility Provisions in the Design of International Law: Introduction to Part II; 4. Duration provisions; 5. Escape clauses and withdrawal clauses; 6. (Im)precision and reservations; Part III. Centralization, Scope, and Control Provisions in the Design of International Law: Introduction to Part III; 7. Dispute resolution provisions; 8. Punishment provisions; 9. Monitoring provisions; 10. Asymmetric design rules, voting, and power; 11. Conclusion; Appendix 1. List of agreements in coil sample; Appendix 2. Selection issues in international cooperation data sets.

Barbara Koremenos is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan. She has published in both political science and law journals, including the American Political Science Review, International Organization, the Journal of Conflict Resolution, the Journal of Legal Studies, and Law and Contemporary Problems. Koremenos received a National Science Foundation CAREER Award for her research - the first such winner to study international relations and law. She has been invited to give seminars at academic institutions in the United States, Canada, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Spain and Switzerland, and has spoken at the American Embassy in Copenhagen as well as forming part of a small-group panel at the State Department to discuss issues of nuclear proliferation.

'International lawyers (and students of international governance) take note: this book is one of the most significant contributions yet from the growing interaction of international relations and international law. Barbara Koremenos shows how states carefully design and apply the technical provisions of treaties - from duration to monitoring to precision - to address incentives, constraints and actor characteristics. An analytical tour de force, the book sheds new light on legalized cooperation.' Kenneth W. Abbott, Jack E. Brown Professor of Law, Arizona State University

• 1. (Re)discovering the continent; Part I. Coil's Building Blocks: Theory and Data: Introduction to Part I; 2. Theoretical framework; 3. The coil sample; Appendix to chapter 3 coding rules; Part II. Flexibility Provisions in the Design of International Law: Introduction to Part II; 4. Duration provisions; 5. Escape clauses and withdrawal clauses; 6. (Im)precision and reservations; Part III. Centralization, Scope, and Control Provisions in the Design of International Law: Introduction to Part III; 7. Dispute resolution provisions; 8. Punishment provisions; 9. Monitoring provisions; 10. Asymmetric design rules, voting, and power; 11. Conclusion; Appendix 1. List of agreements in coil sample; Appendix 2. Selection issues in international cooperation data sets.