Marc Alspector-Kelly is Professor of Philosophy at Western Michigan University. His work in epistemology, the philosophy of science, and the history of analytic philosophy has been published in numerous leading journals including Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Philosophy of Science, Synthese, and Philosophical Studies.

'Marc Alspector-Kelly provides the most comprehensive treatment available of the much-debated topic of epistemic closure, and his own arguments are a valuable antidote to the current consensus in favor of closure. Henceforth, epistemologists who discuss closure will have to reckon with Alspector-Kelly's original and sophisticated case against this principle.' Peter Murphy, University of Indianapolis

• 1. Motivation, strategy, and definition; 2. Counterexamples; 3. Denying premise 1: Skepticism; 4. Denying premise 2: Warrant transmission; 5. Transmission, skepticism, and conditions of warrant; 6. Front-loading; 7. Denying premise 3: warrant for P as warrant for Q; 8. Denying premise 4: warrant by background information; 9. Denying premise 5: warrant by entitlement; 10. Abominable conjunctions, contextualism, and the spreading problem; 11. Bootstrapping, epistemic circularity, and justification closure.

Marc Alspector-Kelly is Professor of Philosophy at Western Michigan University. His work in epistemology, the philosophy of science, and the history of analytic philosophy has been published in numerous leading journals including Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Philosophy of Science, Synthese, and Philosophical Studies.

'Marc Alspector-Kelly provides the most comprehensive treatment available of the much-debated topic of epistemic closure, and his own arguments are a valuable antidote to the current consensus in favor of closure. Henceforth, epistemologists who discuss closure will have to reckon with Alspector-Kelly's original and sophisticated case against this principle.' Peter Murphy, University of Indianapolis

• 1. Motivation, strategy, and definition; 2. Counterexamples; 3. Denying premise 1: Skepticism; 4. Denying premise 2: Warrant transmission; 5. Transmission, skepticism, and conditions of warrant; 6. Front-loading; 7. Denying premise 3: warrant for P as warrant for Q; 8. Denying premise 4: warrant by background information; 9. Denying premise 5: warrant by entitlement; 10. Abominable conjunctions, contextualism, and the spreading problem; 11. Bootstrapping, epistemic circularity, and justification closure.

Marc Alspector-Kelly is Professor of Philosophy at Western Michigan University. His work in epistemology, the philosophy of science, and the history of analytic philosophy has been published in numerous leading journals including Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Philosophy of Science, Synthese, and Philosophical Studies.

'Marc Alspector-Kelly provides the most comprehensive treatment available of the much-debated topic of epistemic closure, and his own arguments are a valuable antidote to the current consensus in favor of closure. Henceforth, epistemologists who discuss closure will have to reckon with Alspector-Kelly's original and sophisticated case against this principle.' Peter Murphy, University of Indianapolis

• 1. Motivation, strategy, and definition; 2. Counterexamples; 3. Denying premise 1: Skepticism; 4. Denying premise 2: Warrant transmission; 5. Transmission, skepticism, and conditions of warrant; 6. Front-loading; 7. Denying premise 3: warrant for P as warrant for Q; 8. Denying premise 4: warrant by background information; 9. Denying premise 5: warrant by entitlement; 10. Abominable conjunctions, contextualism, and the spreading problem; 11. Bootstrapping, epistemic circularity, and justification closure.